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Preface 
Kenan Malik
Kenan Malik is a London-based writer, lecturer and broadcaster. His 
books include The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of 
Ethics (2014), From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and its Legacy 
(2009) and Strange Fruit: Why Both Sides are Wrong in the Race 
Debate (2008).
Golden Dawn in Greece. The Front National in France. UKIP in Bri-
tain. Sweden Democrats. The True Finns. Throughout Europe groups 
once seen as fringe organizations are dominating headlines, and often 
setting the political agenda. The challenge that such groups pose to 
mainstream political parties, and the instability they have unleashed 
upon the mainstream political arena, has created a sense of panic about 
the rise of ‘populism’.
But what is populism? Why is it a problem? And how should it be com-
bated?
What are considered populist parties comprise, in fact, very different 
kinds of organizations, with distinct historical roots, ideological values 
and networks of social support. Some, such as Golden Dawn, are openly 
Nazi. Others, such as the Front National are far-right organizations 
that in recent years have tried to rebrand themselves to become more 
mainstream. Yet others - UKIP for instance - have reactionary views, 
play to far-right themes such as race and immigration, but have never 
been part of the far-right tradition.
What unites this disparate group is that all define themselves through 
a  hostility to the mainstream and to what has come to be regarded as 
the dominant liberal consensus. Most of the populist parties combine a 
visceral hatred of immigration with an acerbic loathing of the EU, a viru-
lent nationalism and deeply conservative views on social issues such as 
gay marriage and women’s rights.
The emergence of such groups reveals far more, however, than 
merely a widespread disdain for the mainstream. It expresses also the 
redrawing of Europe’s political map, and the creation of a new faultline 
on that map. The postwar political system, built around the divide bet-
ween social democratic and conservative parties, is being dismantled. 
Not only has this created new space for the populists, but it is also trans-
forming the very character of political space.  
The broad ideological divides that characterized politics for much 
of the past two hundred years have, over the past three decades, been 
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all but erased. The political sphere has narrowed; politics has become 
less about competing visions of the kinds of society people want than 
a debate about how best to manage the existing political system. Poli-
tics, in this post-ideological age, has been reduced to a question more of 
technocratic management rather than of social transformation.
One way in which people have felt this change is as a crisis of political 
representation, as a growing sense of being denied a voice, and of poli-
tical institutions as being remote and corrupt. The sense of being poli-
tically abandoned has been most acute within the traditional working 
class, whose feelings of isolation have increased as social democratic 
parties have cut their links with their old constituencies. As mainstream 
parties have discarded both their ideological attachments and their 
long-established constituencies, so the public has become increasingly 
disengaged from the political process. The gap between voters and the 
elite has widened, fostering disenchantment with the very idea of poli-
tics.
The new political faultline in Europe is not between left and right, 
between social democracy and conservatism, but between those who 
feel at home in - or at least are willing to accommodate themselves 
to - the post-ideological, post-political world, and those who feel left 
out, dispossessed and voiceless. These kinds of divisions have always 
existed, of course. In the past, however, that sense of dispossession 
and voicelessness could be expressed politically, particularly through 
the organizations of the left and of the labour movement.  No longer. 
It is the erosion of such mechanisms that is leading to the remaking of 
Europe’s political landscape. 
The result has been the creation of what many commentators in 
Britain are calling the ‘left behind’ working class. In France, there has 
been much talk of ‘peripheral France’, a phrase coined by the social geo-
grapher Christophe Guilluy to describe people ‘pushed out by the dein-
dustrialization and gentrification of the urban centers’, who ‘live away 
from the economic and decision-making centers in a state of social and 
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cultural non-integration’ and have come to ‘feel excluded’.
European societies have in recent years become both more socially 
atomized and riven by identity politics. Not just the weakening of labour 
organizations, but the decline of collectivist ideologies, the expansion of 
the market into almost every nook and cranny of social life, the fading of 
institutions, from trade unions to the Church, that traditionally helped 
socialize individuals – all have helped create a more fragmented society. 
At the same time, and partly as a result of such social atomization, 
people have begun to view themselves and their social affiliations in a 
different way. Social solidarity has become defined increasingly not in 
political terms - as collective action in pursuit of certain political ideals 
– but in terms of ethnicity or culture. The question people ask themsel-
ves is not so much ‘In what kind of society do I want to live?’ as ‘Who 
are we?’. The two questions are, of course, intimately related, and any 
sense of social identity must embed an answer to both. The relationship 
between the two is, however, complex and fluid.  
As the political sphere has narrowed, and as mechanisms for poli-
tical change eroded, so the two questions have come more and more 
to be regarded as synonymous.  The answer to the question ‘In what 
kind of society do I want to live?’ has become shaped less by the kinds 
of values or institutions we want to struggle to establish, than by the 
kind of people that we imagine we are; and the answer to ‘Who are we?’ 
defined less by the kind of society we want to create than by the history 
and heritage to which supposedly we belong. Or, to put it another way, 
as broader political, cultural and national identities have eroded, and as 
traditional social networks, institutions of authority and moral codes 
have weakened, so people’s sense of belonging has become more nar-
row and parochial, moulded less by the possibilities of a transformative 
future than by an often mythical past. The politics of ideology has, in 
other words, given way to the politics of identity. 
Both these developments have helped make the ‘left behind’ feel 
more left behind. Atomization has played into the hands of the deraci-
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nated middle class.  Identity politics have helped foster communities 
defined by faith, ethnicity or culture. For many working class commu-
nities these two processes have helped both corrode the social bonds 
that once gave them strength and identity and dislocate their place in 
society.
The ‘left behind’ have suffered largely because of economic and poli-
tical changes. But they have come to see their marginalization primarily 
as a cultural loss. In part, the same social and economic changes that 
have led to the marginalization of the ‘left behind’ have also made it far 
more difficult to view that marginalization in political terms. The very 
decline of the economic and political power of the working class and the 
weakening of labour organizations and social democratic parties, have 
helped obscure the economic and political roots of social problems. 
And as culture has become the medium through which social issues 
are refracted, so the ‘left behind’ have also come to see their problems 
in cultural terms.  They, too, have turned to the language of identity to 
express their discontent.
Once class identity comes to be seen as a cultural attribute, then 
those regarded as culturally different are often viewed as threats. Hence 
the growing hostility to immigration. Immigration has become the 
means through which many of the ‘left behind’ perceive their sense of 
loss of social status. It has become both a catch-all explanation for unac-
ceptable social change and a symbol of the failure of the liberal elite to 
understand the views of voters. The EU, meanwhile, has become sym-
bolic of the democratic deficit in many people’s lives, and of the distance 
(social, political and physical) between ordinary people and the politi-
cal class.
In an age in which progressive social movements have largely crumb-
led, and in which there is widespread disenchantment with the very idea 
of collective social transformation, people’s political anger often finds 
expression not through opposition to a particular policy or  government, 
or even to capitalism, but through a generalized hatred of everything 
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and everyone in power. That is why populist groups position themselves 
as ‘anti-political’ parties. They play upon on and fuse together many of 
the themes that have become so corrosive of contemporary politics: not 
simply the contempt for mainstream politics and politicians, and the 
sense of voicelessness and abandonment, but also the perception of a 
world out of control and as driven by malign forces, of victimhood as a 
defining feature of social identity, and a willingness to believe in conspi-
racy theories. The result has been the creation of an indiscriminate rage 
that is not just politically incoherent, but also potentially reactionary. 
Inchoately kicking out against the system can all too easily mutate into 
indiscriminately striking out against the ‘Other’. 
So, how do we challenge the populists? First, we need to stop being so 
obsessed by the parties themselves, and start dealing with the issues that 
lead many voters to support them. It is true that many of the policies, 
even of relatively mainstream parties such as UKIP, are repellent, and 
many of their leaders hold obnoxiously racist, sexist and homophobic 
views. It is true, too, that many of their supporters are hardcore racists. 
But this should not blind us to the fact that many others are drawn to 
such parties for very different reasons – because these seem to be the 
only organizations that speak to their grievances and express their frus-
trations with mainstream politics. Given this, simply exposing UKIP or 
Front National politicians as racists will change little, especially given 
that virtually all politicians are busy stoking fears about immigration. It 
is not that such exposés should not be done, but that they are futile if 
wielded as the principal tactic.
Engaging with the concerns of potential UKIP or FN voters, rather 
than simply dismissing them as racists, does not mean, however, caving 
into reactionary arguments or pandering to prejudices. It means, to the 
contrary, challenging them openly and robustly; challenging the idea, 
for instance, that immigration is responsible for the lack of jobs and 
housing, or that lower immigration would mean a lower crime rate, or 
that Muslims constitute a social problem for the West. 
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Yet, mainstream politicians have generally done the opposite. 
What has made their assault on parties such as UKIP and the FN par-
ticularly ineffective is that at the same time as attacking them as racist, 
mainstream politicians have themselves assiduously fostered fears 
about immigration and adopted populist anti-immigration policies. 
All this has merely confirmed the belief that the populists were right 
all along. It has engorged cynicism about conventional politicians. 
And since immigration has not been primarily responsible for the ‘left 
behind’ being left behind, it has done nothing to assuage the sense of 
marginalization and voicelessness that many feel. Indeed, by stoking 
new fears about immigration, it has merely deepened the sense of grie-
vance. To combat the populists, we need to challenge the rhetoric and 
policies not simply of UKIP or the FN but also of the Conservatives, 
the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, of the Parti Socialiste, the 
UMP and the Nouveau Centre. It is the anti-immigration rhetoric of the 
mainstream parties that make people receptive to the anti-immigration 
rhetoric of the populists.
Finally, we need to establish new social mechanisms through which 
to link liberal ideas about immigration and individual rights with pro-
gressive economic arguments and a belief in the community and the 
collective. Those who today rightly bemoan the corrosion of collective 
movements and community organizations often also see the problem as 
too much immigration. Those who take a liberal view on immigration, 
and on other social issues, are often happy with a more individualized, 
atomized society. Until all three elements of a progressive outlook – a 
defence of immigration, freedom of movement and of individual rights, 
a challenge to austerity policies and the embrace of collective action - 
can be stitched together, and stitched into a social movement, then 
there will be no proper challenge to the populists.
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Clara Sandelind (ed.)
University of Sheffield
Chapter 1
Clara Sandelind is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of 
Politics, University of Sheffield. Her PhD thesis is entitled Nationalism 
and Attitudes to Immigration and she has also written on issues of 
territorial rights and self-determination.
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»My plan: Patriotism, not thieving Moroccans«. That was the 
message of a Freedom Party (FPÖ) candidate in local elections 2012. 
In the Austrian 2013 general election, FPÖ got 21.4 per cent of the votes 
using posters stating that »Vienna cannot become Istanbul«. In the 
Swiss 2007 election, The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) used posters port-
raying white sheep kicking a black sheep off the Swiss flag. The Swedish 
2010 election saw the Sweden Democrats having their televised advert 
censored. In the advert, women dressed in burqas were racing a group 
of scared pensioners to get to welfare spending first. In Italy, politicians 
from the Lega Nord party have compared Italy’s first black minister, 
Cécile Kyenge, to an orang-utan. Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Inde-
pendence Party (UKIP), maintained in a radio interview in 2014 that it 
was understandable if people would rather have Germans than Romani-
ans as neighbours.
Despite the notorious charge from populist, anti-immigration parties 
that so called political correctness has stifled the debate and prevented 
legitimate concerns about immigration to be voiced, the limits for what 
can be said about immigration appear to be few. Immigration became 
increasingly politicised in the 1980s and are now one of the key political 
issues in Europe.1 Hostility towards immigration, as well as support for 
populist parties, increased during the 80s and 90s, but has since stabi-
lised.2 The trend in Europe therefore seems to be a stabilisation of the 
presence of populist, anti-immigration parties as well as negative atti-
tudes amongst European populations, while the arguments are getting 
more hostile, blunt or outright offensive. 
This book is about how this trend may be turned around. Its purpose 
stems from a concern that divisive and parochial ways of debating immi-
gration are becoming entrenched in Europe. Inwards migration has 
doubtless re-shaped many European communities and this raises issues 
that need addressing, such as the economic and political integration of 
immigrants. The problem with populist, anti-immigration parties is that 
they talk about such issues using a xenophobic language and simplifica-
Introduction
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tions of complex issues, they neglect the interests of those not included 
in the »nation« and insinuate that migrants arrive with dishonest inten-
tions, such as taking jobs, benefits or committing crimes. This is not 
only divisive but also very unhelpful in addressing important questions 
about the future of diversity and border regimes in Europe. 
The contributions to this volume therefore focus on parties whose 
prime agenda is driven by opposition to immigration and who employ 
a populist rhetoric coloured by a chauvinist form of nationalism. They 
often spread, and feed off, a strong sense that national self-determina-
tion is being violated by domestic elites, by the European Union and by 
immigration. These concerns are presented as »common sense« poli-
tics; populists claim to speak the language of »the ordinary man«. This 
gives their message a flavour of truthfulness, allegedly lacking amongst 
other parties. But most Europeans do not, after all, vote for populist par-
ties, thus populists’ message is arguably not that appealing to the »ordi-
nary man«. Yet their ability to reduce debates on immigration to simp-
listic and divisive statements is a cause for worry both for those on the 
side of openness and those who want to take seriously challenges faced 
by increased immigration in European countries. This book therefore 
seeks to answer questions of what lies behind the support of populist, 
anti-immigration parties and how their anti-immigration argument can 
be met. 
As Mikael Hjerm and Andrea Bohman show in their contribution to 
this book (Chapter Three), attitudes to immigration have not become 
more negative in the past decade. Anti-immigration parties that were 
previously in or supporting governments have lost such influence in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy. And as Matthew Goodwin discus-
ses in Chapter Two, the financial crisis of 2008 did not bring the expec-
ted gains to populist parties, but, as Maurizio Ambrosini also points out 
in his case study of Italy, shifted focus towards economic issues. In many 
countries we find no anti-immigration party of significance, even in 
those struck the most by the financial crisis, such as Spain and Portugal, 
4and the importance of immigration issues amongst the European public 
has dropped (see Figure 1). 
The actual political influence of anti-immigration parties is also 
questionable. Some academics have argued that anti-immigration 
parties have a so called “contagion effect” on mainstream parties; 
mainstream parties tend to adopt more restrictive immigration policies 
as a response to increasing popularity of the anti-immigration position.3 
Others, however, maintain that anti-immigration parties seem to have 
no impact at all on the positions of mainstream parties.4 In Sweden, one 
of the case studies in this book, immigration policy was even liberalised 
in the same parliamentary period that saw the entrance of the anti-
immigration far right party the Sweden Democrats. 
Yet there can be no denying that in many countries immigration is 
being intensely and sometimes divisively debated. In Chapter Three, 
the authors argue that the main attraction of populist parties is their 
anti-immigration policies. As way of responding, it therefore becomes 
important to take seriously the worries and concerns people have in 
relation to immigration. This has become increasingly difficult to do for 
several reasons. One, which Jamie Bartlett discusses in Chapter Five, is 
that traditional means of political communication, such as mainstream 
media and political parties, enjoy less and less public trust. Another, 
pointed out by Sjoerdje van Heerden and Bram Creusen in Chapter 
Eight, is that politicians, journalists and commentators find it difficult 
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Figure 1. Immigration is one of the two most important issues facing the country
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5to talk about immigration. It appears not to be like other policy areas 
but involves a minefield both of prejudice and accusations of being “out 
of touch” with the concerns of ordinary voters. Thus while mainstream 
parties struggle to strike the right balance, populists are fuelling hosti-
lity with their unashamed message of narrow nationalism. 
In the autumn of 2014, a former MP for the British Conservative Party, 
Matthew Parris, wrote an article in The Times in which he argued that 
the Conservatives should be “careless” about the opinions of the people 
of Clacton, a town where the UK Independence Party (UKIP) is set to 
win their first MP. The people of Clacton’s hostility towards immigra-
tion and Europe is not where the future of Britain lays, Parris maintai-
ned. Of course, UKIP cheered the opportunity to use the words of a true 
“man of the establishment” to showcase their main selling point; that 
mainstream parties have turned their back on ordinary voters and are 
in denial about the consequences of immigration. No doubt, Parris gave 
a disrespectful account of the people of Clacton, denying them a part 
of Britain’s future and patronising them for their tattoos and choice of 
clothing. Nonetheless, the temptation by mainstream politicians across 
Europe to adopt knee-jerk policy responses to concerns about immigra-
tion is equally disrespectful. The most respectful approach must be to 
have an old-fashioned argument about the advantages and disadvanta-
ges of immigration; economically and culturally as well as morally; for 
the receiving society as well as for the migrant. Disrespecting voters are 
those who refuse to engage in an informed argument by simply accep-
ting the views of voters, regardless of what these entail, or those who 
think that voters’ opinions should just be ignored. 
Europe looks different today than it did three decades ago (Figure 
2). The increased diversity can be fascinating, economically beneficial, 
frightening, culturally enriching or corrosive. Whatever it is, it is there 
and it will cause discussions. The benefits and challenges it brings 
vary widely across Europe. The gap between native and foreign born 
unemployment, for example, differs substantially between European 
Introduction
6countries (Figure 3). Some of the reasons for this gap can be found in 
different labour and welfare regimes, some stem from more specific 
cultural and social issues related to both the composition of the migrant 
population and specific features of the host country (such as language 
issues). The addition of an immigration element to socio-economic 
policies should not make anyone nervous – there is nothing inherently 
discriminatory in pointing out that some groups may face and/or pose 
extra challenges. Likewise, cultural issues can be discussed in an inclu-
sive way, talking with people from minorities rather than about them. It 
is disrespectful to treat people as if they were determined by their cul-
tural background, either by labelling all critique of minority cultures as 
prejudice or by making sweeping generalisations of how people behave 
based on their cultural or religious background. Yet more diverse socie-
ties will raise questions of the values and customs that we share and we 
cannot shy away from those debates.   
At the same time, immigration raises issues not only of what binds us 
together within nation-states, but what unites us as human beings. As 
the world witnesses with horror the spread of the Islamic State (IS) in 
Syria and Iraq and as the situation deteriorates in Libya, migrants flock 
to Calais to find lorries to hide in to take them to the UK and thousands 
die at sea as they try to reach Italy or Malta. When people suffer in Syria, 
Iraq or Libya, they enjoy the compassion of Europeans, yet when they 
arrive at the border they are mostly met with a cold shoulder. Very little 
of the debates on immigration concerns this seeming contradiction of 
human solidarity. 
We learn from the contributions to this volume that we should not 
treat support for anti-immigration parties simply as protest votes, as a 
consequence of a deep economic crisis or as something that will soon 
be in the past. Populist parties may not be too dissimilar to mainstream 
ones, as they get further professionalised, gain governmental experience 
and have mastered a new media landscape. And, crucially, many voters 
in Europe are attracted to their message of more restrictions on immi-
Clara Sandelind
7gration. But as I have highlighted, the populist message on immigration 
is infected by hostility. By pointing out immigrants as the outside enemy 
they present an easy solution to complex social, economic and cultural 
phenomena. But established parties have still not found a forceful way 
of responding that can include all aspects of immigration – from those 
fleeing warzones to those, perhaps like some people in Clacton, who 
Introduction
Figure 2. Foreign-born population 1980 and 2010 in European countries
Figure 3. Percentage point difference in unemployment rate between the native 
and foreign born population 2010
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8see a world changing around them that they feel they are not part of or 
which they cannot control.
This volume will provide analyses that help understand the nature of 
support for anti-immigration populists is in post-crisis Europe. Why are 
people opposed to immigration and have they become more negative 
over time? Did the economic recession boost support for populist, anti-
immigration parties? Why do some cast their vote on a populist party 
and how does the new media landscape, increasingly dominated by 
social media, affect support for populism? In the second part, four case 
studies will show how concerns about immigration have been met by 
politicians and civil society in Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands and Den-
mark, in order to better understand how immigration can be debated in 
ways that challenge the populist message. 
Thus, in Chapter Two, Matthew Goodwin asks why the radical right 
in Europe did not gain more ground following the economic crisis in 
2008. Contrary to popular belief, there has not been a unison increase 
in support for these parties across Europe post-crisis. Goodwin ques-
tions popular assumptions about connections between poor economic 
conditions and low levels of political trust, on the one hand, and support 
for the radical right, on the other. Instead, he argues that support for the 
radical right is better understood as rooted in a cultural divide between 
“winners” and “losers” of globalisation. Moreover, in times of crisis, 
voters may be more prone to vote for the party they trust most on the 
economy, which is more likely to be one of the established parties. 
In the Third Chapter, Mikael Hjerm and Andrea Bohman show how 
attitudes to immigration have not become more negative during the 
past decade, despite what one might be led to believe given the atten-
tion given to the electoral successes of anti-immigration, populist par-
ties. They begin by reviewing the factors influencing people’s attitudes 
and focus on “group threat theory”. According to this theory, negative 
attitudes to immigration occur when people feel threatened by immi-
grants, for example on an economic or cultural basis. On a contextual 
Clara Sandelind
9level, whether immigrants are perceived negatively also depend on how 
accepted prejudice is in society, while the size of the immigrant popula-
tion has different effects in different contexts. On the individual level, 
higher levels of education, friendship with immigrants and a less autho-
ritarian personality correlate with more positive attitudes to immigra-
tion. Hjerm and Bohman point out that because of increasing ethnic 
diversity and changing economic and political circumstances, negative 
attitudes to immigration should increase. Yet, as they show, this is not 
the case. By comparing different age cohorts, they argue that younger 
people tend to be more positive to immigration, but that demographic, 
economic and political circumstances cannot explain the reasons for 
this. 
In Chapter Four, Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, Sjoerdje 
van Heerden and Sarah de Lange discuss the similarities and differen-
ces between radical right parties and their voters, on the one hand, and 
mainstream parties and their voters, on the other. They question popu-
lar demographic explanations for support of these parties, pointing out 
that socio-structural models mostly cannot account for the success 
or failures of these parties. Neither is it the case that charismatic lead-
ership is particularly important for the radical right. Instead, it is the 
actual policy programmes of populist radical right parties that attract 
voters. Their support, the authors argue, is based on policy preferences 
of voters, just like support for mainstream parties. They also note that 
there is nothing distinct about radical right parties and mainstream 
ones in terms of cooperation within government in coalitions. In short, 
the radical right is not so different after all, at least not in terms of how 
they attract their supporters or how parties act in power. 
Chapter Five is written by Jamie Bartlett, Demos, who takes a closer 
look at the changing nature of political activism brought about by the 
growing importance of social media. Bartlett argues that online acti-
vism benefits populist parties on right and left, in particular considering 
the low levels of trust in politics amongst the European public. Sup-
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porters of populist parties have lower levels of trust also in mainstream 
media, fuelling the importance of the Internet amongst these voters. 
Examining data from a poll of 15,000 Facebook supporters of populist 
parties in Europe, conducted by Demos between 2011-2013, he explains 
how populist parties have been successful in exploiting this new format 
of political activism. 
Chapter Six contains the first case study. Jeppe Fuglsang Larsen 
has looked at Danish Nørrebro, a district of Copenhagen in which the 
Danish People’s Party (DPP) has witnessed big electoral losses. It is 
also an area characterised by high levels of immigration. Fuglsang Lar-
sen shows how politicians from the mainstream parties have managed 
to win the argument on immigration by putting forward the positive 
impact immigration has had. They have portrayed the multicultural 
society as something essentially good. They have also focused the dis-
cussion on gang-related crime on issues of social conditions, rather 
than on issues of culture, the latter which has been the basis of DPP’s 
argument. The chapter is based on several interviews with politicians in 
Nørrebro, including DPP representatives. 
In Chapter Seven, I have examined the case of Landskrona, a south-
ern Swedish, post-industrial city. In Landskrona, the Sweden Demo-
crats (SD) rocketed in the 2006 election, but lost much support in the 
2010 election, though they regained some support in 2014. The chapter 
starts by exploring why Sweden experienced a radical right party ente-
ring parliament comparatively late, before moving on to the specific 
case study. In Landskrona, the success of SD in 2006 can be explained 
by the focus on criminality, strongly connected to immigration in public 
debate, as well as by widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent 
social-democratic party. In 2010, while criminality and social depriva-
tion were still high on the agenda, the connection with immigration was 
less emphasised. There was also much more satisfaction with the new 
centre-right leadership, in particular the Liberal Party with its conserva-
tive policies on crime and social issues. 
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Chapter Eight is a case study of the Netherlands, written by Sjoerdje 
van Heerden and Bram Creusen, University of Amsterdam. The case 
study focuses on the electoral support for the Party for Freedom (PVV) 
and especially on the strategies of the mainstream parties in minimising 
the success of PVV. Through interviews with party representatives as 
well as strategists, the chapter looks at how, and to what effect, other 
parties have tried to (re)take command of the debate about immigra-
tion and integration. The authors conclude that mainstream parties 
have struggled to find the right tone in dealing with PVV, given that most 
of the time their responses to immigration and integration issues only 
seemed to have fuelled support for the PVV. Established parties especi-
ally have trouble altering the populist frame created by the PVV, which 
portrays them as incapable and impotent on these matters. Van Heer-
den and Creusen also note how party leader Wilders’ way of communi-
cating suits a new media climate, where one-liners produced by Wilders 
on Twitter make easy and ready-made headlines.
The last case study, Chapter Nine, is based on Italy and the role of 
civil society in promoting immigrants’ rights in a hostile environment. 
It is written by Maurizio Ambrosini, Milan University. He shows how 
civil society, such as the Catholic Church, lawyer organisations and 
trade unions, have played an important part in campaigning for immi-
grants’ rights and to change public opinion, while governmental immi-
gration policy has remained largely the same despite political changes. 
One important campaign, “I am Italy too” has been backed by a large 
number of civil society actors who push for Italian citizenship law to be 
liberalised. The campaign has been successful in changing the stakes in 
the debate, though they have not yet reached their aim. Ambrosini also 
argues that the economic crisis has shifted focus away from immigration 
to the economy, providing opportunities for a more positive immigra-
tion debate. The chapter is based on several interviews with civil society 
actors. 
Lastly, the key lessons from the contributions of this book are sum-
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marised to suggest ways of moving forward in debates about the future 
of immigration. One key conclusion is that voters’ concerns need to be 
taken seriously, rather than being treated as a side effect of something 
else, such as mistrust in politics or poor economic conditions. Voters 
of these parties are attracted to their policies and these need to be add-
ressed, along with underlying societal changes that drive support for 
stricter immigration policies. Following on this, another lesson is that 
populist parties should not be treated differently to others, perhaps not 
even in terms of negotiating within parliament, though this will ultima-
tely depend on their policies. Importantly, while immigration and inte-
gration ought to be discussed seriously, they should not be conflated or 
entangled with social and economic issues. 
Mainstream parties and the civil society together must be able to 
offer a vision where immigration is not seen as a threat, yet which takes 
seriously the concerns of voters. These discussions also need to take 
place on the local level, in the communities that are affected by econo-
mic changes and where people have concerns about immigration. Only 
then can politicians show that they take the lived experience of voters 
seriously. It does not entail simply accepting those experiences as rea-
lity, without considering research and others’ experiences as well, such 
as those of migrants. Such uncritical engagement with voters is signi-
ficant of the populist strategy. Immigration debates in many European 
countries too often lack the perspective of migrants and contain wides-
pread myths about the economic impact of immigration. This must not 
be encouraged. However, discussions of prospects and opportunities, as 
well as of immigration, must take place in the communities and with the 
people whom these issues concern.
Notes
 1 Hutter, S (2012), ‘Congruence, counterweight, or different logics? Comparing 
electoral and protest politics’ in Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Dolezal, M., Helbling 
Clara Sandelind
13
M., Hutter, S. and Wues, B. Political Conflict in Western Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 182-206.
 2 Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky (2006), ‘The Rise of Anti-foreigner 
Sentiment in European Societies, 1988–2000’, American Sociological Review 
71; Goodwin, M. (2011), ‘Right Response: Understanding and Countering 
Populist Extremism in Europe.’, A Chatham House Report, September 2011. 
 3 Van Spanje, J. (2010), ‘Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other 
Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe’, Party 
Politics 15 (5).
 4 Akkerman, T. (2012), ‘Immigration policy and electoral competition in 
Western Europe. A fine-grained analysis of party positions over the past two 
decades’, Party Politics DOI: 10.1177/1354068812462928.
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Followers of radical and extreme right parties often believe that a 
crisis will bring them to power. As the old economic and political order 
breaks down they will be propelled into office by insecure and anxious 
voters, who are looking for parties that project discipline, strength and a 
nationalist ethos. In 2009, the onset of the Great Recession and a wider 
financial crisis seemed to present Europe’s radical right with the much 
anticipated moment of opportunity. While academics have long argued 
that latent support for these parties exists in most (if not all) Western 
democracies, largely because some voters will always feel ‘left behind’ 
by rapid social and economic change and angry toward perceived out-
groups, the sudden economic downturn seemed to present a perfect 
storm for these parties in three ways.2  
First, some argued that the crisis enlarged public sympathy for the 
radical right by heightening feelings of economic insecurity among 
citizens, especially those with low incomes and few qualifications who 
are already prone to voting for the radical right at elections. Research 
suggests that low-income groups are especially receptive to changes in 
unemployment, whereas high-income groups are often more receptive 
to changes in levels of inflation, and such voters might be expected to 
turn to the radical right as an outlet for these anxieties.3 In Europe, the 
Great Recession was also followed by a period of harsh fiscal austerity 
measures and major structural reform of labour markets and social wel-
fare that further impacted on individual prospects. The consequence, 
it is often argued, is that a greater number of insecure voters became 
receptive to the radical right’s call to protect native workers and punish 
elites who failed to manage the crisis.
Second, from 2009 onward some European states such as Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal were forced to rely on external organizations for 
bailout packages, including the European Union (EU), the Internatio-
nal Monetary Fund and European Central Bank (the »Troika«). These 
actions proceeded with little input from citizens and made little room 
for traditional democratic discourse, leading some academics to talk of 
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a ‘temporary hollowing out of national democratic procedures’ in Euro-
pean states.4 Such developments would not have gone unnoticed by 
citizens across Europe and may benefit the radical right by heightening 
fears about ‘threats’ to national sovereignty from distant and often une-
lected external actors. Such actions play directly into the radical right’s 
strategy of attacking political and financial elites for ignoring the demos. 
Indeed, even before the recession research had shown that those who 
are most attracted to the radical right tend to be more distrustful toward 
politicians and more dissatisfied with how their national democracy is 
functioning.5 
Third, in broad terms the Great Recession also coincided with 
increased migration into Europe, which began in the 1980s and was 
followed by greater movement within Europe after the Schengen Agre-
ement and enlargement of the EU. Unlike the economic turmoil in the 
1930s, which erupted in countries that had little experience of mul-
ticulturalism, the Great Recession emerged amidst a period of rising 
ethnic and cultural diversity. This appears especially important given a 
long tradition of research that suggests that both a decline in economic 
conditions and an increase in the size of minority populations are cen-
tral to explaining increased prejudice in society.6 For example, studies 
have shown that public hostility toward immigrants is often strongest 
among economically insecure citizens, while at the extreme end of the 
spectrum outbursts of violence against minorities have also been tra-
ced to fears over growing economic competition.7 The crisis may have 
increased public concern over threats to national identity, anxiety over 
the effects of immigration and the general availability of scarce resour-
ces given this increased ‘ethnic competition’.
These three observations help to explain why the post-2008 crisis 
was followed by many predictions from commentators that Europe 
would witness an upsurge in public support for radical and extreme 
right-wing parties that are defined by their desire to protect the native 
group from ‘threatening’ others, to uphold traditional authoritarian 
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values and attack established politicians for betraying the people.8 This 
is an old view, as it has long been argued that during periods of economic 
decline political actors assume an important and often manipulative 
role by targeting resentments and encouraging group conflict. As Green, 
Donald, Glaser and Jack and Andrew Rich9 note, the mediating role of 
elites is especially prominent in the Marxist thesis that racial antago-
nism between groups is fomented by capitalists who want to deflect 
attention away from class politics in periods of economic strain.10 In 
contemporary Europe this role is most often associated with the radical 
right, which targets economically vulnerable voters through a range of 
nativist, authoritarian and populist policies. Aside from framing mig-
rants, asylum-seekers and settled minority groups as a threat to resour-
ces, the radical right often advocates a position of ‘national preference’, 
arguing that the native group should be prioritized when distributing 
scarce resources. Some of these parties have also devoted greater effort 
to opposing globalization and the European Union, offering economi-
cally protectionist messages to their struggling blue-collar voters. But to 
what extent has the radical right actually benefitted from the post-2008 
financial crisis?
As discussed in this chapter, contrary to popular assumptions, even 
a cursory glance at national election results undermines the argument 
that the crisis triggered a sharp, overall rise in support for the radical 
right. While some of these parties have prospered, others have conti-
nued to languish on the fringe, unable to exploit the unique opportu-
nity for mass mobilization. Drawing on a range of economic, political 
and public opinion data, this chapter puts the impact of the crisis on 
Europe’s radical right under the microscope. After exploring support 
for the radical right since the crisis, the chapter turns to examine a range 
of economic data and its association with support for these parties. It 
concludes by setting out some possible explanations for why the Great 
Recession might more accurately come to represent a ‘lost opportunity’ 
for this party family.  
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Radical Right Support Since the  
Crisis: Conventional Wisdoms
Recent years have seen significant gains by the radical right. The first 
opportunity to gauge the impact of the financial crisis on this support 
arrived in 2009, with elections to the European Parliament. In Austria, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Hungary, radical right parties polled at 
least 14 per cent of the national vote, while other less successful parties, 
such as the British National Party won seats for the first time. Interest in 
this diverse party ‘family’ was also fuelled by the subsequent formation 
of a pan-European alliance between some of these parties, which for-
malised links between the extreme and radical right in Britain, Bulgaria, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.11  
Amidst the growing crisis, 2009 also saw the arrival of the more 
confrontational English Defence League (EDL), which rallied young 
working class men who voiced concern over their economic prospects, 
Islam and immigration.12 The next year saw Geert Wilders’ Party for 
Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands more than double its number of 
MPs and agree to support a minority right-wing government after att-
racting over 15 per cent of the vote. Two years later, Marine Le Pen won 
a record 17.9 per cent of the vote at the Presidential elections in France, 
while in legislative elections her party, the National Front (FN), won 
13.6 per cent of the vote, its best result since 1997. Attention then moved 
to Greece where an openly neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, polled almost 
7 per cent of the vote at two national elections in 2012 and attracted con-
siderable publicity after its members were associated with criminality, 
racial violence and murder. Outside of elections in 2011 this interest 
in Europe’s extreme right was also fuelled by the murder of 77 young 
people on the island of Utøya in Norway, by Anders Breivik. 
Reflecting on events such as these, commentators began to draw 
a straight line between the financial crisis and support for the radical 
right. ‘The politics of populist anger’, wrote the New York Times in 2013, 
‘are on the march across Europe, fuelled by austerity, recession and ina-
A Breakthrough Moment or False Dawn? The Great Recession and the Radical Right in Europe
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bility of mainstream politicians to revive growth’.13 Others also argued 
that Europe’s radical right has ‘been force-fed by the worst world reces-
sion since at least the 1930s, and possibly since before 1914. Mass unem-
ployment and falling living standards in the euro-area and the wider 
EU made worse by the crazy and self-defeating austerity obsession of 
European leaders has opened the door to the revival of the far right’.14 By 
2013, the World Economic Forum contributed to this debate by warning 
that economic stagnation could produce tension and a deterioration of 
Europe’s social fabric.14
Much of this marked a continuation of older thinking about the rise 
of fascism in interwar Germany and Italy. Despite an academic consen-
sus that it is inaccurate to describe the modern radical right as fascist, 
and also evidence that openly neo-Nazi and fascist parties have perfor-
med poorly in post-war election,16 commentators continued with the 
comparison, attributing the rise of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini to 
financial depression and hyperinflation, even though the drivers of sup-
port for fascism and Nazism were far more complex. As Roger Eatwell 
(2014) observes, much of this was based on a misreading of European 
history. Whereas in Italy some strikes did spark anxieties over the threat 
from communism and an uncertain economic future, the country was 
not engulfed by a major economic depression when Mussolini came 
to power in 1922. While a severe depression was present in Germany, 
research suggests that voters hit hardest by the crisis did not respond 
in a uniform fashion. While the unemployed tended to switch to the 
Communists it was the ‘working poor’ and self-employed who were 
at low risk of unemployment who often switched to Hitler and the 
Nazis.17  There is also scant evidence of a strong correlation between eco-
nomic distress and support for the Nazis.
Nonetheless, the 2014 European Parliament elections produced a 
similar response. Much of the media coverage focused only on suc-
cessful cases, with three radical right parties winning a national elec-
tion in their respective countries for the first time. Compared to 2009 
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the Danish People’s Party increased its share of the vote by ten points 
to finish in first place with almost 27 per cent of the vote. In France Le 
Pen and the FN finished first after increasing its vote share by 18 points 
to 25 per cent, and meanwhile the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) also finished first after its support increased by over ten points 
to almost 27 per cent of the vote. It was the first time since 1906 that a 
party other than the Conservative Party or Labour Party won the hig-
hest share of the vote in a nationwide election. 
The radical right also polled strongly in other states: support for 
the Freedom Party of Austria increased by 7 points to 19.7 per cent; the 
Sweden Democrats won seats in the European Parliament for the first 
time after attracting 9.7 per cent of the vote; in Greece, Golden Dawn 
also won three seats after attracting 9.4 per cent; the neo-Nazi National 
Democratic Party of Germany captured one seat; and the anti-Semitic 
and anti-Roma Jobbik retained its three seats after finishing in second 
place with 14.6 per cent. At least at first glance, such results appeared to 
validate the claim that the Great Recession was now directly benefitting 
the radical right. But was this really the case?
Support for the radical right:  
a surge or stable?
To explore the impact of the Great Recession on Europe’s radical right 
we can make use of a range of data including electoral support for these 
parties, economic conditions, the perceived importance (or ‘salience’) 
of immigration to voters and public trust in political institutions. The 
data on public opinion that we will examine are drawn from the ‘Euro-
barometer’ surveys at three points in time; before the crisis fully arrived 
in May 2007; mid-crisis in May 2010; and November 2013, when relative 
economic stability had returned to some states. 
First, to what extent was the Great Recession followed by a general 
upsurge in support for the radical and extreme right-wing? Before tur-
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ning to our data one useful starting point is analysis by Cas Mudde18  
who compares support for the radical right during the pre-crisis (i.e. 
2004–07) and post-crisis (2009–13) periods, and based on results at 
national elections. Overall, Mudde observes that 10 of the 28 EU mem-
ber states have no significant radical or extreme right party. This inclu-
des countries that experienced some of the worst effects of the crisis 
and were forced to obtain bailout packages, namely Cyprus, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. Each of these states does have an active extreme 
right that is represented in examples such as the National Popular Front 
in Cyprus, Immigration Control Platform in Ireland, National Renova-
tion Party in Portugal, National Republican Movement and Platform for 
Catalonia in Spain, but such groups failed to make a noticeable impact at 
the national level.19 Greece is the only country to have received a bailout 
and experienced growing support for the extreme right in the form of 
Golden Dawn, which polled 7 per cent of the national vote at two elec-
tions in 2012 before gaining 9.4 per cent and three seats at the 2014 Euro-
pean Parliament elections.20 
What of the remaining 18 countries where the radical or extreme right 
is present? As Mudde notes, between 2005 and 2013 only nine states saw 
an increase in support for the radical right while nine did not. Of the 
countries that saw an increase only four – Austria, France, Hungary and 
Latvia – saw the radical right increase its national vote share since the 
crisis. Nor does this appear to be solely a response to economic events. 
The Freedom Party of Austria and National Front in France have attrac-
ted growing support since the 1980s, while in Hungary Jobbik was recru-
iting rising support since it formed as a party in 2003 and the National 
Alliance in Latvia polled strongest after the peak of the crisis (although 
it is plausible that its effects were delayed).21 Meanwhile, based on 
Mudde’s calculations, the radical right in a host of other countries has 
suffered a loss of support since the crisis, including Germany, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Denmark, Slovenia, Belgium, Italy, Slovakia and Romania. 
This complicated picture is also reflected in closer analysis of the 
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results in 2014. Overall, only 10 of 28 EU member states elected candi-
dates from radical right parties and although the total number of radical 
right MEPs increased by 15 compared to 2009, much of this growth was 
driven by the strong performances of the French National Front and 
Danish People’s Party. As Mudde22 observed after the elections, the radi-
cal right in Europe actually only gained additional seats in six countries 
while it lost seats in seven others, with parties such as the British Natio-
nal Party, Popular Orthodox Rally in Greece, Greater Romania Party and 
Slovak National Party losing elected representation. Only in Greece has 
the extreme right appeared to prosper amidst the crisis.
An alternative method of gauging the strength of the radical right is to 
examine its support not at the national but European level. This appears 
especially important given that public anxiety or anger over the Euro-
zone crisis and its management is likely to be directed more strongly 
toward the EU, which was involved directly with these events. Table 1 
presents the combined vote share for radical right parties at elections 
to the European Parliament over a ten-year period that covers the Great 
Recession and its immediate aftermath, from 2004 until 2014. The four 
countries of Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania and Slovenia have been omit-
ted as no radical or extreme right party was found in these cases, while 
Croatia has been excluded because it only joined the EU in 2013. We 
also adopt a wide definition of the radical right, including right-wing 
extremist groups like Golden Dawn alongside moderate radical right 
Eurosceptic parties like the True Finns and the UK Independence Party. 
In broad terms, this provides insight into public support for parties that 
offer a combination of populist, anti-immigration and anti-establish-
ment messages to voters.
Based on these data, since 2004 public support for the radical right at 
the European level has increased in sixteen countries. In seven of these 
countries – Denmark, France, Latvia, Austria, Finland, Hungary and the 
Netherlands – the radical right has increased its overall share of the vote 
since 2004 by more than 10 per cent. Interestingly, in all of the countries 
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that saw growth for the radical right these parties consistently failed to 
win over 10 per cent of the vote in 2004, yet by 2014 received at least 12 
per cent in four countries and at least 20 per cent in another three (Den-
mark, France and Austria). These data also suggest that the share of the 
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2004 2009 2014 % change 
2004–2014
Denmark 6.8 15.3 26.6 19.8
France 9.8 6.3 24.9 15.1
Latvia - 7.5 14.3 14.3
Austria 6.3 17.3 20.2 13.9
Finland 0.5 9.8 12.9 12.4
Hungary 2.4 14.8 14.7 12.3
Netherlands 2.6 17 13.3 10.7
Sweden 1.1 3.3 9.7 8.6
Greece 4.1 7.7 12.1 8
United Kingdom 21 22.9 29.1 7.5
Slovakia - 14.6 5.3 5.3
Cyprus - - 2.7 2.7
Romania - 8.7 2.7 2.7
Italy 5 10.2 6.2 1.2
Portugal 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3
Spain - 0.1 0.04 0.04
Czech Republic 1.2 - 0.5 -0.7
Germany 1.9 1.3 1 -0.9
Bulgaria - 12 3 -9
Belgium 17.1 11.2 6.4 -10.7
Poland 17.8 3 7.1 -10.7
Table 1. Support for the Radical Right at European Parliament Elections, 2004–2014
Notes: Austria is combined vote for Freedom Party of Austria and Alliance for the Future of Austria; 
Belgium is Flemish Interest, Popular Party and National Front; Bulgaria is Ataka; Cyprus is National 
Popular Front; Czech Republic is Right Block, Workers Party; Denmark is the Danish People’s Party; 
Finland is the True Finns; France is the National Front; Greece includes combined vote for the Popular 
Orthodox Rally and Golden Dawn; Hungary is Hungarian Justice and Life Party and Jobbik; Netherlands 
is List Pim Fortuyn and Party for Freedom; Poland is League of Polish Families, Real Politics Union, 
Right of the Republic, Congress of the New Right and United Poland; Portugal is National Renovation 
Party; Romania is Greater Romania Party; Slovakia is People’s Party – Our Slovakia and Slovak National 
Party; Spain is National Democracy, Republican Social Movement; Sweden is Sweden Democrats; and 
United Kingdom is combined support for the British National Party, UK Independence Party and An 
Independence from Europe.
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vote for the radical right in 2014 was strongest in the United Kingdom, 
a country that is traditionally known for having a weak radical right. 
In the UK these elections were won outright by the UK Independence 
Party, while the British National Party and a splinter group from Ukip, 
An Independence from Europe, failed to win seats but attracted at least 
1 per cent of the vote. In sharp contrast, the radical right is barely visible 
in two southern European democracies – Portugal and Spain – while 
since 2004 and amidst the crisis similar parties have lost support in five 
countries; the Czech Republic, Germany, Bulgaria, Belgium and Poland. 
This confirms the general picture from above; of a radical right family 
that has experienced considerable variation in its level of support across 
Europe since the onset of the crisis.
To what extent does the crisis explain this variation in support and 
the increased support that some parties experienced since 2004? We can 
address this question by turning to explore economic data, public con-
cern over the radical right’s core issue of immigration and public trust 
in politics. Beginning with economic conditions, the Great Recession 
unsurprisingly had profound effects. Across the Eurozone, and between 
2007 and 2013, unemployment increased from 7.5 to 12 per cent while in 
countries such as Greece and Spain these figures would rise to over 25 
per cent (and reach even higher levels among youths). At the same time, 
growth in overall gross domestic product (GDP) across the Eurozone 
slumped from around 3 per cent in 2007 to -4.4 per cent in 2009, and by 
2013 had only risen to -0.4 per cent.23 Government debt as a percentage of 
GDP also reached striking levels; in Eurozone countries increasing from 
66 per cent in 2007 to over 92 per cent in 2013, but elsewhere reaching 
175 per cent in Greece, 133 per cent in Italy and 124 per cent in Ireland. 
Given these trends, it is not surprising that when asked to describe the 
condition of Europe’s economy the proportion of citizens across the EU 
who thought it was ‘good’ more than halved, falling from 58 per cent in 
2007 to 28 per cent in 2013.24 
Table 2 presents data on how these three trends – GDP, unemploy-
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ment and government debt – impacted on individual states and along-
side changes in support for the radical right. Clearly, this does not 
incorporate other important factors such as the impact of economic 
conditions at local or regional level, and on individual voters. But it 
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GDP
2007–2012
Unemployment
2007–2012
Gross debt
2007–2012
% change 
radical right 
support, 
2004-2014
Euro area average -3.7 9.4 73.8 -
Austria -2.8 4.3 68.9 +13.9
Belgium -3.0 7.6 94.4 -10.7
Bulgaria -5.8 8.9 16 -9
Cyprus -7.5 6.5 64.2 2.7
Czech Republic -6.7 6.2 36.2 -0.7
Denmark -2.0 6.0 39.3 +19.8
Estonia -3.6 10.4 63 -
Finland -6.3 7.6 44.1 +12.4
France -2.3 8.8 78.5 +15.1
Germany -2.6 7.1 75 -0.9
Greece -10.5 13.4 137.6 +8
Hungary -3.3 9.7 77.3 +12.3
Ireland -4.8 11.1 74.3 0.0
Italy -4.1 8.0 115.4 +1.2
Latvia -4.8 13.7 32.2 +14.3
Netherlands -5.1 4.1 60.8 +10.7
Poland -4.8 9.0 51.6 -10.7
Portugal -5.6 11.4 91.6 +0.3
Romania -6.9 6.8 25.5 +2.7
Slovakia -8.7 12.5 38.4 +5.3
Spain -5.1 17.2 58.1 +0.04
Sweden -2.4 7.5 39.6 +8.6
United Kingdom -3.1 7.0 69 +7.5
Table 2. Economic Conditions and Radical Right Support, 2004-2014
(Bold indicates above Eurozone average)
Note: GDP is gross domestic product change over the period 2007-2012. Unemployment is average 
annual rate 2007-2012. Government debt is government debt as a percentage of GDP, with the average 
taken between 2007 and 2012.
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nonetheless contains useful insights. If the crisis is largely responsible 
for increases in support for the radical right, then we might expect to 
find the parties that have prospered to be based in states that expe-
rienced the worst effects of the crisis. However, even a cursory look at 
the data reveals that the picture is far more complicated.
Of the three countries where all three indicators are above the Euro-
zone average, and where the economic conditions are most severe 
–Greece, Ireland and Portugal – only one saw the emergence of what 
could be described as a reasonably successful extreme right party. The 
rise of Golden Dawn coincided with a sharp deterioration in the eco-
nomy, although even still the party has not (yet) polled over 10 per cent 
of the national vote. 
Of the seven countries identified above that have seen the sharpest 
gains for the radical right since 2004, Denmark and Austria have remai-
ned below the Eurozone average on all three indicators. In fact Denmark 
has seen one of the strongest performances by the radical right and yet 
has experienced a relatively low reduction in GDP growth, low unem-
ployment and low levels of government indebtedness. Latvia and Hung-
ary have exceeded the average on two indicators while Finland and the 
Netherlands experienced a sharper than average contraction of GDP. 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that while two of the most popular 
radical right parties in Europe are found in Austria and the Netherlands, 
these two states also saw the lowest average unemployment rates in 
Europe. The relationship between macro economic conditions and sup-
port for the radical right, therefore, appears far more complicated than 
popular assumptions would have us believe.
One alternative possibility is that while the Great Recession does 
not appear to have had a direct impact on support for the radical right, 
it might have had an indirect effect by heightening public concerns over 
immigration. Amidst this destabilizing event did voters in Europe sud-
denly become far more concerned about this issue? In 2007, 2010 and 
2013 voters were asked to rank the two most important problems in 
A Breakthrough Moment or False Dawn? The Great Recession and the Radical Right in Europe
28
their respective countries. As shown in Table 3, across the EU as a whole 
the average percentage of voters who selected immigration as one of the 
two most important issues actually declined from 15 per cent in 2007, to 
10 per cent toward the end of 2013. Contrary to popular assumptions, 
the onset of the Great Recession was not followed by a sharp and sudden 
Matthew Goodwin
2007 2010 2013 Change 
2007–2013
Germany 8 5 14 +6
Sweden 9 9 13 +4
Latvia 6 5 9 +3
Lithuania 9 6 11 +2
Finland 4 16 5 +1
Greece 5 3 6 +1
United Kingdom 32 28 32 0
Hungary 2 1 2 0
Romania 2 1 2 0
Malta 30 24 29 -1
Czech Republic 5 3 3 -2
France 10 6 8 -2
Portugal 3 1 1 -2
Slovenia 3 1 1 -2
Bulgaria 5 1 2 -3
Slovakia 3 1 0 -3
Belgium 19 16 15 -4
EU 15 9 10 -5
Ireland 12 4 7 -5
Poland 10 1 3 -7
Austria 20 14 12 -8
Netherlands 13 10 4 -9
Denmark 21 10 10 -11
Italy 15 12 4 -11
Table 3: Salience of Immigration across the EU, 2007–2013. What are the two most 
important issues facing (our country) at the moment (max two answers possible)? 
Ranked by change 2007–2013
Source: Eurobarometer
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increase in public concern over immigration. The most plausible expla-
nation for this finding is that anxieties over immigration were relegated 
in the minds of voters behind by far stronger concerns over the national 
economy, unemployment and the cost of living, all issues that tend not 
to favour radical right parties that target social and cultural issues.
There are some interesting variations across countries and when 
considering the relative strength of radical right parties. The voters who 
are most concerned about immigration are in the UK and Malta, both 
countries where the extreme has remained weak and where the salience 
of immigration also did not increase during the crisis. While the radical 
right-wing UK Independence Party has polled stronger, interestingly 
this was from 2010 and after the onset of the crisis. Only six states actu-
ally witnessed an increase in the salience of immigration – Germany, 
Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Greece – none of which are 
known for exceptionally high levels of support for the radical right. Mor-
eover, all of these states started with low levels of public concern over 
the issue, while the increase since the crisis has not been striking. Mean-
while, public concern over this issue has remained at comparatively low 
levels in Finland, France, Greece, Hungary and the Netherlands, yet all 
of these countries have seen more successful incursions by radical right 
parties since the onset of the crisis. This provides further evidence that 
while the Great Recession did not trigger an upsurge in public concern 
over immigration, the relationship between this issue and radical right 
support is far more complex than many assume. 
Another possible indirect effect of the crisis is that it was followed by 
a collapse of political trust that enlarged the number of potential and 
politically dissatisfied voters for the radical right. Drawing on the same 
data, we can track overall levels of trust in governments between 2007 
and 2013. While the full data is presented in Appendix 1, Figure 1 pre-
sents the overall change in the percentage of voters who said that they 
trust their national government. Across the EU, public trust in national 
governments declined significantly; while 41 per cent of voters trusted 
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their national government in 2007, this subsequently declined to 29 per 
cent in 2010, and 23 per cent by 2013. By the end of 2013, therefore, fewer 
than in one in four voters trusted their national government. 
As above, there are interesting variations across countries. Unsur-
prisingly, the sharpest declines in trust were recorded in the southern 
European democracies of Spain (-43 per cent), Greece (-31 per cent) and 
Portugal (-31 per cent). These are also joined by the Netherlands, where 
trust similarly fell sharply in the crisis period by 36 points (but started at 
one of the highest levels in the pre-crisis area). A similar picture emer-
ges in the European Social Survey, which suggests that the decline in 
economic conditions from 2009 did negatively affect the democratic 
legitimacy of countries that were worst affected by the Great Recession. 
Comparing political trust and satisfaction with democracy between 
2004 and 2010, there is clear evidence of a significant decline in these key 
indicators across most countries. But this decline is especially visible in 
countries that were hit the hardest, namely Greece, Ireland and Spain, 
and also France. In the Eurozone countries changes in these attitudes 
toward the political system were strongly correlated with a decline in 
GDP over the same period. Further analysis revealed that this decline in 
support for the political system can be explained by a parallel increase in 
overall levels of dissatisfaction with the economic conditions. It is the 
Figure 1. Change in percentage of voters who trust their national government, 
2007–2013
Source: Eurobarometer
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economically disadvantaged in society – those who work in low status 
jobs, are unemployed or have experienced unemployment in the past 
– who are the most likely to be more distrustful toward the political sys-
tem, and dissatisfied with how democracy is working.25
But how does this relate to support for the radical right? As above, 
there does not appear to be a clear relationship between overall declines 
in trust and the strength of radical right parties. While those countries 
that have witnessed some of the largest declines – including Ireland, Por-
tugal, Spain and Slovenia – have no successful radical right parties, oth-
ers that have either seen only a slight drop in trust or even an increase in 
overall trust –including Austria and Hungary – have radical right move-
ments that are well entrenched in their respective party systems.
Discussion: Explaining the Disconnect
Why has Europe’s radical right not prospered more fully from the great 
recession? At the outset of the chapter it was noted how an economic 
crisis is often thought to improve the radical right’s electoral fortunes 
by heightening feelings of economic insecurity, anxieties over immigra-
tion and resentment toward political elites. With this in mind we can 
now put forward some possible explanations for why the crisis has not 
more clearly impacted on support for the radical right.
As shown, the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and 
support for the radical right is far from clear. Economic conditions are 
certainly important to explaining voting behaviour more generally, but 
despite a large academic literature there is little evidence of a positive 
relationship between macroeconomic conditions and radical right sup-
port.26  
One reason can be found in the growing research on the emergence 
of a so-called ‘new cultural divide’ in West European party systems, 
which suggests that perceived conflicts over values are equally if not 
more important than perceived conflicts over economic resources. As 
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one academic notes, these evolutions have meant that ‘certain social 
groups have lost in terms of life-chances or privileges, while others feel 
threatened in their identity by the policies enacting universalistic values 
and by European integration’,27 allowing the radical right to increasingly 
mobilize votes from citizens who are described as the ‘losers’ of globali-
zation28 or ‘the left behind’.29 
While the exact nature of these value conflicts continue to be deba-
ted, there appears a consensus that the underlying dividing line separa-
tes two broad groups in society: those who subscribe to a libertarian and 
universalistic outlook, who have the skills and education to adapt and 
prosper in a global economy and diverse society; and those who adhere 
to a traditionalist and communitarian outlook, who often do not have 
the resources to adapt to the changed reality and thus are especially 
likely to feel threatened by these rapid changes. 
A second possible explanation for the failure of the radical right 
in Europe to prosper more fully from the Great Recession is found in 
research on ‘valence’ models of voting behaviour. Rooted in the work of 
academics like Donald Stokes30, the valence approach essentially argues 
that what matters most to voters when making decisions about who to 
support are their evaluations of the competence or management abilities 
of different parties on the most pressing issues. The economy has long 
been considered to be the ‘classic’ valence issue, as most voters are united 
in wanting low unemployment, low inflation and economic growth, so 
their decisions about who to support will be influenced strongly by their 
perception of which party is most able to deliver these key outcomes. 
These perceptions of competence are likely to be especially crucial 
during periods of crisis when there is a much stronger public consensus 
on the most important national problem, and the need for a competent 
manager.31 Indeed, since the onset of the post-2008 crisis, research has 
shown that voters have often switched their loyalty to parties that hold 
an image of economic competence, and to party leaders who are seen 
as a ‘safe pair of hands’ in managing the economy.32 Similarly, during an 
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earlier financial crisis in Britain over the Exchange Rate Mechanism, it 
was shown how negative perceptions of the competence of the Conser-
vative Party were a significant driver of support for Tony Blair and ‘New’ 
Labour.33 In contrast to established parties that can point to a record of 
economic management, parties on the radical right are often not viewed 
in the same light.
2007 2010 2013 Change 
2007–2013
Hungary 27 40 37 10
Sweden 55 57 57 2
Latvia 20 13 21 1
Poland 18 28 19 1
Bulgaria 22 43 20 -2
Malta 51 33 48 -3
Romania 19 12 16 -3
Lithuania 26 13 20 -6
Austria 57 54 50 -7
United Kingdom 34 26 24 -10
Germany 49 32 38 -11
Slovakia 42 38 29 -13
Belgium 62 22 48 -14
Czech Republic 34 32 16 -18
EU 41 29 23 -18
France 36 25 14 -22
Ireland 41 21 17 -24
Finland 75 49 50 -25
Slovenia 36 27 10 -26
Denmark 67 50 40 -27
Italy 37 25 10 -27
Greece 41 25 10 -31
Portugal 46 20 15 -31
Netherlands 73 47 37 -36
Spain 52 20 9 -43
Appendix 1: Trust in national government, 2007–2013
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Furthermore, when evaluating the various parties, voters often 
obtain their information from sources such as the mass media and opi-
nion leaders, many of whom are often overtly hostile toward the radical 
right. Lacking an image of economic competence, and framed in a nega-
tive light by mainstream media, such parties might often struggle to 
fully mobilize mass support amidst a crisis when public concerns over 
the economy are dominant. Each of these three reasons provide some 
insight into why the relationship between economic conditions and 
support for the radical right is not as straightforward as is often assu-
med, although clearly there is a need for more research in this area. 
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Last years’ media headlines about an anti-immigrant wave that 
spreads across Europe, increased mobilization around far right ideas 
and European racism on the rise, leaves you with the feeling that atti-
tudes towards immigrants are deteriorating in Europe.1 Indeed, much 
has happened over the past decade that we, on theoretical grounds, 
expect to increase immigrant antipathies among the native populations 
in Europe. First, the global recession and Euro zone crisis have put con-
siderable strain on European economies. Large government debts and 
high unemployment rates have implied cuts in public spending and an 
increased labor market uncertainty, which in turn have had direct con-
sequences for people’s lives. Second, declining birth rates, aging popula-
tions and increasing international migration have altered the demograp-
hic composition of countries, where heterogeneity has been increasing 
in some countries in Europe. Third, political and institutional develop-
ments, such as the EU enlargement and the electoral success of extreme 
right parties, have impacted the political landscape both in terms of new 
decision-making structures and shifts in policy focus. Nationalist and 
anti-immigrant elements have gained momentum in local, regional and 
national elections in Europe during several years. The Freedom party 
in the Netherlands, Jobbik in Hungary and the Sweden Democrats in 
Sweden are examples of parties that have entered parliaments and made 
their mark on the political climate in their respective countries after 
2002. Their entry on Europe’s political arena has increased the saliency 
of the immigration issue as well as the negative framing around immi-
grants and immigration.
Drawing on group threat theory, a theory that explains anti-immi-
grant attitudes by looking at relations between groups, we expect 
these important economic, political and demographic changes to have 
generated an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe.2 In this 
chapter, we review the theoretical grounds for such an expectation. 
We also look closer at past trends in anti-immigrant attitudes and how 
these are explained in previous research before asking how attitudes 
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towards immigrants in Europe have evolved in the first decade of the 21th 
century. Is the average native European more or less negative towards 
immigrants today than at the turn of the century, and what is the direc-
tion for the future?
Group threat theory
According to group threat theory, anti-immigrant sentiments is a 
response to a perceived threat from an out-group, due to intergroup 
competition for scarce resources such as political power, jobs, or wel-
fare benefits. Blumer identified group identity as: 
• identification with one’s own group; 
• out-group stereotyping; 
• how people understand other groups; 
• preferred group status; 
• which hierarchical position people want different groups to have.3  
He described perceived threat as how threatened people feel that 
their own group is by other groups, as being intrinsic to prejudice. The 
last of these preconditions, the group threat condition, states that pre-
judice is a reaction to explicit or implicit challenges to the dominant 
group’s position. Such challenges function as a catalyst that makes the 
other three preconditions lead to prejudice. 
Put differently, and more precisely, group threat theory assumes that 
people make group classifications that will have political and economic 
saliency in that they are more likely to want to benefit their own group 
over other groups in the struggle for scarce resources. When one or 
more minority groups threaten the majority group, it elicits negative 
out-group attitudes among the members of the majority population. For 
anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe this implies that a rise is anticipated 
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when natives feel that their interests are threatened by the presence of 
immigrants.4 However, it is important to note that these threats do not 
have to be real; it is enough that people perceive them as being real. In 
other words, it does not matter if immigrants actually are competing for 
jobs or not as long as people think that they are.
In addition to the threat in itself, group threat theory also stresses 
the importance of the context where such threat takes place. Given the 
group aspects of prejudice, what goes on in the wider community may 
affect people’s attitudes towards immigrants regardless of whether it 
affects them personally. Previous studies have shown that contextual 
factors may increase or mitigate feelings of threat and thereby either 
add to or reduce anti-immigrant attitudes.5 Economic conditions, poli-
tical contexts and demographic compositions are particularly likely 
to affect anti-immigrant attitudes. The next paragraphs describe how 
these contextual factors affect anti-immigrant attitudes.
First, economic circumstances are identified as an important 
explanation as to why groups of people hold certain views towards 
immigrants. Ever since the early 50s the existence of prejudice has 
been explained by the competition for scarce economic resources: that 
immigrants pose a threat to the material well-being of the majority 
population.6 As Giles and Hertz put it, the relationships between dif-
ferent ethnic groups are viewed ‘as a function of their competitive posi-
tions’ (p. 317).7 Many studies similarly conclude that economic threats 
are of importance.8 Quillian shows that low GDP and a large proportion 
of immigrants produce anti-minority prejudice in Europe.9 The less 
the majority feels that their jobs are in jeopardy, the more likely they 
are to be in favor of, or at least not against, increased levels of immi-
gration.10  Moreover, anti-immigrant sentiments rise during economic 
downturns and are also dependent on the respondents’ perception of 
national economics.11 A poor economy does not only affect the labor 
market, but also the possibilities for redistribution and thus there is an 
increased competition for welfare state resources. Competition that, 
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according to group threat theory, breeds anti-immigrant sentiments.   
Second, the political context also constitutes an important contex-
tual determinant. Previous research suggests that a negative political 
climate increases anti-immigrant sentiment as political rhetoric makes 
the presence of foreigners salient and activates feelings of economic, 
political, and/or cultural threat.12 Hopkins demonstrates that a negative 
rhetoric significantly influences how people interpret an increase in the 
share of immigrants in their surrounding area.13 Other studies relate 
negative attitudes to the mobilization of the extreme right, including 
how other political parties behave in response to their parliamentary 
presence, as well as to institutional features such as citizenship regi-
mes.14 Clear social norms are important for how prejudicial attitudes 
develop.15 If societal norms against prejudice are weak, or eased by 
repeated hostile statements, certain political elements will have greater 
political leeway to influence attitudes on issues related to immigration 
and immigrant presence. Anti-immigrant expressions may also increase 
if such ideas are legitimized by trusted elites.16 People who are negatively 
disposed are more likely to articulate their views, as well as to advocate 
or act on their beliefs, if they resonate with views and interpretations 
conveyed in rhetorical frames. Hostile rhetoric by political represen-
tatives may, in other words, moderate any stigma associated with anti-
immigrant attitudes; attitudes which consequently become more likely 
to spread further in society.17  
The third contextual feature of importance to anti-immigrant atti-
tudes is the demographic composition of a geographic area. To the 
extent that a large minority population implies higher levels of compe-
tition, group threat theory expects a strong relationship between the 
size of the immigrant population and individuals’ attitudes.18 The size 
argument can explain the relationship between whites and African-
Americans in the United States, but becomes questionable when we 
consider other group relations.19 Hood and Morris show that attitudes 
towards immigration and immigrants in the US are more positive when 
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the concentration of immigrants is high.20 The latter result concurs with 
Taylor, who demonstrates that size matters when it comes to African-
American minorities, but does not influence whites’ prejudice towards 
immigrant groups in the United States.21 Dixon and Rosenbaum present 
similar evidence.22 However, inconsistent findings in the European con-
text suggest that other demographic features might be more important 
in regard to the level of threat.23 Also, recent research suggests that the 
size of immigrant population may interact with other contextual and 
individual features in producing anti-immigrant attitudes.24  
Individual explanations
In addition to these contextual factors, anti-immigrant attitudes are 
also predicted by a number of different individual features. For example, 
sociological research unequivocally shows that education is a very good 
antidote against anti-immigrant attitudes. In general, the more educa-
tion one has (measured in years of studies or degrees earned), the less 
likely one is to hold negative attitudes towards immigrants. According 
to group threat theory, the relationship between education and anti-
immigrant attitudes is primarily due to the privileged labor market 
position held by the higher educated. Compared to people with lower 
education, the highly educated generally have a more secure employ-
ment, where they to a lesser extent are competing with immigrants over 
jobs. Socio-economic position and labor market security are important 
explanations, but research also shows that education may decrease anti-
immigrant attitudes through transmitting fundamental social values 
and critical thinking to reject simplistic stereotypes. 
Another important indicator of anti-immigrant attitudes is actual 
experiences with immigrants and members of ethnic out-groups. 
Contact with individuals from other ethnic groups reduces a reliance 
on stereotypes and ultimately decreases anti-immigrant sentiments.25 
However, not all forms of contact are equally effective. In fact, superfi-
cial contact between members of different groups, especially in compe-
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titive environments, can lead to conflict and only exacerbate negative 
attitudes. Positive outcomes are most likely when social interaction 
is meaningful. Thus, in terms of reducing anti-immigrant attitudes, 
friendships are better than superficial interaction. 
Further psychological research finds a relationship between parti-
cular personality traits and anti-immigrant sentiment. Individuals with 
an inherent preference for hierarchy and a strong reverence for rules are 
said to have an authoritarian personality. Even if the debate is not settled 
regarding the degree to which personality types are genetically determi-
ned, individuals with an authoritarian personality tend to articulate anti-
pathy and hostility towards immigrants and other minority groups.
One of the most important insights in research on anti-immigrant 
attitudes so far is that the triggers of out-group prejudice are more or 
less universal. In fact, Pettigrew claims that individual-level predictors 
of prejudice (or anti-immigrant attitudes) are consistent over geo-
graphical areas, across groups as well as over time.26 In other words, the 
factors that contribute to anti-immigrant sentiment are more or less the 
same in Sweden as in the USA, in Poland or in Italy. However, since there 
are only small changes in the individual determinants over time, know-
ledge about the individual explanations is of limited help when it comes 
to understanding changes in attitudes over time. The relative stability of 
individual determinants implies that we cannot expect them to have any 
large influence on attitudinal trends – especially not when studying the 
development over a relatively short period of time. 
Group threat and change
Even if we acknowledge that social circumstances can affect anti-immi-
grant attitudes, the mechanism at an aggregate level is not obvious as 
aggregate changes in anti-immigrant attitudes can stem from two sour-
ces. First, attitudinal shifts can be the expression of individual changes. 
Put differently, it can be the result of individuals turning more or less 
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aversive towards immigrants. Second, anti-immigrant changes can be 
related to shifts in generations. This implies that new generations with 
lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes replace generations with less 
benevolent views. 
Studying the effect of age on anti-immigrant attitudes, we know that 
younger people are less likely than older people to possess negative atti-
tudes about immigrants.27 The reason for this could be that anti-immi-
grant sentiments increase with age, perhaps related to an increased per-
ception of threat once retired and more dependent on the welfare state. 
A more popular explanation is that individual attitudes tend to be fairly 
stable over the life course and that the oldest generation has, on average, 
the same attitudes today as they had when they were young. Many atti-
tudes and political values are formed already during late adolescence 
or early adulthood, during what is generally described as the forma-
tive years, and remains largely the same during the course of life.28 For 
trends in anti-immigrant attitudes this would imply that most change 
over long periods of time is related to cohort replacement rather than to 
individual changes.29 For example, Lewis and Gossett show that half of 
the positive attitude change in Californian attitudes towards same sex 
marriages can be attributed to changes between generations.30  
Looking at changes up until the mid-1990s the general picture is clear, 
anti-immigrant attitudes decline over time.31 The main reason for this 
long term change is related to cohort replacement where older cohorts 
both have grown up in different times and are composed differently. 
The fact that cohorts diverge in their composition means that indivi-
dual characteristics related to anti-immigrant attitudes are unevenly 
dispersed across generations. The most obvious example is perhaps 
education where younger cohorts in Europe today have higher educa-
tion than older cohorts. That education generally implies less negative 
attitudes is well-established in previous research. Also, older cohorts of 
today experienced their formative years in a time where both interracial 
contacts were scarce and the political sanctioning of racism was more or 
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less widespread. The latter can be exemplified with Apartheid in South 
Africa or the Jim Crow laws in the USA. Individuals who grew up during 
those times were less exposed to immigration and ethnic diversity and 
may therefore not have developed positive attitudes towards immigra-
tion and ethnic diversity either. However, it is important to note that this 
does not imply that tolerance or an appreciation of diversity automati-
cally will increase over time. Individuals are influenced by zeitgeist or 
the spirit of the age. Even relatively rapidly shifting circumstances such 
as the levels of unemployment are shown to influence attitudes among 
young people in their formative years.32 Given the increasing electoral 
success of explicitly anti-immigrant, radical right parties throughout 
Europe, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that the younger generations 
of today will be less tolerant than their parents.         
Given the fact that the three social circumstances; demography, 
economy and political circumstances have changed rapidly over the 
last decade in Europe there are reasons to suspect that anti-immigrant 
attitudes are increasing in Europe. 
However, there are two possible changes at stake. First, it is possible 
that all people are equally affected by the social circumstances. Second, 
it is also possible that the effect of social circumstances is more related 
to a generational effect. In other words, the social circumstances affect 
the youngest generation the most as they are in their formative years, 
whereas the effect on other generations is smaller. After presenting the 
data we will examine changes in anti-immigrant attitudes in general, as 
well as examine if there are differences across different cohorts.
Data
Our data comes from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a 
comparative attitude and behavioural survey conducted in more than 
30 European countries. It is carried out every second year and consists 
of a comprehensive base module encompassing standardized back-
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ground variables as well as numerous central attitudes, values and 
behavioural questions. Added to this are two thematic modules that are 
rotated between the survey periods. In terms of all aspects, from survey 
construction and translation to sampling, data collection and supple-
mentary work, the ESS is by far the most thorough and standardized 
cross-country comparative project of this nature yet undertaken. 
This study relies on ESS data from six rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010 and 2012). Not all countries have participated in all rounds. 
To increase comparability over time, we will in this case include only the 
countries that have participated in at least five rounds of ESS.
To be able to measure anti-immigrant attitudes we use three items: 
1. Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s eco-
nomy that people come to live here from other countries? 
2. Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally under-
mined or enriched by people coming to live here from other 
countries? 
3. Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people 
coming to live here from other countries?  
All responses to the questions range from 0 to 10 on an 11-point scale, 
where high numbers indicate stronger anti-immigrant attitudes. We 
have added the three items into an index, where higher number indica-
tes more anti-immigrant attitudes.33  
Results
Figure 1 illustrates the average development in anti-immigrant atti-
tudes in Europe 2002-2012. The relatively flat line suggests that not 
much has happened in how Europeans view immigrants during this 
period of time. The mean score in 2002 was 4.9 on the attitudinal scale 
0-10, where lower values represent more negative and higher values 
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Figure 1. Anti-immigrant attitudes 2002–2012, mean development
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Figure 2. Anti-immigrant attitudes 2002–2012, mean development
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Figure 3. Anti-immigrant attitudes 2002–2012, development by age group 
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more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Ten years later, in 2012, 
the general pattern is largely the same, with a European average of 4.6. 
Nor can any clear trend be observed in this period as anti-immigrant 
attitudes first rise marginally between 2002 and 2004, and then slightly 
decrease until 2008, only to increase and decrease again to the final year 
of measurement. If anything, the average level of anti-immigrant atti-
tudes has decreased somewhat between 2002 and 2012. Further, figure 
2 shows the development in anti-immigrant attitudes by country, and 
reveals that the attitudinal trends look somewhat different in different 
countries. While Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Portugal and Slovakia 
display higher degrees of anti-immigrant attitudes at their last point of 
measurement compared to their first, the opposite pattern is visible in 
the remaining countries, in particular in Poland, Germany, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway and Estonia. However, the differences are mar-
ginal in most countries and, again, do not follow any clear direction. 
Taken together, this suggests that the dramatic changes in the European 
economy, political context and demography during the last decade, 
have – at least so far – had limited impact on European attitudes towards 
immigrants. 
Given how much previous research points to cohort replacement as 
the main trigger behind attitudinal change, focusing on how attitudes 
have developed among young Europeans in their formative years is still 
interesting. Although the economic, political and demographic deve-
lopments do not seem to have generated any general increase in anti-
immigrant attitudes, it is still possible that the contextual changes have 
had implications for how the youngest cohort feels about immigrants. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the attitudinal development in two age groups: 
those that were 20 years and younger at the time of measurement, and 
those that were older than 20 years. By comparing the development in 
these two groups, we set out to examine whether the economic, political 
and demographic developments in Europe specifically have influenced 
attitudes among those in their formative years. In line with findings 
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from previous studies, the youngest cohort displays the lowest level of 
anti-immigrant attitudes. The older category is on average somewhat 
more prone to express negative views on immigrants. In terms of deve-
lopment over time, no significant differences are visible between the dif-
ferent age groups. The two lines largely follow each other up until 2008 
when the rise in anti-immigrant attitudes appears to be slightly more 
pronounced in the older group. The difference remains between 2010 
and 2012, when the two curves both turn downwards again, albeit very 
it is still very small. Thereby, it is clear that the theoretical expectations 
of a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes in response to a deteriorating eco-
nomy, harsher political climate and increased ethnic heterogeneity, are 
not supported in our data – not in relation to general attitudes in Europe 
and not in regard to young people in their formative years. Instead, the 
levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe seem to have been rather 
stable over the last decade. 
Concluding discussion
Group threat theory predicts that social circumstances should affect 
anti-immigrant sentiments and previous empirical research have indi-
cated that economic, political and demographic circumstances are par-
ticularly likely to influence anti-immigrants views. In spite of substan-
tial changes within those areas in Europe during the last decade we do 
not witness any general increase in anti-immigrant sentiments. There 
are a number of possible reasons for this outcome. 
The first possibility is the counterfactual argument. Namely, that we 
without the changes in social circumstances in Europe we would have 
been able to observe a decline in anti-immigrant sentiments. In general, 
tolerant attitudes have been increasing for a long period of time. For 
example, people in general are less homophobic as well as less prejudi-
ced.34 Ford shows that the number of people who would mind having a 
black boss in the UK dropped from approximately 20 per cent in 1983 
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to approximately 13 per cent in 1996, but as our data show we do not 
observe any decline in the UK during our point of examination.35 So, 
it may be possible that we would have continued to witness a steady 
decline in anti-immigrant sentiments during the last decade if it were 
not for the changes in the social circumstances. This possibility can be 
partly tested by modelling different effects in different countries depen-
dent on changes in the three important social circumstances, but the 
latter is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, and partly related to the first explanation, is the possibility 
that the changes in social circumstances in fact have limited effect 
on the examined attitudes. If this was the case we would expect anti-
immigrant attitudes to continue diminishing during the examined 
time period. However, the reason that this is not happening, i.e. that 
such attitudes are not decreasing, could be related to an increased 
marginal cost. By this we mean that it gradually becomes more difficult 
to decrease anti-immigrant attitudes, as the baseline is relatively low 
already. For example, it can be that a greater proportion of those hol-
ding such attitudes today are ideologically convinced individuals, who 
less easily change their views. Note, however, that we do not claim that 
anti-immigrant attitudes never would disappear or that such attitudes 
cannot decrease further, only that it is possible that the marginal cost 
make it more difficult. 
Third, even though previous research has indicated that the factors 
we have discussed are of importance it may still be possible that there 
are other social circumstances that counteract the negative impact of 
those examined. For example, even though increasing heterogeneity is 
claimed to be perceived as a threat to the native population we must rea-
lize that increasing heterogeneity also results in increasing interethnic 
contacts – contacts that reduce anti-immigrant sentiments. 
Fourth, due to the long time decline in anti-immigrant sentiments 
it is possible that the relation between the previously important social 
circumstances and anti-immigrant sentiments is weakening as people 
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are less prone to view such social circumstances as related to immi-
grants. The latter is in line with the finding that cultural threats tend to 
be more threatening than economic ones.36 It is possible that people are 
more inclined to dislike immigrants because they perceive the threat 
towards their way of living as bigger than the threat of immigrants 
coming to take their jobs. If the latter is changing in favor of more cul-
turally based anti-immigrant attitudes it does not matter if there is a 
recession or not.  
We cannot provide the answer to the displayed results. We can only 
acknowledge that the level of anti-immigrant sentiments is very stable 
during the first decade of the millennium. Moreover we also acknow-
ledge that there are currently no indication of Europe turning more 
xenophobic in time to come, as the there are no signs that the anti-
immigrant sentiments are increasing amongst the youngest generation. 
We must, however, bear in mind that anti-immigrant sentiment is but 
one factor that affects the lives of newcomers to European societies. The 
fact that such sentiments have become increasingly politicized during 
the last decade cannot be neglected. More people in more countries are 
increasingly willing to cast their vote for parties around Europe that, to 
varying degree, want to weaken rights for immigrants. So, even though 
it is positive that anti-immigrant attitudes are not on the rise those 
attitudes are present in all societies in Europe. Combined with the suc-
cess of the extreme right where such attitudes carry even more political 
importance than before there is still reason to worry both about the 
level of tolerance in Europe today as well as in the future.   
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Since the 1980s parties have emerged in various West-European 
countries that have been labelled either ´anti-immigration parties´, 
´extreme right parties´, ´far right parties´, or ´populist radical right 
parties´. For well-known historical reasons the rise of these parties 
has created the fear of a right-wing backlash and has therefore often 
evoked bitter reactions from grass root organizations, the political 
establishment, as well as the state. In Belgium established parties have 
made their antipathy towards anti-immigration parties most explicit 
by forming a ‘cordon sanitaire’, that is, by signing a formal agreement 
that they will not collaborate with anti-immigrant parties in any arena 
(e.g. electoral, executive or legislative) or at any level (local, national, 
or regional). Dutch, French and German anti-immigration parties 
(e.g., the Centrum Democraten, the Front National, and the Republika-
ner) have also been treated as political lepers by the establishment, 
even though these parties are not subject to a formal cordon sanitaire. 
Such strategies of exclusion are often justified by claims that the 
anti-immigration parties in question are anathema to modern plura-
listic democracies. On the same grounds established politicians, but 
also public figures, mainstream journalists and commentators, often 
advise voters not to support these so-called dangerous political out-
casts. 
In this chapter we demonstrate that these justifications are mostly 
unfounded and that the accompanying advise is counterproductive. 
Drawing on existing research of ourselves and others, we show, for 
example, that a vast majority of anti-immigration parties are not anti-
democratic in the strict sense and that voters that support these par-
ties are in many ways similar to established party voters. Moreover, we 
reveal that, for a variety of reasons, exclusionary strategies, are unlikely 
to prove effective and are also, by and large, unnecessary.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we will discuss diffe-
rent conceptualisations of the parties under study. Second, we will 
discuss their support base, and examine in which respects these par-
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ties’ voters are different from or similar to supporters of established 
parties. Third, we will discuss research on how these parties behave, 
especially once they assume office. Fourth, we will discuss the litera-
ture on the consequences of different responses to the rise of anti-
immigration parties. Finally, we will discuss the practical implications 
of this research.
Which parties are we talking about?
Anti-immigration parties, such as the British National Party (BNP), the 
Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), French Front National (FN), or the 
Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) have contested elections since the 
1970s, albeit with varying success. The most important ideological fea-
ture shared by these parties, irrespective of their lines of descent is their 
resent¬ment against immigrants and the immigration policies enacted 
by European governments. They typically campaign, for instance, for 
a reduction in the inward flow of immigrants – especially from outside 
Western Europe – and for integration programmes that have strict 
requirements and are compulsory. Within the group of anti-immigra-
tion parties, a distinction can be made between different groups of par-
ties: extreme right parties, radical right parties with roots in the ultra-
nationalist milieu, and radical right parties without ties to neo-Nazi, 
neo-fascist or extreme right movements. 
The first group of parties consists of, amongst others, the German 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), the Greek Laïkós Sýn-
desmos - Chrysí Avgí or Golden Dawn, and the Hungarian Jobbik Magya-
rországért Mozgalom (Jobbik). These parties are the direct or indirect 
descendants from pre-war fascist movements and explicitly refer to 
neo-fascist or neo-Nazi symbols and ideas. Therefore, anti-communist, 
anti-democratic, anti-Semitic, and racists elements can be recognized 
in their ideology.2 Moreover, they have a tendency to glorify violence, 
or, as in the case of Golden Dawn, are actively involved in violent and 
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criminal acts. However, it should be noted that few extreme right or 
neo-fascist parties compete in elections in Europe and that they tend to 
be relatively unsuccessful.3 
A second group of parties also had ties to neo-fascists groupus¬cules 
when they were founded, but have transformed into radical right parties 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Prominent members of this group are the Bel-
gian Vlaams Blok (VB), the Dutch Centrum¬partij (CP) and CentrumDe-
mocraten (CD), and the French Front National (FN). More recently elec-
ted anti-immigration parties, such as the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna 
(SD), also have roots in the neo-Nazi or neo-fascist milieu. However, in 
recent years these parties have changed their discourse, avoiding any 
references to neo-Nazi or neo-fascist ideas and cutting ties with the 
extra-parliamentary extreme right. Instead, they have adopted an ideo-
logy that combines nativism with populism.  
A third group of parties is ideologically very similar to the second 
group, but unlike the second group, they are not the offspring of neo-
fascist clubs and cliques.  The Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
(FPÖ), for example, developed from the Verband der Unabhä¬ngigen 
(VdU), which was founded in 1949 by two liberal journalists who wanted 
to stay clear of the socialist and Catholic ’Lage¬r’. Other anti-immigra-
tion parties, like the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties, the Italian 
Lega Nord (LN) and the short-lived Swedish Ny Demok¬rati (ND) and 
Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), have also been created by leaders who had 
no links whatsoever to fascist groups. In recent years, parties such as the 
Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), the Finnish Perussuomalaiset (PS) 
or the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP), have joined this group, by 
transforming from mainstream to radical right parties. The PS and SVP, 
for example, were originally founded as agrarian parties, while the PVV 
was established by a former member of parliament of the Dutch liberal 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD). Given that the ideology 
does not prominently feature anti-democracy, anti-Semitism, or classic 
racism4, it would be misleading to call these parties extreme right.
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While we can thus distinguish three groups of anti-immigration 
parties, the main distinction is between the first group (which we may 
call extreme right) and the second and third group (which we may call 
radical right). The second and third group have a different historical 
heritage, but their current political programs are largely identical. One 
key element that all of these radical right parties share is populism, in 
addition to the already discussed nativism. The most general characte-
ristic of populist parties is that they consider the political establishment 
to be technically incompetent and morally corrupt. Populist parties find 
‘something rotten in the state’. They assume that the common man is 
basically good and his opinions are always sound, whereas the political 
elite is — by its very nature — selfish and dishonest.5 Members of the 
elite hide their selfish interests behind a veil of democratic and techno-
cratic rhetoric. Populist parties see a fundamental split between what 
politicians say and what they do. Subsequently, conspiracy theories fre-
quently surface in populist discourse. 
Populists claim to solve the social problems they see — whether it is 
public safety, immigration or medical care for the elderly — by introdu-
cing more direct forms of democracy. The populist politician has a con-
ception of democracy that emphasises majority rule and direct demo-
cracy. Typical elements of liberal democracies, most notably individual 
rights and freedoms as well as minority rights, are trumped by majority 
rule. Such populist claims for more democracy are part and parcel of 
the democratic tradition that has always hovered between the consti-
tutional protection of minority rights and untrammelled majority rule. 
So, populist parties are essentially democratic, because they accept the 
basic rule that decisions have to be taken by parliamentary majorities. 
However, they often have an uneasy relationship with the constitutional 
pillar of liberal democracies, which are institutionalized to protect indi-
vidual citizens from majority decisions. 
In sum, we may distinguish two groups of anti-immigration parties. 
The first group consists of radical right parties, which are generally 
Not that different after all: radical right parties and voters in Western Europe
70
populist, and which accept the basic norms of parliamentary demo-
cracy. The second group consists of extreme right parties, which do 
not accept parliamentary democracy as the most appropriate form of 
governance. Most of the discussion below focuses on the first group and 
in these instances we will refer to radical right parties. When we speak of 
anti-immigration parties, we refer to both groups (extreme and radical 
right parties). 
What determines support  
for these parties?
In the 1980s and early 1990s much research on anti-immigration parties 
concentrated on the political biographies of their leaders, in an attempt 
to find out whether or not they had links with neo-fascist groups. Other 
studies examined whether these parties promoted ethnic violence or 
used racist propaganda in their electoral campaigns. Most of these early 
studies were case studies, which resulted in monographs about indivi-
dual anti-immigration parties (examples are Bakkes and Jesse (1990), 
Furlong (1992), Ignazi (1989), Mayer and Perrineau (1989), Luther 
(1988) and Van Donselaar and Van Praag (1983). In the early 1990s other 
scholars began to conduct comparative research on these parties. These 
comparative studies were primarily conducted by political scientists 
and sociologists, such as Meindert Fennema, Cas Mudde, Hans-Georg 
Betz and Piero Ignazi. 
It was, however, not until the publication of Herbert Kitschelt’s The 
Radical Right in Western Europe (1995) that mainstream political science 
theories were employed to explain support for anti-immigration par-
ties. Since then, the research on support for anti-immigration parties 
has flourished. In a very general sense, four models (not mutually exclu-
sive) have been proposed to explain the support for these parties: socio-
structural models, protest vote models, charismatic leadership models 
and policy voting models. We will discuss each of these in turn. 
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Socio-structural models
Until the late 1990s, socio-structural models inspired most research 
on anti-immigration parties. According to these models, the rise of 
anti-immigration parties should be seen as a backlash response to 
modernization. The crux of socio-structural explanations is that sup-
port for anti-immigration parties comes from citizens who feel threa-
tened by rapid changes in post-industrial societies. Manual workers 
with low education tend to lose their jobs as a result of changes in 
modes of production. Moreover, they are competing with immigrant 
groups for scarce resources such as jobs and houses. These ‘losers 
of modernity’6  feel threatened by rapid social change and tend to 
support anti-immigration parties out of generalized feelings of dis-
content. However, the results of much research shows that reality is 
more complex, or more nuanced, than implied by this modernization 
perspective.
Analyses of the socio-demographic profiles of supporters of anti-
immigration parties indicate that there is indeed an overrepresentation 
of men, manual workers with low education and an underrepresenta-
tion of highly educated professionals, particularly from the public 
sector. Moreover, in some countries there is an underrepresentation 
of religious people among voters for anti-immigration parties. Yet, 
research from the late 1990s and early 2000s showed that all of these 
socio-demographic characteristics combined explain only seven per-
cent of the differences in preferences for anti-immigration parties.7 In 
other words, the differences within social groups are much larger than 
the differences between them. 
At the aggregate level, differences in socio-structural conditions 
do not explain the differences in support for anti-immigration parties 
very well either.8 Countries with very similar socio-structural condi-
tions like Sweden and Denmark may differ enormously in the success 
of anti-immigration parties.VB, one of the most successful anti-immi-
gration parties, surged in Flanders, which is one of Europe’s most pros-
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perous areas. In Wallonia, which is known for its high unemployment, 
due to the fact that old industries relocated or went bankrupt, the anti-
immigration party Front National belge (FNb) has had very limited sup-
port. Various studies have tried to link support for anti-immigration 
parties to economic conditions or to the presence of immigrants, but 
the results of those studies have been quite inconsistent and most stu-
dies did not show a statistically significant relationship.9   
While socio-structural models do not have much predictive power 
for explaining support for anti-immigration parties, there seems to 
be renewed interest in this model. In a volume edited by Jens Rydgren 
(2012), several scholars have looked at the class basis of support for 
anti-immigration parties, and at the implications of the rise of these 
parties for social democracy. Much of this research is inspired by 
the idea that the liberalization of economic markets have generated 
new inequalities between winners and losers of globalization.10 The 
losers are the low educated manual workers who therefore would be 
inclined to support parties that promote strict rules on immigration 
and who are against further European unification. The contributions 
to Rydgren’s volume mainly confirm that highly educated citizens 
are strongly underrepresented among the supporters for anti-immi-
gration parties. Van der Brug et al. show that socio-structural and 
demographic variables explain a larger proportion of the variance in 
support for anti-immigration parties in a 2009 data set than in older 
data sets (from 1999 and 2004).11 So, these kinds of parties are now 
attracting voters more exclusively from specific layers of society than 
they did in the past. Having said that, they also conclude that the pre-
dictive power of these socio-structural models is still weak. So, the 
fact that lower educated citizens are on average more likely to support 
anti-immigration parties than people with a university degree, tells 
us very little about individuals. Most people with little education do 
not support anti-immigration parties, while some highly educated 
people do.
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Political discontent
Some contributions to the literature have looked at the role of political 
discontent as drivers of support for anti-immigration parties.12 Since the 
vote for radical parties is related to political discontent, it has sometimes 
been concluded that voters for these parties are protest voters. In some 
of our research we have tested the protest-vote model. In line with Van der 
Eijk et al.13 we conceptualised protest voting as a rational, goal directed 
activity, with the prime motive to show discontent with ‘the’ political 
elite. Since anti-immigration parties are treated as outcasts by a large part 
of the elites in their countries, votes for these parties frighten or shock 
these elites, which is exactly what the protest voter wants to accomplish. 
So, the concept of a protest vote consists of two elements. The first ele-
ment that distinguishes protest votes from other types of votes is that 
discontent with politics (reflected in political cynicism, or lack of politi-
cal trust) should have a strong effect on support for an anti-immigration 
party.14  That is to say, that voters with low levels of political trust and high 
levels of political cynicism are more inclined to vote for anti-immigration 
parties, than voters with high levels of political trust and low levels of poli-
tical cynicism. The second element is, in the words of Lubbers and Schee-
pers that »political attitudes … are expected to be of minor importance«.15 
So, protest voters do not support a party for substantive reasons, such 
as its policy proposals and ideological position, but rather to show their 
general discontent with the political establishment.  
There are two causal mechanisms that might theoretically explain the 
relationship between support for anti-immigration parties and political 
discontent: expressing discontent and fuelling discontent. The protest 
vote model assumes that voters support anti-immigration parties in 
order to express their feelings of discontent. Yet, as argued by Van der 
Brug16 and by Rooduijn et al. (forthcoming), the causal effect can also 
run in the opposite direction. One of the messages of anti-immigration 
parties is that the elite in their countries is either corrupt or incompe-
tent and has lost contact with the concerns of ordinary citizens. To the 
Not that different after all: radical right parties and voters in Western Europe
74
extent that supporters of these parties are influenced by these messages, 
voters for anti-immigration parties might become more discontented as 
a consequence.  Van der Brug17 and by Rooduijn et al. (forthcoming) have 
demonstrated that anti-immigration parties do indeed fuel discontent 
among their voters. So, the empirical evidence underlying the first ele-
ment of the protest vote model is weak at best.
The second element was tested by Van der Brug et al. and Van der Brug 
and Fennema.18 These studies showed that policy preferences and ideo-
logical positions are the best predictors of support for the more success-
ful radical right parties. Voters are attracted by these parties because of 
their programs, just as is the case for other parties. This does not rule out 
the possibility that some voters for anti-immigration parties, especially 
those who support small extreme right parties, do so mainly to express 
discontent with politics in general, but this explains the voting beha-
viour of a small group of voters. The overwhelming majority of voters 
who support radical right parties do so because they agree with its politi-
cal program. Thus, votes for these parties cannot be considered protest 
votes, because the second element of the protest vote model (protest 
voters do not support a party for substantive reasons) does not apply.
Characteristics of the parties and their leaders
There is some limited support for the notion that the typical low edu-
cated ‘angry white man’ is the driver of support for these parties. So, if 
these structural characteristics of voters do not explain support for 
anti-immigration parties, characteristics of the parties themselves 
and their leaders might explain it? In this line of reasoning, some have 
argued that charismatic leadership would be very important for the suc-
cess of anti-immigration parties. Yet, the evidence underlying this claim 
is often quite sketchy and there is some tautological reasoning, because 
the perception of charisma is inherently related to success. An unpopu-
lar politician will never be called charismatic.
Van der Brug and Mughan19 designed an empirical test of the claim 
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that the success of anti-immigration parties depends in particular upon 
the charisma of the party leader. Following Weber, they defined charisma 
as an unusually strong bond between party leaders and their suppor-
ters. So, they argued that if support for anti-immigration parties would 
depend particularly upon the charisma of the leader, there ought to be 
exceptionally strong effects from evaluations of the leader onto support 
for the party. Yet, they found that leadership effects are just as important 
for anti-immigration parties as they are for other parties. So, while all 
parties may well benefit from having leaders who are convincing in the 
media and in public debates, there is nothing exceptional that distinguis-
hes anti-immigration parties from other parties in this respect.
Carter and Golder20 have pointed out that there is an enormous diffe-
rence among anti-immigration parties in their electoral success, which 
is mainly the result of their ideological profile. Extreme right and neo-
fascist parties tend to be small and electorally unsuccessful, while radical 
right parties can be quite successful. The main difference seems to lie 
in their acceptance of the core principles of parliamentary democracy.21 
Parties that are perceived by the voter as posing a threat to democracy 
are unlikely to become successful. We want to stress here that it is the 
perception of potential supporters of these kinds of parties that mat-
ters. Parties like the FN, the FPÖ, VB and the PVV are seen by many 
mainstream politicians and by many left-wing voters as a threat to demo-
cracy. Yet, this does not hurt these radical right parties electorally as long 
as many voters on the right side of the spectrum do not share this image.  
Policy voting
It appears that protest voting and charismatic leadership do not per-
form well in explaining support for radical right parties. Socio-structu-
ral models explain only 13 per cent of the variance in support for these 
parties.22 So, what motivates people to support them? The answer is: the 
substance of politics, that is policy preferences. Voters for radical right 
parties are motivated by the same substantive and pragmatic conside-
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rations that motivate supporters for established mainstream parties:23 
they vote for these parties because they are ideologically related (in left/
right terms) or because they agree with them on their core issues.24  
Left/right distances are the most important driver of support for all 
sorts of parties, including anti-immigration parties. Yet, this does not 
mean that voters support these parties for their positions on socio-
economic issues only. Rather, socio-cultural issues have become increa-
singly integrated in the left/right dimension as well.25 As for the issue 
of immigration, the left/right divide is quite straightforward: left wing 
parties advocate lenient immigration policies, while right wing parties 
promote stricter policies. Considering the issue of integration, the 
socio-economic left/right dimension is illustrated by left wing parties 
that stress the role of the government in elevating the socio-economic 
status of immigrants, opposed to right wing parties that emphasize the 
immigrant’s own responsibility to acquire a stable socio-economic posi-
tion. On the socio-cultural left/right dimension, left wing parties advo-
cate a multiculturalist society in which immigrants are able to keep their 
cultural identity, while right wing parties favour a monoculturalism 
where immigrant have to adapt to the culture of the host society. This 
implies that mainstream right-wing parties, rather than social democra-
tic parties, are the main competitors of anti-immigration parties.26 After 
all, they are closest to anti-immigration parties on the left/right divide.
Consequently, the potential level of support for anti-immigration par-
ties depends to a large degree upon the policy positions of their main 
opponent on the right. If the main competitor takes a firm stand on 
immigration, there is less room for anti-immigration parties than if this 
party promotes an open border policy.27   
Do anti-immigration parties behave like other parties? 
Although anti-immigration parties’ ideology clearly differs from that 
of established parties, their strategic motivations and behaviour clo-
sely resemble those of Christian-democratic, conservative, liberal and 
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social-democratic parties. The existing research that we present in this 
part of the chapter focuses primarily on the radical right, as little is 
known about the behaviour of the few extreme right parties that have 
entered Western European parliaments. This research shows that in 
many ways radical right parties are ‘normal parties’, in the same way 
their voters are ‘normal voters’. The parties do not simply shout from 
the sidelines, nor do they refuse to get their hands dirty in the execu-
tive or the legislative. Instead, they seek to realize the same party goals 
as established parties and go about achieving these in similar ways. 
Moreover, radical right parties are in many respects treated as ‘normal 
parties’ by established parties, because their approach to the radical 
right is primarily guided by strategic considerations (e.g. winning back 
electoral support and gaining office) and far less by normative conside-
rations.28   
Radical right parties’ goals and behaviour
Radical right parties have the same objectives as other parties: they aim 
to control cabinet portfolios, influence policy-making, and maximize 
their share of votes (cf. Müller and Strøm 1999). They formulate policy 
programmes, for example, to attract followers, whose support can be 
converted into parliamentary seats. Having a parliamentary presence 
enables the parties to directly or indirectly influence policy-making, 
which they greatly desire despite often being perceived as protest par-
ties (De Lange 2008). However, like established parties, radical right 
parties are not always able to maximize office, policy and votes at the 
same time. Important trade-offs exist between these goals, because 
strategies that serve to maximize one goal hamper the maximization of 
others. Government participation, for example, provides parties with 
cabinet portfolios and direct influence on policy-making, but it is likely 
to lead to electoral losses in subsequent elections. After all, governing 
parties are often responsible for unpopular reforms and are therefore 
likely to be punished by voters. Although it has every so often been assu-
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med that those trade-offs are more pronounced for radical right parties 
than for established parties, existing studies show the opposite (De 
Lange 2008).29 
Radical right parties in office
The executive arena is an area in which the strategic behaviour of radical 
right parties and the strategic responses of established parties can be 
clearly observed. Despite their success at the polls, radical right parties 
have long been kept out of public office. In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
both established parties of the left and the right refused to ally with these 
parties. However, since the mid-1990s established parties of the right 
have invited these parties into national governments in a number of 
countries (see Table 1), for strategic reasons that will be outlined below. 
In Italy in 1994, for example, Silvio Berlusconi forged a coalition of the 
Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Forza Italia (FI) and the LN. Although initially 
short-lived, the coalition resigned the same year, it resumed office in 
2001 and most recently in 2008. Austria was the second country to have 
a government in which a radical right party participated. In 2000 the 
Austrian Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) formed a government with 
Jorg Haider’s FPÖ after lengthy coalition negotiations with the Sozialde-
mokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) broke down. Three years later ÖVP-
leader Wolfgang Schüssel decided to reform his coalition with the FPÖ 
and its successor the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ), despite the poor 
electoral showing of the latter party in the 2002 elections. In 2002 the 
LPF entered the Dutch parliament with an impressive 17 per cent of the 
popular vote and was immediately invited into a government alliance by 
Jan Peter Balkenende, leader of the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA). 
The SVP had been represented in Swiss Federal Council for many years, 
but in 2003 the radical wing of the party got the upper hand in the coun-
cil when its leader Christoph Blocher was elected to it. Hence, most stu-
dies consider it to be a radical right party with government experience 
since this year. Most recently, the Norwegian FrP assumed office after 
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the 2013 elections, in a government led by the conservative Høyre (H). 
Although the BZÖ, FPÖ, FrP, LN, LPF, and SVP are the only radical 
right parties that have held cabinet portfolios, other parties have acted 
as support parties to right-wing minority governments. Between 2001 
and 2011 Denmark was governed by minority coalition consisting of 
the conservative Det Konservative Folkeparti (KF) and liberal Venstre 
(V), which survived by the grace of the support of the Dansk Folkeparti 
(DF). In the Netherlands, a country without a tradition of minority 
governance, the PVV concluded a gedoogakkoord (support agreement) 
with the Dutch Christian-democratic CDA and the liberal VVD in 2010. 
However, the government resigned a mere two years later after the PVV 
withdrew its support. 
As the overview highlights, especially established parties of the right 
(e.g. Christian-democratic, conservative and liberal parties) have resor-
ted to governing with radical right parties. In Western Europe, coali-
tions including on the one hand radical right parties, and on the other 
green, social-democratic or social-liberal parties have not (yet) been 
constructed, at least not at the national level. However, in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as at the regional and the local level, these allian-
ces are not uncommon. Examples include the Carinthian coalition bet-
ween FPÖ and SPÖ that was formed in 2004 and the Fico government in 
Slovakia, which included both the radical right Slovenská národná strana 
(SNS) and the social-democratic Sociálna demokracia (Smer).
Government participation in coalitions led by established parties of 
the right is an attractive possibility for the radical right. Radical right par-
ties on the one hand and Christian-democratic, conservative and liberal 
parties on the other hand, have partially overlapping orientations,30 
but prioritise different issues. This makes it possible to reach coalition 
agreements in which every party can implement preferred policies on 
its core issues. Radical right parties, for example, attribute high levels of 
salience to immigration and integration issues, while liberal parties are 
keen on economic reform. These differences make it possible for these 
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parties to exchange favours for mutual gain, that is to negotiate on a quid 
pro quo basis where advantages are granted in return for something. 
When this bargaining strategy is used, parties are willing to give each 
other free reign in policy domains that are not central to their party plat-
forms. This trading of influence over certain policy domains facilitates 
the conclusion of a coalition agreement. Hence, the way in which radical 
right parties negotiate about coalition agreements with established par-
ties differs from traditional ways of forming coalitions, which is based 
on compromising, meeting in the middle, and splitting the difference. 
As a result, coalition agreements between radical right parties and esta-
blished parties of the right yield substantial policy pay-offs for all invol-
ved parties (De Lange 2012a, 2012b).31  
Despite this rationale for radical right parties’ government participa-
tion, it is often believed that they are either unwilling or unable to take up 
responsibility in the executive. However, reality proves otherwise. First 
of all, when invited to participate in government coalitions by Christian-
democratic, conservative or liberal parties, radical parties are generally 
inclined to accept this invitation for the strategic motivations already 
mentioned. They negotiate about the contents of coalition agreements, 
trying to get concessions on issues that are important in their program-
mes, and make deliberate decisions to fill junior ministerial and minis-
terial portfolios, such as the Ministry of Interior Affairs or the Ministry 
of Justice, which preside over asylum, immigration and integration 
policies.32 Thus, contrary to popular belief, radical right parties are often 
willing to take up government responsibility when asked to do so. 
Secondly, once they are in office, radical right parties seek to reform 
policies in key areas, such as immigration and integration policies. 
Although not all radical right parties in office have had equal levels of 
influence on policy output, especially the BZÖ, the DF, the FPÖ and the 
SVP have managed to tighten legislation that impacts upon immigrants’ 
rights.33 In this respect, the parties are capable government partners. At 
the same time it should be noted that a number of right-wing govern-
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ments that have not included radical right parties have made similar 
adjustments to immigration and integration legislation,34 suggesting 
that these parties are not instrumental to policy reform.  
Thirdly, coalition governments including radical right parties are 
not less stable than other kinds of coalitions. The governments that 
include these parties have an average tenure that is not significantly 
shorter than that of other types of government (see Table 1). The Balke-
nende I and Berlusconi I governments were, by comparative standards, 
rather short-lived (10 and 8 months respectively) and in both cases the 
radical right party caused upheaval in the governing coalition and was 
forced to resign (Netherlands) or quit voluntarily (Italy). The Rutte I 
cabinet lasted a little longer (25 months), but had to resign because the 
PVV refused to support a package of budget cuts. However, it should be 
noted that all governments in the Netherlands, also those not including 
radical right parties, that have assumed office in the past decade have 
been rather short-lived. Other governments that included radical right 
parties have been rather stable and have (come close to) finishing their 
terms. On average governments including or supported by radical right 
parties have governed for 37 months, which is considerably more than 
the 18 months the average post-war government in Western Europe 
lasts.35 
Fourthly, radical right parties have experienced both positive and 
negative incumbency effects (the effect on party support as a conse-
quence of their government participation) (see Table 1). On average 
the incumbency effect has been negative, but a number of parties have 
gained support among voters in post-incumbency elections. For the 
FPÖ and the LPF the first elections after their term in office proved 
disastrous. The FPÖ lost 16.9 per cent of the voters in the 2003 elections, 
while the LPF was abandoned by 11.3 per cent of the voters in the same 
year. In other cases the losses were considerably smaller or minimal 
gains were made.36 When we compare the results of radical right parties 
to those of other parties, the former do not appear to have fared badly. 
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They have done better than radical left parties, a group in which no party 
managed to win votes after their government participation.37 Moreover, 
the average electoral punishment they have experienced is comparable 
to that endured by the green parties that have been in office.38  
Thus, it can be concluded that radical right parties are in many 
respects normal parties, or at least comparable to established parties. 
Of course, this does not mean they do not differ in any way in terms of 
stragegy and behaviour from their established counterparts. Radical 
right parties have been known »to keep one foot in and one foot out of 
government«39 and maintain their populist profile even when taking up 
responsibility in the executive. In most cases, they no longer focus on 
criticising the establishment as a whole, but attack first and foremost 
left-wing parties (greens and social-democrats) and progressive par-
ties (social-liberals). The PVV, for example, accuses Dutch left-wing 
parties GroenLinks (GL) and Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) of promoting 
‘left-wing hobbies’ and being part of a ‘left-wing church’ to which also 
Dutch mainstream media outlets and opinion leaders belong. More-
over, most governing radical right parties shift their criticism to other 
institutions and actors, such as the European Union, the judiciary, and 
the media, which are accused of preventing them from executing their 
policy reforms.40  
How do established parties respond?
Before we elaborate on the consequences of different responses to anti-
immigration parties, we briefly discuss the different strategies available 
for established parties to combat these parties.
Different responses to anti-immigration parties
Established parties can choose between two strategies to respond to 
anti-immigration parties: to engage or disengage.41 By disengaging from 
anti-immigration parties, established parties deprive these parties 
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from any sense of legitimacy. To this end, established parties can either 
ignore or isolate anti-immigration parties. By ignoring anti-immigration 
parties, established parties hope to accomplish that these anti-immigra-
tion parties will quickly wither and fade due to a lack of attention and/
or recognition. Isolation is achieved by way of legal or political means, 
such as raising the electoral threshold, outlawing the party, or forming 
blocking coalitions. Both strategies of disengagement – ignore and iso-
late – are so-called ‘clean-hands’ strategies; these strategies are politi-
cally correct and adhere to the advice of most anti-racism groups.42  
Established parties can also pursue a strategy of engagement. One 
way of engaging with the anti-immigration party is to (partially) adopt 
their policy positions. Another way of engaging with anti-immigration 
parties is formal collaboration. This latter strategy of collaboration can 
occur in three domains: the legislative, executive, and electoral domain. 
Legislative collaboration entails that, from time to time, established 
parties vote together with anti-immigration parties on a particular piece 
of legislation. Executive collaboration takes the partnership one step 
further, and entails that established parties agree to form a governing 
coalition with the anti-immigration party. The highest order of colla-
boration is the formation of a formal coalition agreement between an 
anti-immigration party and one or more established parties, to contest 
elections jointly.43 Of course, the two strategies of engaging and disenga-
ging may to some extent be combined. Established parties may partially 
adopt the policy positions of an anti-immigration party, while at the 
same time challenging its legitimacy.
All strategies entail possible drawbacks for the established party. 
Ignoring the anti-immigration party, for example, can seem as a renoun-
cement of democratic duties. Also, while co-optation of policy positions 
might win back voters, in turn, the party now risks losing its own core 
constituents. And although collaboration may register immediate posi-
tive effects, established parties also run the risk that voters dismiss them 
as power-hungry politicians who sold their soul. Besides, the decision to 
Not that different after all: radical right parties and voters in Western Europe
85
collaborate can cause friction within the party itself. For example, when 
the Dutch Christian democratic CDA took part in a minority govern-
ment that was officially supported by the PVV, this led to a serious rift 
within the party. Legal and political containment most likely weakens 
anti-immigration parties, but it inherently concerns a strained relation 
with the democratic right of freedom of expression. To put legal or poli-
tical restraints on certain actors, opposes this democratic principle.44  
Consequences for anti-immigration parties
Art45 maintains that when established parties enforce a strategy of 
disengagement, they can effectively weaken anti-immigration parties. 
Strategies of disengagement signal to potential voters that the party is 
illegitimate, and in general, elite cues are expected to reduce electoral 
support. Besides, strategies of disengagement impair anti-immigration 
parties’ ability to recruit qualified party members and thus to organize 
effectively; capable politicians are unwilling to work for parties that 
have no hope of gaining executive authority. Art46 takes Germany as 
an example of a country where anti-immigration parties have been 
successfully repressed. Germany’s Nazi past produced a ‘culture of 
contrition’ among all elite actors, making them extremely sensitive 
and vigilant towards parties that bore any resemblance to the Nazis, 
or sought to downplay the Second World War atrocities. Therefore, 
German political actors adopted a clear strategy of de-legitimization of 
Die Republikaner (REP), following this party’s electoral breakthrough in 
1989. While political collaboration could have been beneficial for some 
established parties, this was not considered an option. The Germans 
followed a collective policy of seclusion (Ausgrenzung) that prohibited 
personal contacts with REP politicians, legislative collaboration with 
REP politicians, and support for any REP policy proposal or candidate. 
At the same time, REP was heavily combated and marginalized by media 
and civil society. In the end, these measures prevented REP from con-
solidating itself.47 Fennema and Van der Brug (2006) also maintain that 
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one of the main reasons that the Dutch anti-immigration party CD fai-
led to establish itself in the late 1980s early 1990s, was that its message 
was widely and consistently de-legitimized by relevant political actors 
and the media. 
The usefulness of strategies of disengagement is also illustrated by 
Bos and Van der Brug48 who show that party support for anti-immigra-
tion parties, depends to a large degree on the extent to which voters per-
ceive these parties as legitimate. By this they mean that the party is seen 
as democratic. Voters are only willing to support an anti-immigration 
party, when they de not consider this party to be a threat to democracy.49 
More recently, Van Spanje and De Vreese (forthcoming) conducted a 
study into the electoral effects of the prosecution of PVV party leader 
Geert Wilders for hate speech. Their study shows that Wilders benefi-
ted electorally from the decision to prosecute him. The authors provide 
four reasons for why this may have been the case. First, the defendant’s 
party most likely wins a lot of media attention by being prosecuted, 
and an increase in media attention is expected to increase the party’s 
perceived effectiveness, and thus party support.50 Second, prosecution 
can lead to a stronger association between the defendant’s party and 
the political issue at stake. A further strengthening of the association 
between a party and a political issue, amplifies the party’s ‘issue owner-
ship’. ‘Issue ownership’ is an important political strength since parties 
win votes most easily on the issues they ‘own’.51 Third, the electorate 
perceives an issue more important when it gets more media attention.52 
Provided that prosecution indeed brings more media attention and 
voters are exposed to this, prosecution would increase the importance 
of the issues of immigration and integration. This increase in perceived 
importance benefits anti-immigration parties, since they ‘own’ these 
issues.53 Fourth, prosecuted politicians benefit from prosecution by 
portraying themselves as martyrs for freedom of speech. Political mar-
tyrdom is a successful populist strategy to attract voters that are suspi-
cious of the political establishment.54  
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This conclusion supports Fennema55, who asserts that strategies of 
de-legimization have been met with increasing opposition. From the 
1980s onwards, elite actors started to reject the idea of a so called ‘mili-
tant democracy’56 and argued that there is no moral or philosophical 
ground to restrict the freedom of political expression, even when it is 
directed at the fundamental principles of democracy. 
Based on a broader survey of the apparent co-variation between 
anti-immigration parties’ success and the strategies adopted by the 
established parties, Downs57 concludes that overall strategies of con-
structive engagement have been more productive than strategies of 
disengagement. Downs observed counterproductive effects of legal 
and political repression of the VB in Belgium, while he also noticed that 
anti-immigration parties have been weakened or ‘tamed’ effectively in 
countries where it was granted at least some executive authority, such as 
in France, and to a lesser extent in Denmark and Norway. Constructive 
engagement can weaken or ‘tame’ anti-immigration parties in two ways. 
First, in search for greater legitimacy and effectiveness, anti-immigra-
tion parties challenge their hard line politics; they have to make con-
cessions in order to stay in power. Second, anti-immigration parties in 
office have shown prone to internal divisions, poor candidate selection, 
party schisms and rifts, eventually causing these parties to self-destruct. 
Either by design or by chance, established parties have sown the seeds 
of anti-immigration parties’ undoing by granting them a taste of incum-
bency.58 Downs, however, does not suggest that national governments 
should carelessly welcome anti-immigration parties in their legislative 
assemblies. According to the author, collaboration should be coupled 
with an aggressive intellectual/educational campaign that alerts the 
public to the possible dangers of anti-immigration parties.59 
Art60 disputes the effectiveness of strategies of engagement more 
generally, and asserts that these strategies also have counterproductive 
effects; by legitimizing anti-immigration parties, the establishment 
allows these parties to become permanent forces in the political sys-
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tem. Allowing anti-democratic forces to blossom can put the system in 
danger, especially in times of crises.61 Therefore, strategies of disengage-
ment should not be readily dismissed. On that matter, Art stresses the 
importance of timing in order for strategies of legal or political repres-
sion to work. Once the organizations of anti-immigration parties have 
become strong, their supporters loyal and their official entrenched in 
government, efforts to de-legitimize them are likely to become inef-
fective or even counterproductive.62 A recent study indeed shows that 
‘demonizing’ anti-immigration parties only has a negative effect on 
their support in the first years after the party was founded (Van Heer-
den, 2014). 
However, it should be noted that responses of established parties 
to anti-immigration parties are often guided by strategic rather than 
normative considerations. As we discussed in the previous section, the 
government cooperation between radical right parties and established 
parties of the right, was mainly brought about by strategic factors. 
Conclusion
In this contribution we distinguished between two kinds of anti-immi-
gration parties, the extreme right and the radical right. Extreme right 
parties are anti-democratic, whereas radical right parties accept the 
main rules of parliamentary democracies. We discussed much research 
which shows that radical right parties are in many ways ‘normal par-
ties’ and that the people that vote for them are in many ways ‘normal 
voters’. Some political commentators and policy analysist might find 
this conclusion somewhat controverisial since it does not fit the ‘poli-
tically correct’ idea that radical right parties are anathema to modern 
day pluralistic democracies. Much research shows, however, that most 
citizens consider radical right parties to be like any other party, no 
matter what the intellectual and political elites think of them. For this 
reason, it is not likely that (potential) voters will be affected by appeals 
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not to support these parties because of their allegedly anti-democratic, 
anti-system and/or neo-fascist character. This leads up to the question 
of whether the approach to radical right parties and extreme parties 
should be different.
Moreover, debates about the government participation of radical 
right parties have often had a strong normative component. Many com-
mentators have voiced concerns that the rise to power of these parties 
has had negative consequences for the stability of governments or the 
quality of democracy. Although these debates are certainly important, 
they should not distract from the fact that the interactions between 
radical right and mainstream parties are part of the broader process of 
party cooperation and competition, in which strategic considerations 
often prevail over normative ones. To understand why established 
parties in many countries stopped treating the radical right as political 
pariahs, it is necessary to analyse how the success of these parties has 
transformed the competitive and cooperative dynamics of the party 
systems in those countries. The rise of the radical right has shifted the 
balance of power in many West European parliaments to the right and 
has therefore provided some established parties with new coalition 
alternatives and hence a competitive advantage. 
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Changes in the way we communicate – from the Gutenberg prin-
ting press to the first televised US presidential debate – always have 
an effect on politics. The Internet is no different: since the net’s wide 
adoption from the early 1990s on, analysts have long argued that mass 
communication through the web would facilitate collective action by 
bringing groups together around single issues, lowering barriers to 
entry and thereby fundamentally changing the nature of political move-
ments.1 Social media – a very large and varied mix of platforms and sites 
which prioritize content put up by the users – is now at the forefront of 
this change. More and more of us live a greater part of our social, profes-
sional and political lives online. Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and Linke-
dIn are all examples of the rapid transfer of people’s lives – interactions, 
identities, arguments and views – onto a new kind of public sphere; a 
vast digital social commons. Europeans spend an average of four hours 
a day online and around three in four Europeans use at least one social 
networking site.2 And it’s still growing: 2010–12 saw an increase in online 
penetration of twenty per cent.3 My argument in this chapter is that 
populist parties in Europe have been quicker to spot the opportunities 
these new technologies present to reach out and mobilize an increa-
singly disenchanted electorate. The rest need to catch up. We are finally 
beginning to witness how this enormous transformation impact how 
people interact with politics. The size, diversity and dynamism of social 
media platforms allow people to connect and form social movements 
outside the existing political channels far more quickly and easily than 
ever before, often at zero cost. New social movements have emerged 
that use social media extensively in their operations and challenging 
existing parties and methods in a way unthinkable a decade ago: the 
English Defence League in the UK, the Pirate Party in Germany and the 
Occupy movement are all examples of movements that have employed 
social media to grow rapidly and create a significant political and social 
impact all in the last five years.
In this chapter, I will argue that these changes – the dramatic reduc-
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tion in costs of organising, mobilizing and communication – are cur-
rently helping populist parties of left and right enjoy significant levels 
of support and prominence, especially when coupled with large declines 
in the levels of trust and confidence people have in existing political 
systems. I will examine some of these broad shifts in Internet use across 
the continent, and explain why and how populist parties and move-
ments have been so effective at using them. I will then present some new 
research looking at the motivations of people who support these parties 
and conclude with the significant challenge these movements pose to 
the status quo. Throughout, I will draw on a poll of 15,000 Facebook sup-
porters of populist parties in Europe, conducted by my research group 
Demos between 2011–2013.4
The populist moment 
Recent election results and opinion polls across Europe appear to show 
that populist parties are growing across the Continent. Over the past 
five years, focus has mainly been on those which are broadly right wing, 
defined by their opposition to immigration, multiculturalism (with a 
special focus on Islam) and concern for protecting national culture, 
often against the EU and/or globalization. They vary of course: some, 
like the UK Independence Party, are a non-racist, liberal, but anti-Euro-
pean Union party with a restrictive approach to immigration. Others, 
such as Greece’s Golden Dawn, are defiantly racist and often openly 
Neo-Nazi. Although they are often defined as the ‘populist right’ or 
‘the extreme right’, they do not fit neatly into traditional political divi-
des. The growth of these parties over the past three decades has been 
remarkable and they now command political weight in the parliaments 
of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Latvia, as well as the European Parliament. 
However, the economic crisis appears to have also helped lift what is 
sometimes called the ‘populist left’, which focuses more on citizens’ and 
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workers’ rights against global capitalism, and opposes spending cuts 
and austerity measures (subsequently often being fairly anti-European 
Union in outlook and rhetoric). Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a rabble rousing 
Communist candidate, secured 11 per cent of the first round vote in last 
year’s French Presidential race, while SYRIZA (The Coalition of the 
Radical Left) in Greece might beat the New Democrats in the next natio-
nal election.5 In the February 2013 Italian elections, Beppe Grillo’s party, 
the ‘Five Star Movement’, became the largest single party in the Italian 
parliament. In fact, Beppe Grillo straddles both left and right. He is a 
popular comedian and blogger; and he ran a vehemently anti-establish-
ment campaign, selecting his candidates online, and refusing to give 
any interviews to the Italian media, communicating instead through 
his own blog. These parties also performed well at the 2014 European 
parliamentary election – with Beppe Grillo coming second in Italy, while 
SYRIZA came top in Greece. Overall, the results were viewed as a suc-
cess for the anti-EU populist parties, at the expense of the mainstream 
centre-left and centre-right.
Despite offering radically different solutions to perceived social 
problems, both sets of movements are part of the same general trend, 
broadly defined as ‘populist’. Populist parties across the spectrum 
pit the good, honest, ordinary voter against the out of touch, liberal, 
mainstream political elite. They claim to represent the former against 
the latter, an authentic and honest voice in a world of spin and self-inte-
rest.6 Taken together, ‘populist’ parties across the spectrum are increa-
sing in size and popularity.
Democratic crisis
One of the key social trends over the last decade has been the decline 
in trust, engagement and support for the national democracies and the 
institutions of political and social life across much of Europe. There is 
a growing democratic deficit: the perception and reality that there is a 
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large distance in understanding between the governors and the gover-
ned. Political parties, sitting at the heart of both national and European 
elections, are highly distrusted almost everywhere. In Germany 68 per 
cent distrust them, as do 86 per cent of French citizens and 83 per cent 
of British citizens. Their formal membership has been falling for the 
past 30 years: Parties in the UK and France have lost around one million 
members and German parties half a million. Only around two per cent 
of voters in these countries are now members of a mainstream political 
party.7
By representing the ordinary person against the out of touch profes-
sional politician, populist parties can surf the wave of this widespread 
disillusionment against ‘the system’.  Of course, the supporters of left 
and right populist parties differ on specifics. While the right tend to 
concern themselves with immigration, integration and identity, the 
left are more worried by economics and jobs (although, it is important 
not to exaggerate that distinction). They are united, however, in their 
general dissatisfaction with the institutions of political life. In my 
research looking at the online supporters of populist parties and move-
ments, supporters consistently displayed significantly lower levels of 
trust in political parties, the justice system, parliament and the media, 
compared to the typical citizen. Whether they were from the left or 
right was immaterial. For example, in Demos’ recent research on new 
political movements in Hungary, levels of trust in the government were 
exactly the same for the far right Jobbik party and the left wing populist 
movements like the Hungarian Solidarity Movement (or Dialogue for 
Hungary), with a mere five per cent tending to trust their government.8 
Amongst the general Hungarian population, 31 per cent tend to trust the 
government.9 Similarly, while only 12 per cent of Jobbik supporters and 
9 per cent of supporters of left-wing populist groups trusted political 
parties, 20 per cent of Hungarians more generally tended to trust them.10 
The same patterns were found in our studies of the German Pirate Party 
and the Italian Five Star Movement – both broadly left wing –the Ger-
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man Die Freiheit and Italian Casa Pound party (although this is perhaps 
more accurately described as a ‘movement’) – both broadly right wing. 
In terms of the level of trust with which the press, the police and a host of 
other institutions are regarded, right and left wing populists have more 
in common with each other than with the population more generally.11
Turning disenchantment into politics
Yet disenchantment and disillusionment on their own are rarely enough 
– new forms of communication, particularly the networking, organizing 
and mobilizing potential of social media, is allowing disenchantment 
to materialise into real world affect. This is why the new digital public 
space has become extremely important – a new space for this politi-
cal frustration to be expressed. Close to 350 million people in Europe 
currently use social networking sites: that’s three in four EU citizens. 
More of us sign into a social media platform at least once a day than 
voted in this year’s European elections. Facebook has 232 million users 
across the EU and 16 per cent of European Internet users have a Twitter 
account. Crucially, it’s also political: People use social media to discuss 
news stories, join political movements and talk about public issues that 
matter to them. Unlike a decade ago, a public space is now more easily 
available to citizens willing to learn about and discuss issues beyond 
national borders at essentially no cost. The ability to use social media 
to reach and mobilize voters is increasingly important in a period where 
electoral turnout is so low. Only half voted in radical anti-establishment 
politician George Galloway’s recent by-election landslide win in the 
North of England and under 25 per cent in UKIP’s recent breakthrough 
at local council elections in the UK. While some European countries 
have much higher turnout than others – Belgium for instance, where 
voter turnout is compulsory, achieved over 90 per cent turnout in 2009 
– the downward trend is unmistakable. Only 43 per cent of eligible EU 
citizens voted in the 2009 Parliamentary elections, down from 45.5 per 
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cent in 2004, 49.5 per cent in 1999, 56.7 per cent in 1994, 58.4 per cent 
in 1989, 59 per cent in 1984, and 62 per cent in 1979.12 In the 2014 elec-
tions – for the first time – turnout did not fall overall, although nor did 
it increase. As the recent US elections demonstrate, social media can be 
an incredibly useful way to quickly and easily reach and mobilize voters. 
Indeed, you don’t need the weighty machinery of an established party: 
Facebook groups and Twitter feeds can spread a message and mobilize 
voters for next to no cost. 
Subsequently, social media is increasingly part of political campaigns 
– for all parties. It is affecting the way political parties form, organize, 
communicate and listen to potential voters.13 There has been a marked 
increase since 2005 in participation in online polls, surveys, petitions 
and joining political groups. The political habits of many European 
citizens are changing in other ways too. Voters and non-voters alike are 
increasingly non-partisan, less likely to be bound by tightly defined poli-
tical ideology or even a defined identification with one party or another. 
While this trend is most prevalent amongst young people, it is a general 
attitudinal shift rather than a generational phenomenon.
Populist parties have been quick to spot the opportunities this pre-
sents. Indeed, generally speaking, political radicals are early adopters 
of new forms of technology. In the eighties and nineties, for example, 
the American white supremacist organisations Stormfront and the 
Aryan Brotherhood created and maintained popular support groups on 
Usenet and Bulletin Board Systems. According to the Alexa, a company 
that ranks website traffic, the British National Party’s website is signi-
ficantly more popular than either Labour’s or the Conservative Party’s. 
The number of Facebook supporters of European populist parties often 
dwarfs those of mainstream political parties, and even their own formal 
membership.14 For example, at the time of writing, the British National 
Party has 159 thousand Facebook likes and UKIP has close to a quarter 
of a million. Meanwhile, the Conservative party has 250 thousand, the 
Labour party 180 thousand and the Liberal Democrats 100 thousand. 
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Similarly, in Italy, Beppe Grillo has 1.6 million likes, while current Prime 
Minister Renzi has fewer than half that. 
Social media is in many ways the ideal medium for populist parties. 
It is distributed, non-hierarchical and democratic. It is an alternative 
to the mainstream media, which many supporters of populist parties 
strongly distrust. It is therefore not controlled by the elites: the content 
is generated by us – the honest, hard-working, ordinary citizens – exactly 
those people who the populists are defending. Indeed, populist parties 
are far less likely to trust mainstream media sources than the typical 
citizen. While an average of 30 per cent of EU citizens trust mainstream 
media sources, only 12 per cent of European populists trust them.15 This 
is true of the supporters of populist parties on both the left and the right. 
In Italy, for example, 18 per cent of the right-wing Lega Nord’s suppor-
ters trust the mainstream media and only 11 per cent of Beppe Grillo 
supporters tend to trust the press; 4 per cent the TV and 23 per cent the 
radio.16 In contrast, a full 40 per cent of Italians more generally trust the 
TV, 39 per cent the radio and 34 per cent the press.17 Attitudes towards 
the Internet are wholly different. 80 per cent of Hungarian left-wing 
populists trust the Internet, compared to only 40 per cent of Hunga-
rians more generally.18 76 per cent of Beppe Grillo supporters trust the 
Internet, as opposed to 37 per cent of Italians more generally.19 Where 
European populists are more cynical about the credibility and dependa-
bility of every other media platform, the Internet stands out as a bastion 
of trustworthiness. It is the only media source populists have more faith 
in than their compatriots.20
The short acerbic nature of populist messages works well too. One 
of the characteristics of populist movements in general is simplifying 
complex problems, offering impossibly simple solutions that are unlikely 
to work in reality. Humour, outspokenness, pithy put downs and catchy 
slogans: these are the DNA of cyber culture. Beppe Grillo, for example, 
used social media to a quite devastating effect. He is the most ‘followed’ 
and ‘liked’ politician in Europe by some distance; his messages went viral 
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and felt more authentic than wooden press releases. Of course, all the 
while, inside Grillo’s Trojan Horse were exhortations for his supporters 
to form local meet up groups, discuss politics, get out and vote and ask 
friends to do likewise – confounding many pollsters in the process. 
The echo chamber
The consumption of media – essentially how we understand much of 
what is happening in the world – has also been transformed. Social media 
is changing the way people get access and digest their information.21 The 
last decade has seen a steady rise in Internet penetration across Europe; 
at the same time, trust in the traditional press has gone down and trust in 
the Internet and online news consumption has gone up.22 However, this 
dramatic transformation does not necessarily herald a more open public 
space where information flows freely across different groups or sustain 
an informed public debate.The ability to create and personalize our 
own media consumption can lead to what Eli Pariser calls the ‘the filter 
bubble’, which refers to people surrounding themselves with information 
that corroborates their own world view and reduce their exposure to con-
flicting information.23 Sustained exposure to a selective output can har-
den viewpoints and create a false body of evidence, based upon which an 
individual makes flawed judgments about the wider world. This problem 
is made worse by the fact that too many Internet users do not critically 
evaluate the credibility of the information they digest online. 24 
Misinformation, inaccuracies and propaganda often live quite easily 
alongside accurate information online and can even flourish. Metape-
dia is an online encyclopedia aesthetically very similar to Wikipedia, 
ostensibly concerned with ‘culture, art, science, philosophy and poli-
tics’.25 The entry for ‘Immigration’ reveals a series of conspiratorial 
avowals presented as fact, including the assertion that ‘most people 
don’t realize that Jews are the driving force behind mass immigration 
and demographic genocide.’26 Further scrutiny reveals that the website 
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is run by far-right activists. In the context of a dialogue such as that 
concerning immigration, already characterized by political polarization 
and emotive, sometimes poorly evidenced opinion, these specific pro-
blems can have a particularly corrosive influence. On a collective level, 
there is some evidence that this might increase political polarization 
and radicalize perspectives.27 In the UK, we already have what is called 
a ‘reality–perception gap’. For example, in a 2011 survey, 62 per cent of 
respondents thought of ‘asylum seekers’ when asked what they associ-
ate with immigrants. In fact, asylum seekers are only four per cent of the 
immigrant population. Perceptions and reality part company and social 
media can make this worse. More broadly, social media also allows and 
facilitates the creation of social groups composed of people holding 
similar opinions, sharing stories that confirm existing views. This is 
sometimes called the ‘echo chamber’. 28
Understanding the populist voice
As well as providing the opportunity for this kind of misinformation 
and political polarization, social media represents an often very positive 
new public space for popular political and social discourse. That also 
makes it a novel way to gain insight into the motivations of members of 
these groups on a scale that was previously extremely difficult. 
In a recent survey of supporters of fifteen European populist political 
parties from left and right, conducted through Facebook, my research 
group at Demos targeted respondents who self-identified as online 
supporters and asked them why they joined.29 Unsurprisingly, for a full 
quarter of respondents, disaffection with mainstream parties or frustra-
tion with their nation’s political elite was the principle reason for their 
choice. One member of the German Pirate Party stated that ‘politicians 
aren’t representing the will of the people anymore’, while a member 
of the Austrian Freedom Party more specifically cited the inability of 
mainstream politicians to engage the populace.30 ‘…what they [FPO poli-
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ticians] do talks to young people and they don’t circumscribe it as other 
boring politicians do […] they make their points a bit »wildly« from time 
to time, but that’s the only way of giving young people a wakeup call.’31 
The second most important catalyst, at 18 per cent of all the justifi-
cations given by members of the (predominantly right-wing) populist 
parties, was disaffection with immigration policy, multiculturalism and 
integration. Many of the anti-immigration arguments were detailed. 
One English Defence League supporter stated that ‘mass immigration, 
which may well benefit the »upper classes« but kicks the working class 
in the teeth, colonizes whole communities and erodes our culture, puts 
a strain on public services, increases crime...’. Other statements were 
more overtly xenophobic. One Dutch Freedom Party follower justified 
his support for the party with the simple statement ‘we need to get rid 
of all foreigners’. 
Feelings of alienation and isolation and perceptions of cultural ero-
sion motivated 15 per cent of respondents. One Bloc Identitaire mem-
ber explained his support as due to ‘the values of our identity’ and ‘too 
much anti-white racism in this country’.32 One respondent joined the 
Swedish Democrats ‘to save my heritage my people and my customs.’33 
14 per cent focused on a specific party policy or political leader. One 
English Defence League member stated that ‘after hearing Tommy 
Robinson speak for the first time, I was absolutely 100% sold. All my 
worries and conerns were comming [sic] straight out of his mouth into 
waiting cameras and reporters, with 1000 people standing behind him 
to cheer him on.’  One support of Grillo’s Five Star Movement listed its 
policies towards ‘water [utilities], citizens participation’ and the ‘use of 
the computer for democracy’ as their principle motivations.34 
A threat to democracy? 
It is the argument of this chapter that new trends in communication 
work well for populist parties – and they are taking advantage of the 
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opportunities they present. Taken together with other trends in society 
– such as growing voter disenchantment and trust, it is likely that popu-
list movements of all shades will continue to grow in popularity. 
However, it is unclear the extent to which a leap in support for popu-
list parties presents a major threat to open, liberal democracy.  There is a 
natural check on the size of populist parties – their radicalism and popu-
larity is usually inversely proportionate to their distance from power. As 
they become more successful they are held to greater scrutiny and the 
subsequent self-imposed seriousness makes them appear a little more 
like the parties they claim to oppose. When in power, such as the gover-
ning coalitions of agreements made by the Danish People’s Party or Geert 
Wilder’s Freedom Party, their popularity often drifts, as impossible pro-
mises are not kept. After all, announcing policies or criticising others is 
easier than actually delivering meaningful and long-term change. 
What’s more, ‘populism’ is malleable, elastic, at once a term of abuse 
and of pride. Certainly, it can be an important check on politics that gets 
too far out of synch with those it is meant to represent; a sort of demo-
cratic nudge. Concerns about the effect of immigration and segregated 
communities are in some instances perfectly legitimate, worries, which 
cannot and should not be pretended away in a liberal democracy. But 
where populist parties resort to an overly simplistic form of politics 
that stirs up enraged emotions and channels it unfairly against (usually 
foreign) scapegoat, it does become a problem.   
The challenge therefore lies ultimately with other parties to respond. 
The more established parties may have to change to survive: they 
will have to get used to a new type of membership – elastic, less loyal 
and conditional – which can be mobilized at election time. The future 
belongs to the party that can respond to concerns that people have in a 
way that makes sense to them, without tipping into unhealthy populism, 
and using modern communications and technology to understand, con-
nect, respond and mobilize. This will make for an increase in ‘shock’ 
results in the years ahead.  Although that might be mitigated somewhat 
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if the larger parties begin to learn lessons from the way populist parties 
have been able to find new audiences and channels using social media. 
The UK Labour Party, for example, has recently hired Matthew McGre-
gor (a former digital adviser to President Obama’s 2012 re-election 
campaign team) to help the party use social media more effectively to 
fight the 2015 General Election. But whichever way you view it – and it 
often is a matter of perspective – this will jolt some life into a stuttering 
democracy, making the whole system more chaotic, but hopefully also 
more dynamic, diverse, and open. 
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»For us who grew up in Copenhagen in the 50s and 60s Nørrebro 
is something special […] there was room to do what you wanted and lots of 
tolerance. Today Nørrebro is totally changed […] the tolerance is gone. A main 
reason for this is that Nørrebro has become a Muslim enclave. And where 
Islam comes in, tolerance goes out.«  – Pia Kjærsgaard, member and former 
leader of the DPP.1 
»There is a certain spirit to Nørrebro. When you say: ’What is Nørrebro?’ 
The answer is love. […] It is about humanism and taking care of the weak […] 
There are many cultural and political groups in Nørrebro […] They work 
from keywords such as love, tolerance, free spiritedness, curiosity and youth-
fulness.« – Thorsten Dam, local journalist from Nørrebro.
Nørrebro is a district of Copenhagen and as shown above, depending 
on who you talk to, it is described and experienced very differently. 
Some see it as a place filled with love and tolerance of diversity while 
others see it as an un-Danish part of Copenhagen »ruled« by Muslims. 
Nørrebro is an example of an area where a nationwide, popular anti-
immigration party experiences very little voter support. This chapter 
seeks to describe the central actors, debates and public action in this 
specific area in order to come up with an explanation for the otherwise 
popular party’s unpopularity. This will include a description of the 
party’s only successful election in the area in 2001.
This case study explores reasons for why the Danish People’s Party 
(DPP) experiences low voter support in Nørrebro. It is argued that the 
demographic composition of Nørrebro provides one explanation: as 
the area is mainly populated by groups, such as young people and ethnic 
minorities, who are statistically unlikely to vote for the DPP. Moreover, 
other parties and civil organizations have been successful in creating 
an atmosphere of tolerance and acceptance of cultural, religious and 
ethnic diversity in Nørrebro.
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The Danish People’s Party –  
a right-wing party with success
A poll from July 11 2014 indicates that the DPP would get 21.5 per cent of 
the votes in a general election, which would make it the second largest 
party in Denmark.2 The following section will focus on the rise of the 
DPP: how it was founded and how it has become one of the most influen-
tial parties in Danish politics.
The DPP was founded in 1995 by a splinter group from the Progress Party 
(PP). The PP’s main policy was to erode all income tax and to minimize 
state regulations and welfare. In the 1980’s they started promoting anti-
immigration and especially anti-Muslim politics.3 In 1995 Pia Kjærsgaard 
and Kristian Thulesen Dahl, among others, decided to form their own right-
wing party that could join in coalition with other parties and appear respec-
table, something the PP has struggled with.4  This party became the DPP.5 
The PP was, however, not the only foundation of the DPP. The Danish 
Association (DA), which was founded in 1987, and had around 3.000 
members, created a political space for right-wing, anti-immigration and 
anti-Muslim views and arguments. The ties between the DA and the DPP 
have been strong; Pia Kjærsgaard often adopted the populist rhetoric of 
the DA in the DPP’s early years.6 
With ties to the DA it can be argued that the DPP represents the first 
real anti-immigration party in Denmark, since its inception it has been 
involved in nationalist and anti-immigration politics.7 This element has 
strengthened over the years. The DPP has gradually shifted from a party 
rooted in a neoliberal approach to tax and welfare spending to a nationa-
listic and anti-immigration party, which is both sceptical of the EU and 
supports the welfare state.8 The election in 2001 marked a turning point 
for the DPP.9 In 1998 the DPP got 7.4 per cent of the vote, however, in the 
2001 election they received 12.0 per cent - making them the third largest 
party in Denmark.10 In order to form a majority government, the Liberal 
Party and the Conservatives formed a coalition with the DPP. With a sig-
nificant share of the vote they appeared as an obvious choice. 11 
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Since the election in 2001 the DPP has been one of the most influen-
tial parties in Danish politics, in regards to its electoral size, policies and 
media attention. They have gradually moved to the centre of the politi-
cal spectrum and now compete with the Social Democrats over working 
class voters.12 In the election in 2005 they received 13.3 per cent of the 
vote and in in 2007 they received 13.9 per cent. The DPP was the only 
party to gain votes at each election from 1998–2007. The election in 2011 
was the first time that the DPP lost votes when they received 12.3 per 
cent. However, as stated earlier, according to recent polls the DPP might 
become the second largest party in the next election.
Nørrebro
The success of the DPP is nationwide but there are areas in Denmark 
where the DPP struggles to find support. One of these places is Nørre-
bro, which is part of the Copenhagen Municipality. The reason for focu-
sing on Nørrebro is that support for the DPP has decreased in nearly 
every election, compared to the region as a whole. It is also one of lowest 
percentages of support for the DPP in Denmark. The focus on Nørrebro 
is also based on an interest in the specific character of the area, as it 
represents one of the most multicultural and »politically active« areas 
in Denmark.
Nørrebro has historically been a place of political activity, namely 
through anti-establishment protests and riots. Throughout the 1970s, 
80s and 90s there were many clashes between residents of Nørrebro 
and the police, all of which have been politically motivated. The most 
violent incident was the riot after the EU referendum on 18th May, 1993. 
Containers were set on fire and rocks thrown at the police who respon-
ded with gunfire. Another violent demonstration occurred when the 
police evicted the Youth House (Ungdomshuset) in 2007, which fun-
ctioned as a meeting place for extreme left-wing groups and anarchists. 
The following year ethnic minority youths set fire to cars and containers 
as a reaction to what they called brutal and racist behaviour from the 
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police.13 These events have helped present an image of Nørrebro as a 
dangerous and unsafe place.
In 1998 Pia Kjærsgaard was attacked during a visit to Nørrebro. Indi-
viduals from extreme left-wing groups threw rocks after Kjærsgaard. 
She ended up seeking cover inside a bank from where she called the 
police who escorted her out of Nørrebro. The incident made headline 
news and once again added to the image of Nørrebro as a violent and 
politically extreme part of Denmark. In 2003 Pia Kjærsgaard wrote an 
article with the title »Give Us Nørrebro Back«. She argued that Nørre-
bro has become a Muslim enclave and that the tolerance that characte-
rized Nørrebro in the 50s and 60s has been replaced by Islam. In other 
words, she framed Nørrebro as an »un-Danish« area. 
Nørrebro is one of the most multicultural areas in Denmark. In Janu-
ary 2013 26.7 per cent of Nørrebro’s population were either immigrants 
or descendants of immigrants, and 19.2 per cent of the population were 
from non-western countries. Another demographic factor to consider 
is that 71 per cent of the 76,563 people living in Nørrebro in January 
2013 are under 40 years old.14 In contrast to an image of violent unrest, 
Nørrebro’s young population has created an image of the place as a cen-
tre of »urban cool«.15 
Marie Krarup, MP from the DPP, makes the claim that people who 
vote for the DPP often come from multicultural areas where they have 
experienced the »clashes of cultures« first hand.16 The case of Nørrebro 
contradicts this account. In the election for parliament in 2011 only 4.7 
per cent of the voters in Nørrebro voted for the DPP compared to 12.3 per 
cent in Denmark as a whole, and 8.4 per cent in Copenhagen. In each elec-
tion since the 2001 the DPP has decreased its share of the vote in district; 
a direct contrast with the parties rise in popularity at the national level.
The specific political atmosphere in Nørrebro as described above 
means that some of the debates and actions found in Nørrebro are more 
explicit and radical than similar debates and actions found in other areas. 
As an outcome of this, this case study reveals how debates and actions are 
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carried out in an environment where the political frontiers are sharpe-
ned; this is significant for how politicians and activists engage in Nørre-
bro and how the district is represented and debated more widely.
Reasons for the DPP’s low  
voter support in Nørrebro
The study draws on interviews with politicians that are active or have 
been active in Nørrebro within the last 15 years or so. Political repre-
sentatives with a connection to Nørrebro from the following parties 
have been interviewed: The DPP, the Liberal Party, the Social Liberal 
Party, the Red-Green Alliance, The Social Democrats and the Socialist’s 
People’s Party. In total nine politicians have been interviewed. The case 
study also draws on seven interviews with MP’s from the DPP, which I 
have gathered in relation to the EU-funded Rage-Project.17 Furthermore, 
the case study includes an interview with a local journalist and relies on 
an analysis of newspaper articles.
The discussion below will look at Nørrebro’s demography, followed 
by an analysis of the 2001 election, in which the DPP did well. It will then 
take a closer look at debates in immigration in Nørrebro. This will focus 
on how different versions of the »story« of multiculturalism have been 
told in the area and how this might explain DPP’s low voter support.
Demographic factors
The table below shows the distribution of votes in Nørrebro in each 
election for parliament from 1998-2011 for selected parties.18 
The general voting pattern in Nørrebro shows that left-wing and cen-
tre-left parties - the Red-Green Alliance, the Socialists People’s Party, 
the Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party - are popular among 
voters; they have collectively shared over 65 per cent of votes since 1998. 
The centre-right and right-wing parties – the Liberal Party, the Conser-
vative People’s Party and the DPP – have not surpassed 30 per cent of the 
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vote since 1998. The election in 2001, however, showed a slight turn to 
the right with both the Liberal Party’s and the DPP’s successful in this 
election (this will be dealt with later on). 
Some of the interviewed politicians see age as an explanation for the 
DPP’s unpopularity in Nørrebro. They imply that young people tend to 
vote for parties on the left-wing or centre-left, or at least tend not to vote 
for the DPP. As mentioned above the population in Nørrebro is young 
with 71 per cent of the population under the age of 40. A national survey 
conducted by the Danish Election Project shows that in the election for 
parliament in 2011, 19 per cent of the voters over 67 years old voted for 
the DPP. Among the voters between 52 and 66 years old 15 per cent voted 
for the DPP. The younger the voters are, the less they tend to vote for the 
DPP. Left-wing and centre-left parties are the most popular among the 
youngest age group with 54 per cent of the votes. The two largest parties 
in Denmark, the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party, are, however, 
still the most popular among the 18–36 year olds with 18 and 24 per cent 
of the votes in 2011 respectively, but both are less popular in this age 
group compared to the oldest category of voters.19 Thus the young popu-
lation in Nørrebro can serve as part of the explanation for the popularity 
of left-wing parties and the low support for DPP.20 
Apart from being an area with many young people, Nørrebro is, as 
mentioned above, one of the most multicultural areas in Denmark. 
This may also explain why left-wing and centre-left parties are more 
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Red-
Green 
Alliance
The 
Socialist 
People’s 
Party
The 
Social 
Demo-
crats
The 
Social 
Liberal 
Party
The 
Liberal 
Party
The Con-
servative 
People’s 
Party
The 
Danish 
People’s 
Party
1998 11,4 16,4 32,4 8,2 11,8 6,7 6,4
2001 9,3 15,0 25,7 15,3 15,8 6,1 8,1
2005 9,6 11,9 20,9 24,0 11,7 6,8 7,5
2007 12,3 27,3 22,7 11,0 8,6 6,5 7,0
2011 27,6 15,2 16,2 20,0 8,4 3,1 4,7
Table 1.
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popular in Nørrebro. According to national survey statistics from the 
Danish research institute Catinét, only 4.2 per cent of the immigrants 
and descendants of immigrants participating in the survey would vote 
for the Liberal Party, the Conservatives and the DPP in total if there was 
an election the following day. The DPP would only get 0.6 per cent of the 
votes. The Red-Green Alliance, the Socialists People’s Party, the Social 
Democrats and the Social Liberals would get 65 per cent of the votes.21 
The Social Democrats alone would get 44 per cent of the votes.  Although 
these figures are on a national scale and produced from surveys conduc-
ted from 2002-2005, it seems fair to suggest little significant change in 
these statistics and that it also would apply for a place like Nørrebro. 
These – young people and ethnic minorities – are two main demo-
graphic groups in Nørrebro, which to a large extent can explain why 
the DPP struggles in Nørrebro. Furthermore, young people and people 
from ethnic minorities also have an influence on the specific political 
atmosphere in Nørrebro. 
In 1999, the Social Democrat Danish Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen, said that the DPP in his eyes never would be »house trai-
ned« – implying that the views of the DPP would always be too extreme 
for them to be considered a legitimate party.22 Many years have passed 
since then and with the popularity of the DPP and its political influence 
it seems that the DPP is generally perceived as a more legitimate party 
today. However, according to those within the DPP this is not always the 
case, especially with young people and people with an immigrant back-
ground in Nørrebro. Referring to people from ethnic minorities, former 
member of Nørrebro Local Council and resident of Nørrebro, and now 
spokesman on immigration and integration for the DPP, Martin Henrik-
sen, describes Nørrebro as the only place where people will stop their 
cars and yell at him on the street: »In that way Nørrebro is a special place 
when you come from the DPP,« as he says. According to Henriksen there 
are areas in Nørrebro that you, as a member of the DPP, have to think 
twice before visiting, for example, areas with a predominantly Muslim 
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population like Mjølnerparken.23 Henriksen explains that his election 
posters never get to stay up for long, though he insists on campaigning 
in the area. Benny Hygum, member of the DPP and Nørrebro Local 
Council, states that it is not only people with a Muslim background that 
can be said to still view the DPP as not »house trained«. According to 
Hygum, anarchist groups have been successful in creating an environ-
ment that predominantly attracts the ethnic Danish youth.24 The DPP 
is their number one enemy. In this way, both young ethnic Danish resi-
dents of Nørrebro and residents with ethnic minority backgrounds of 
all ages contribute to a specific political atmosphere in Nørrebro, where 
the DPP are considered unwelcome and unacceptable. 
Other demographic groups in Nørrebro also contribute to this 
atmosphere and it is not only the DPP who are considered unwelcome. 
Leslie Arentoft from the Liberal Party describes it as a political condi-
tion in Nørrebro that you, as a liberal politician, will be abused by certain 
residents of Nørrebro. He has had his ladder kicked away from under 
him while setting up election posters, been spat in the face and has been 
punched in a bar for being a member of the Liberal Party. Hygum calls 
these people who attack members of the DPP and liberal politicians 
»soldiers«. According to him, these are people who, at almost any cost, 
want to keep Nørrebro a place run by left-wing and centre-left parties 
and dominated by residents with these political values. 
The next section will focus on 2001 to seek an explanation for why 
the DPP gained votes in that year’s election – specifically on how actions 
of the extreme left-wing groups might have contributed to the DPP’s 
successful election results.
The 2001-election
In the election in 1998 the DPP received 6.4 per cent of the votes in Nør-
rebro and in 2001 they received 8.1 per cent. However, the general elec-
tion in 2001 revealed a move to the right in Nørrebro.25 This section will 
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seek an explanation for this: why did the DPP gain votes in this election 
but have lost votes in Nørrebro ever since?
The attack on Danishness
In 1998, three years prior to the election, one of the most famous poli-
tical incidents happened in Nørrebro – the attack on Pia Kjærsgaard by 
groups from the extreme left-wing. Three days after the attack a known 
left-wing political writer, Rune Engelbreth Larsen, wrote an article 
entitled Apologies and Congratulation to Pia Kjærsgaard.26 In this article 
he apologized to Kjærsgaard on behalf of the left-wing for the attack on 
her. He also went on to congratulate Kjærsgaard and the right-wing for 
having stronger grounding from which to promote their tougher stance 
on criminal punishment. Søren Krarup, who at the time was a priest and 
member of the Danish Association and later became an MP for the DPP 
in 2001, followed some days later with an article entitled A Stalwart Girl.27 
He painted a picture of Pia Kjærsgaard as a brave woman who, whilst in 
enemy territory, stood up for her beliefs. Krarup turned the debate away 
from the extreme left-wing groups and to the immigrants groups; he 
depicted the attack on Kjærsgaard as an example of the consequences of 
immigration and multiculturalism. This was an environment in which 
a woman, such as Kjærsgaard, who stood firm on her right to be Danish 
and for Danish values, would be hunted down and thrown out of Nør-
rebro. This episode took place three years prior to the election, so to 
directly link the episode to the successful election for the DPP is proba-
bly a little tenuous, but Pia Kjærsgaard and the DPP might have benefited 
from the episode. Significantly, it enhanced the image of Kjærsgaard and 
the DPP as fighters for »true« Danishness and, equally, it represented 
Nørrebro as a part of Denmark ruled by »outlaws« and Islamic groups. 
Those politicians interviewed for this case study, including Martin Hen-
riksen from the DPP, almost all agree that the attack ended up having a 
positive effect for the DPP and that it gained sympathy for Kjærsgaard. 
The attack might also have contributed to the image of Nørrebro as an 
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unsafe place. The Social Democrat chairman for the Local Council in 
Nørrebro, Kim Christensen, has lived in Nørrebro since the beginning 
of the 1980s. He suggests that the general unrest and demonstrations 
among the extreme left-wing groups in this period, for example in the 
events connected to the Youth House, also lead to residents of Nørrebro 
voting for the DPP because the party promised to put more police on the 
streets of Nørrebro and to reinstate a sense of security.
Another explanation for an increase in votes for DPP is that the 2001 
election was regarded as an »immigrant-election«. One of the nationally 
most debated topics in the months up to the election was immigration. 
Significantly, the election was held only a few months after the Septem-
ber 11th terrorist attacks.28 The DPP was the party with the strictest policy 
towards immigration and could capitalize on the global aftermath of the 
attacks. Immigration was also a main topic in Nørrebro before the elec-
tion. Much of the debate in the media was directed towards the Muslim 
movement Hizb ut-Tahrir.29 The movement held a meeting in Nørrebro 
where they allegedly called jihad a legitimate action and encouraged 
Muslims in Denmark not to vote. Kjærsgaard stated that the movement 
should be made illegal and other members from the DPP used the Hizb 
ut-Tharir meeting as an example of the radicalization among immigrants 
in Nørrebro.30 Nørrebro was being associated with »the problems of 
immigration« by the DPP. Kim Christensen suggests that some residents 
of Nørrebro might have felt worried that many »strangers« were moving 
into their neighbourhood. They subsequently, voted for a party that pro-
mised to deal with their concerns. As immigration was one of the most 
debated themes in the 2001-election this might have been a key factor for 
the DPP’s successful election, both on a national scale and in Nørrebro. 
Framing the problems
The interviewees from other parties all tended to agree that the DPP 
has been a co-creator of a popular image of Nørrebro as an »un-Danish« 
place; overrun by Muslims and extreme left-wing groups. The media has 
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also contributed to this image. Many interviewees talk about how their 
relatives from other parts of Denmark express fear when they visit them 
in Nørrebro: they are afraid of walking on the streets at night and have 
questioned the interviewee on why they have chosen to live in such an 
»unsafe« area of Copenhagen. In recent years the debate on Nørrebro 
has focused on »gangs« who fight each other for the drug market. There 
have been shootings on the streets, which have been widely reported 
and contribute to the violent image of Nørrebro. 
This is a contrast to the experience of the interviewees’ everyday 
life in Nørrebro, who all express how safe they feel and say it is a nice 
place to live (although they all viewed the shootings as unacceptable). 
A main theme among the interviews was how the DPP has framed the 
gang related crime as a consequence of the problems with immigration 
and failed integration. Since 2001, Nørrebro has become more multi-
cultural and as such it is an area that could be characterized by tensions 
between different ethnic groups – which would make the DPP’s under-
standing of the gang related crime a plausible explanation. The election 
in 2001 also showed that anti-immigration views do exist among the 
residents of Nørrebro, so one could imagine that the DPP’s views could 
gain further ground among the residents. This has, however, not been 
the case. A reason for this might be that most interviewees’ tended to 
frame crime, such as gang related violence, as having its root causes in 
social conditions – and not a consequence of immigration and integra-
tion. This represents different stories of, or different ways of framing, 
multiculturalism which has consequences for how the specific problem 
of gang related crime should be handled.
The story of multiculturalism  
and everyday life in Nørrebro
A main theme in all interviews has been that the reality of the everyday 
life in the multicultural Nørrebro does not fit with the way the DPP 
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frames multiculturalism and their immigration policies. The official 
immigration policy of the DPP is »firm and fair«. Their focus is to limit 
immigration, especially from Muslim countries, and to assimilate the 
people with immigrant-backgrounds who already live in Denmark 
legally.31 
The DPP want immigrants to assimilate to the Danish way of life, 
because they believe that people of different cultures cannot live pea-
cefully together. This especially goes for Christians and Muslims. Marie 
Krarup from the DPP: »I do not believe that Christians and Muslims 
[…] can live peacefully together […] because it is two fundamentally 
different ways to see the world, which cannot be reconciled.«32 The 
DPP-rhetoric has constructed an »us vs. them«. The »them« is Islam, 
Muslim culture and Muslims who are seen as male chauvinists, against 
democracy and the Muslim culture as tyrannical and discriminatory. 
This image is in opposition to the image of »us«, represented by Danish 
and Christian values, freedom of speech and democracy. 
The representation of »us vs. them« is what the DPP’s version 
of the story of multiculturalism consists of. According to the DPP, 
Denmark can only integrate a limited number of immigrants, and 
areas with larger concentrations of people from ethnic minori-
ties will be examples of the failures of multiculturalism. Accor-
ding to the DPP, Nørrebro is such an example. Martin Henriksen 
from the DPP explains that the left-wing and centre-left parties 
are wrong in claiming that Nørrebro is an example of how people 
of different cultures can live peacefully side by side and inte-
ract with each other – a version of the story of multiculturalism 
I will get back to. He points to the fact that Nørrebro in general is divi-
ded. One block or neighbourhood is populated by immigrants with 
Muslim backgrounds and other blocks are populated by ethnic Danes. 
According to him, people stick to their »own kind«, which reinforces 
parallel communities. Henriksen explains that the few ethnic Danes 
living in neighbourhoods populated by immigrants feel unsafe: »I have 
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visited some of the Danes that live in areas with many immigrants and 
they feel that there is a smear campaign towards them and they are 
verbally assaulted because they are Danish.« Referring to Kjærsgaard’s 
article, »Give Us Back Nørrebro«, Henriksen says that it is fair to 
demand Nørrebro back from people who come from very different 
cultures and who he feels have »occupied« certain areas of Nørrebro. 
He emphasizes the division between ethnic Danes and immigrants in 
Nørrebro and suggests that when they do interact it often ends in con-
flicts and tensions. In this way, the »us vs. them« image that characte-
rizes the DPP’s story of multiculturalism on a national scale also fits 
into the DPP’s version of the story of multiculturalism in Nørrebro. 
However, it is important to note that there are differences between 
how the local representative of the DPP in Nørrebro, Benny Hygum, 
interprets multiculturalism and the official party policy. An example 
of this is whether or not mosques should be built in Denmark – a much 
debated topic. The official party policy is that there should not be any 
grand mosques in Denmark, but Hygum thinks that it is unacceptable 
to forbid mosques in Denmark as long as they follow existing building 
codes. This reflects what he calls a pragmatist attitude towards poli-
tics. He explains that he is not guided by ideology and, contrary to what 
many people think, the issue of immigration is not his main political 
agenda. He also explains that he enjoys disproving many of the negative 
assumptions people in Nørrebro have about the DPP, namely as a party 
obsessed with the politics of immigration. Whether intention or not, it 
seems that the DPP has a local politician in Nørrebro who is less strict 
and less ideologically oriented than many DPP politicians at the natio-
nal level. Hygum’s more pragmatic attitude might enable him to better 
manoeuvre in Nørrebro’s left-wing and centre-left dominated political 
landscape. The pragmatic approach might also be an attempt to appeal 
more to voters in Nørrebro, in light of the specific demographic factors 
mentioned above. However, given that the DPP is losing votes in the 
area, this attempt appears unsuccessful. 
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The other story of multiculturalism
Even though Hygum does not have immigration on top of his political 
agenda, it is still one of the most debated issues in Nørrebro. The debate is 
often characterized by the DPP’s version of the story of multiculturalism 
on the one side; and the Social Liberal Party’s version on the other. Accor-
ding to Klaus Bondam, Social Liberal and former Mayor for the Employ-
ment and Integrations administration in 2010, the »us vs. them« rhetoric 
of the DPP does not fit the reality of Nørrebro. This loses them votes. 
People live in the middle of a multicultural area, and they make it work. 
According to him the vast majority of people from ethnic minorities are 
good and active citizens. Bondam talks about people in Copenhagen and 
in Nørrebro having an intercultural understanding that comes from living 
in an area where people of different cultures interact with each other.33 This 
is for him the main reason for the DPP’s low voter support in Nørrebro.
According to Bondam, and other interviewees, the DPP has, in an 
attempt to speak directly to potential voters, focused on the symbolic 
differences that are supposed to come from different cultures living 
together. For example, pool times for Muslim women, wearing a veil 
in the swimming pool and whether or not to serve halal-meat in insti-
tutions such as hospitals and kindergartens. Bondam’s strategy on the 
other hand was to portray a different image of the multicultural society 
in Nørrebro and Copenhagen in general. Bondam was one of the main 
politicians behind the official integration policy from 2011-2014 in 
Copenhagen Municipality called »Get involved in the city« (Bland dig 
i byen). The policy brochure includes pictures of people from ethnic 
minorities in different situations that all tell a positive story: 
In the brochure you can find a picture of a girl wearing a veil with her 
bicycle […] we have a male child caretaker with an ethnic minority 
background, some young Somali boys with their high school gradua-
tion hats [studenterhuer], an ethnic minority woman sitting at a bus 
stop. It was important for us to send those signals.
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Bondam explains that communication was very important to him. 
The brochure was a direct attempt to paint a positive image of the mul-
ticultural city and send certain signals, which oppose the DPP’s story of 
multiculturalism. A central point of the official integration policy is that 
people in Copenhagen should interact with people who are different 
from them and that politicians should be active in the demolition and 
deconstruction of »hostile images«. This could be seen as an attempt to 
go against the »us vs. them« rhetoric of the DPP.
The Social Liberal Party’s focus on the positives of the multicultural 
society and the great value of interaction across cultures has been criti-
cized for neglecting the problems that might be caused by a large con-
centration of immigrants in specific areas. Bondam, who is no longer 
a member of the party or engaged in politics, acknowledges that there 
are problems with, for example, criminality and radicalization in areas 
such as Mjølnerparken in Nørrebro, but that these are not a direct con-
sequence of having a »different« culture.34 But he adds that he would 
not want the Social Liberal Party to be the only party making decisions 
in Denmark, because they sometimes can forget concrete problems and 
focus too much on an idealistic vision of how they want society to be. 
This mirrors the criticisms from the DPP candidate Hygum and from 
the Liberal Party’s Leslie Arentoft. Arentoft criticizes the Social Liberals 
and other centre-left and left-wing parties for not being willing to take a 
stance against radical Muslim groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, when they 
protest against the democratic political system. He is sure that had it been 
ethnic Danish neo-Nazis protesting, the left-wing would be more critical, 
but in order to preserve a positive image of the multicultural society they 
do not confront Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hygum criticizes the current Mayor for 
the Employment and Integrations administration, Anna Mee Allerslev 
from the Social Liberal Party, for neglecting the problems with crimina-
lity in Nørrebro. He suggests that she ignores gang related crime, and only 
focuses on portraying the multicultural Nørrebro in a positive image that 
fits the ideology of the Social Liberal Party. Hygum ironically states that 
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Allerslev is so proud of living in Nørrebro that she intentionally neglects 
that she lives in an area where people are shot in the head and stabbed.35  
A Combination of Both?
The Social Liberal Party’s story of multiculturalism is a version that 
focuses on the positive aspects of living in a diverse society. By doing this 
they create a counter image to that portrayed by the DPP.36 Interviewees 
from other parties reveal this positive image whilst also showing an 
awareness of those who criticize this position for »neglecting reality«. 
A good example of this is Ninna Thomsen from the Socialist People’s 
Party. Thomsen states that problems are not solved by constructing a 
»them vs. us« but by saying that everyone has a place in the community. 
By this she distances herself from the DPP, but according to her it is one 
of the main tasks of the political left-wing and centre-left to speak about 
the problems that exist and to deal with them. This is according to her 
the only way that these parties can overturn the success of the DPP on 
a national scale, and it is also how the parties on the left of the centre 
can show that they have an understanding of the worries that some of 
the residents in Nørrebro might feel. Ninna Thomsen lives in Nørrebro 
herself and has written an article in the newspaper Politiken, where she 
described her own experience of living in Nørrebro.37 It is her strategy to 
show that she is a part of the same reality as everyone else in Nørrebro. 
In the interview with her she explains: »The cliché about the left-wing that 
we have all the right opinions, but we live in some sort of a tower far away from 
reality where we don’t relate to the problems that might exist in people’s eve-
ryday life, this is important to go against.« Thomsen’s article’s argues that 
gangs and related crime have too much influence on the everyday life of 
normal residents of Nørrebro and that this has to be dealt with.
Taking command of the story
Gang related crime in Nørrebro has been one of the most debated 
issues in the media and by politicians. The debate itself and how the 
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issue should be dealt with also function as a good example of how the 
DPP frames the story of multiculturalism and how it differs from the 
way other parties frame the story. This initially focuses on an event that 
made both national headlines and attracted the international media 
(such as the BBC).38 In August 2012, a local café-owner in Nørrebro, Jane 
Pedersen, was confronted by men who demanded that she paid them 
»protection money« because her cafe was in »their area«. Jane refused 
to pay and hours later her windows were smashed by the men. Jane 
became a local hero and was later voted Copenhagener of the Year by the 
newspaper Politiken.39  
After the incident many politicians wanted to visit Jane at her café 
called Café Viking. Among the visitors were representatives from the 
Social Democrats, the Socialist People’s Party and the Red-Green Alli-
ance. Pia Kjærsgaard from the DPP also wanted to visit »Mama Jane«, 
as the locals’ call her, but Jane refused to let Kjærsgaard visit her café. 
Jane’s reason was that Kjærsgaard was a racist and that this was not a 
race related problem.40 According to Kim Christensen from the Social 
Democrats and chairman of the Local Council in Nørrebro, the imme-
diate response from the DPP after the attack on Café Viking was that this 
was a problem caused by the immigrants from Mjølnerparken. Accor-
ding to Christensen, the reason why Mama Jane did not want the DPP to 
visit her café, was that she had a more nuanced perspective of the gang 
related problems in Nørrebro and that she knew it was not an problem 
of immigration. Christensen emphasizes that gangs do not just consist 
of »blacks« but also of »whites«; therefore it is incorrect to reduce gang 
violence to an issue of race or culture. 
Christensen and interviewees from the Social People’s Party and the 
Red-Green Alliance all share the view that problems in Nørrebro, for 
example with gangs, are not caused by the fact that Nørrebro is multi-
cultural and that people of different skin colours, religions and cultures 
live side by side. Instead, this relates to social conditions such as levels 
of education, unemployment and housing issues. The Liberal Party and 
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the Conservatives do in many ways agree with this. In an article in Politi-
ken Leslie Arentoft explains that he believes that all integration projects 
in Nørrebro have failed in reducing gang related problems and should 
be shut down. He is backed up by Jacob Næsager from the Conservative 
People’s Party who says that a reason for why the integration projects 
have not been successful in reducing gang related problems is that these 
problems are not solely caused by people from ethnic minorities but also 
ethnic Danes. The Liberal Party suggests saving money on integration 
projects and spending them on employment projects instead.41 Even 
though the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals do not agree with 
cutting down on integration projects, the way of framing the gang rela-
ted problems in Nørrebro, as something other than solely integration 
related, is similar for the left-wing, centre-left and centre-right parties. 
Signe Færch from the Red-Green Alliance says that a main reason for 
the DPP’s low voter support in Nørrebro compared to other places in 
Denmark is that they do not get to set the agendas that they are success-
ful in doing elsewhere. She mentions that, elsewhere, the gang related 
problems in Nørrebro might have been framed by a »racist agenda«, but 
that the DPP are not successful in doing this in Nørrebro because resi-
dents know from living amongst each other that culture or race are not 
the reason behind the problems. 
A general comment from the politicians interviewed is that the DPP 
are rather invisible in the political debate and negotiations in Nørrebro 
and insignificant in Copenhagen in general. This is of course a reflection 
of the voter support, which has minimized the DPP’s political influence. 
It might however also reflect a political climate in Nørrebro that to some 
extent might be exclusionary of the DPP and other parties. According to 
Martin Henriksen from the DPP representatives from other parties who 
had argued against him in official political discussions sometimes would 
come over after the discussion and say they actually agreed with him 
on the issue discussed – implying that off the record other politicians 
would be less hostile towards the DPP. Leslie Arentoft from the Liberal 
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Party has also felt excluded in Nørrebro and described an episode where 
a local politician from the Socialists People’s Party was shocked to see 
him, a liberal politician, at a panel discussion. Arentoft describes the 
attitude of some left-wing and centre-left politicians as if they have an 
ownership of Nørrebro. This provides some evidence that politicians 
from popular parties in Nørrebro exclude representatives from more 
unpopular parties. Popular parties, perhaps unsurprisingly, challenge 
this perspective. Instead, the relevant interviewees explained that their 
strategy has not been to exclude the DPP from the political debate, but 
rather to include them. 
Whether or not the politicians in the debate exclude the DPP, the 
people living in the multicultural reality of Nørrebro seem to have exclu-
ded the DPP from the debate by not voting for them. The DPP’s version 
of the story of multiculturalism seems to have been contrasted by the 
experienced reality of the different people of Nørrebro. According to the 
local journalist Thorsten Dam, different organizations and associations 
based in Nørrebro have a big influence on this positive image of multi-
culturalism. He says that these associations promote keywords such as 
»love«, »tolerance« and »curiousness« to create a positive atmosphere 
and image of the different cultures and people in Nørrebro. Dam gives 
the example of the association Antiracist Youth (Antiracistisk Ungdom) 
who reacted to a media debate about halal-meat causing tensions bet-
ween Danish and Muslim communities by arranging a football tourna-
ment. At the event they served meat and food prepared according to all 
religious customs as a way to bring people together across cultures and 
religions.42 Politicians from Nørrebro have also been part of bridging 
gaps between people of different cultures. Diversity Parties (Mangfol-
dighedsfest) have been arranged in Nørrebro, foremost by the Copen-
hagen Municipality with Klaus Bondam and Anna Mee Allerslev from 
the Social Liberal Party as central figures, along with a long list of civil 
associations. These events celebrate diversity between cultures and 
include different food stalls, music and other cultural arrangements.43 
137
The Danish People’s Party in Nørrebro
The fact that the Diversity Parties are arranged by the municipality 
indicates that Copenhagen Municipality politically accepts the multi-
cultural character of the city. Civil associations and politicians actively 
work to facilitate a positive attitude towards the multicultural reality – 
which might be part of the explanation for why the DPP’s version does 
not appeal to the voters in Nørrebro. 
Concluding remarks
Since the DPP’s first election in 1998, the party has only become more 
popular among the voters in Denmark. Recent polls show that the DPP 
might become the second largest party in Denmark in the next general 
election. This case study has explored reasons for why the DPP expe-
riences low voter support in Nørrebro compared to the success the 
party experiences on the national level. Nørrebro is a part of Copen-
hagen that has a history of political activism. Extreme left-wing groups 
and anarchists have since the 1970s demonstrated against the »esta-
blishment« and been in several confrontations with the police. Nørre-
bro is also characterized by its ethnic minority population. It is one of 
the most multicultural areas in Denmark. Ethnic minorities as a large 
demographic group in Nørrebro, combined with the fact that Nørrebro 
is inhabited by many young people, serve as an explanation for why the 
DPP experiences very little voter support in Nørrebro, as statistically 
these groups tend not to vote for the DPP. The case study has also sho-
wed how both people from ethnic minorities and young ethnic Danes 
contribute to a political atmosphere where the DPP and liberal poli-
ticians are considered unwelcome and are attacked both verbally and 
physically. Pia Kjærsgaard was the victim of one of these attacks in 1998. 
This chapter has shown that this attack might have resulted in increased 
sympathy towards her and that this might have had an influence on the 
election in 2001, which was the only successful election for the DPP in 
Nørrebro. This election was, however, also characterized by the focus 
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on immigration on the national level. The interviewees suggested that 
this could also be an explanation for the DPP’s successful 2001-election 
in Nørrebro, as people might have been worried about the »strangers« 
moving in to the area and therefore voted for the party with the strictest 
policy on immigration.
The attack on Kjærsgaard by extreme left-wing groups and young 
ethnic minorities had contributed to an image of Nørrebro to the 
general public as an unsafe place ruled by Muslims. This case study has 
shown how different images and different versions of the story of multi-
culturalism can contribute to the explanation of the DPP’s unpopularity 
in Nørrebro. On the one hand, there is the DPP’s version of the story 
of multiculturalism, which is characterized by the idea that people of 
different cultures cannot live peacefully side by side. This is especially 
the case for Muslims and Christians, who the DPP portray as a »them 
vs. us«-image. According to the interviewees from the DPP, Nørrebro is 
an example of all the negatives of multiculturalism, where Muslims and 
Christians live in different parallel communities and almost never inte-
ract. This is contrasted by the left-wing and centre-left politicians, who 
deliberately have told a positive story of multiculturalism. A strategy 
from these politicians has been to portray a positive image of the mul-
ticultural everyday life in Nørrebro and to encourage people of different 
cultures to interact with each other. They believe that this version of 
the story of multiculturalism resembles the experienced reality by the 
people of Nørrebro and that the problems in Nørrebro are not caused 
by people of different cultures living in the same area, but by social pro-
blems such as housing issues, education and unemployment. 
Thus, an important strategy by the left-wing and centre-left politici-
ans in Nørrebro, which might also be applicable in other areas, seems to 
be to combine the positive version of the story of multiculturalism with 
a clear agenda to solve the gang related problems in Nørrebro rather 
than neglecting them. This has been the critique of the left-wing and 
centre-left by the centre-right and right-wing parties. In other areas the 
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DPP might have been successful in framing issues of gang related crime 
as an immigration issue, as a left-wing interviewee says, but in Nørrebro 
they have not been able to do this. This chapter has shown that this can 
both be a result of other politicians not willing to collaborate with DPP-
politicians, and of a political acceptance and celebration of the multicul-
tural character of Nørrebro, illustrated by the Diversity Parties arranged 
by Copenhagen Municipality and different civil organizations who all 
help in facilitating a positive version of the story of multiculturalism. 
In this way Nørrebro is an example of an area where the positive ver-
sion of the story of multiculturalism has won over the negative version, 
which seems to be winning on the national level. On the national level, 
Nørrebro is often seen as an unsafe place marred by issues with immi-
gration, but the problems in Nørrebro are dealt with as social issues 
rather than cultural ones. The different ways of framing crime-related 
issues are something to be learnt from the case of Nørrebro, as it is argu-
ably one of the main reasons for the DPP’s unpopularity. The politicians 
from the left-wing and centre-left, together with civil organizations, 
have actively created and communicated the advantages of living in an 
area with many people of different cultures, while still focusing on dea-
ling with the concrete problems in the area. This strategy seems to be 
working. 
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Introduction
In the early 1980s, the radical right party Centrumpartij (CP) entered 
the Dutch parliament. This represented a significant shift in Dutch poli-
tical history. Since the end of the Second World War radical right-wing 
parties had failed to gain a presence in parliament.2 However, despite 
their electoral success, the CP quickly fell apart due to internal quar-
rels. In 1984, prominent members of the CP, including party leader Hans 
Janmaat, formed a new splinter party: the Centrumdemocraten (CD). The 
CD’s right-wing policies were continuously de-legitimized by the Dutch 
media and political establishment; the party was even prosecuted for 
hate speech and practices of discrimination. During the general election 
of 1998, the party lost the 2 per cent of the vote it had gained before, and 
never found its way back into parliament.3 While radical right parties 
in other Western European countries, such as France, Austria, and Bel-
gium, were successful in this period, the Dutch political establishment 
appeared to fend off the radical right through a process of de-legitima-
tion and prosecution.
In 2002, the political establishment was staggered by the electoral 
success of Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF). While the LPF was a relatively new 
party, it won 17.3 per cent of the vote in the general election. Former 
university lecturer, Pim Fortuyn, founded the party. Fortuyn was an 
eccentric politician compared to Dutch parliamentary standards. He 
was a flamboyant homosexual, who skilfully used populist rhetoric to 
win over the electorate. Established politicians had great difficulties 
debating Fortuyn. Due to his strict views on immigration and integra-
tion he was frequently accused of being a radical right demagogue. 
Significantly, and in contrast to the legacy of CP/CD, popular support 
for the LPF remained durable and Fortuyn quickly became a media dar-
ling. Shockingly, Fortuyn was shot in 2002 by an animal rights activist. 
Quickly after the murder, the LPF withered and faded, largely due to 
internal strife. 
In 2006, the establishment was again taken by surprise by a radical 
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right-wing newcomer. This time, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) ente-
red Dutch parliament after it had gained about 6 per cent of the vote.4 
The party leader Geert Wilders became famous for his provocative 
and controversial statements, notably in his views towards Islam, and 
his anti-establishment attitude. Although the PVV experienced some 
electoral ups and downs, the party gradually grew stronger and began 
to seriously compete with established parties. Wilders competently 
portrayed the establishment as a class of unqualified and blameworthy 
rulers. In addition, he portrayed his party as the true representative 
of the »Dutch people«, protecting the electorate against »outsider« 
threats, such as immigration. Thus, just like the LPF, the PVV has used 
populist rhetoric to attract its voters, and, once again, the establishment 
had trouble striking the right tone in its response. Moreover, to date, the 
establishment’s reactions appear to have benefitted the PVV, instead of 
damaging it.5 
Thus, while the political establishment and media seemed successful 
in diminishing the CP/CD, it was unable to ward off the LPF and PVV. 
The sudden death of Fortuyn and the organisational beheading of the 
LPF, most likely caused the party’s decline -rather than the reactions of 
the political establishment. Furthermore, the PVV has been a prominent 
member of Dutch parliament for almost eight years now. This raises 
the important question of why established parties have been unable to 
(fully) re-strengthen their position throughout this period and combat 
this new right-wing movement effectively. 
The main objective of this chapter is to ascertain how, and to what 
effect, Dutch parties and media have responded to the populist radical 
right rhetoric of the PVV: How have established parties tried to (re)take 
command of the debate on immigration and integration, and to what 
extent have they  succeeded? What are the effects of excluding radical 
parties, and, equally, what are the effects of political collaboration? 
Furthermore, what role has the media played in this process? Some 
commentators have argued that, in contrast to the treatment of the 
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CP/CD, the media have favoured the PVV by giving the party too much 
attention.6 To address the central questions of this article, we draw upon 
evidence from multiple interviews which the authors conducted with 
(ex-)politicians, pundits, journalists and spin-doctors. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Firstly, we discuss the emer-
gence of Wilders and the PVV in order to understand how the PVV 
became the party it is today. These sections provide the contextual 
background for the interviews. Secondly, we present the results from 
our interviews. Seven respondents were interviewed to shed their light 
on various aspects of party competition between the PVV and the poli-
tical establishment. Thirdly, we consider the role of the media. In our 
concluding section we briefly summarize our findings and elaborate 
upon their implications. 
Wilders and the PVV
Wilders started his political career working for the liberal-conservative 
party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie VVD. From 1990 to 1998 
he served as a political assistant to the parliamentary frontman, Frits 
Bolkestein, who was the first mainstream politician to raise concern 
about the integration of minorities in Dutch society.7 Although some 
party members thought Bolkestein should moderate his tone, the VVD 
blossomed electorally under his leadership. 
In 1998 Wilders became a member of parliament for the VVD. As 
a parliamentarian, Wilders repeatedly addressed the issue of Islamic 
fundamentalism, which he described as one of the biggest threats of the 
decade. According to Wilders, the VVD had simply followed its coalition 
partners, D66 and PvdA, and not set out its own agenda. Not only did 
this position sit in opposition to Wilders views, but he feared it made the 
VVD vulnerable to electoral competition on the right.8 
Wilders’ fear was validated in 2002 when Pim Fortuyn, and his party 
the LPF, entered the Dutch political scene. Fortuyn stated that the West 
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was caught in a struggle between »modernity and a backward and repre-
hensible culture«, i.e. Islam9, and that the political establishment had 
miserably failed to mobilize society against this threat. Quickly, it was 
estimated that the LPF would receive about 17 per cent of the vote. Wil-
ders had to stand by and watch the LPF fill the political space the VVD 
had made available.10  
On May 6th 2002, just a few days before the general elections took 
place; Fortuyn was shot and killed in a parking lot after he exited a Dutch 
radio show. He was killed by an environmentalist and animal rights acti-
vist, who in his trail stated that he sought to protect the weaker members 
of Dutch society from Fortuyn. Despite the murder of its party leader, 
the LPF won 17.3 per cent of the vote at the general elections. The PvdA 
and D66 were the biggest losers, but the VVD also lost votes – from 24.7 
per cent to 15.5 per cent. A government coalition was formed between 
the Christian-Democratic party CDA, the LPF and VVD. However, as a 
political newcomer with its party leader and main ideologist just assass-
inated, the LPF was unable to take its government responsibilities. The 
party was plagued by internal rift and public scandals and just 87 days 
after the cabinet had been installed, the government fell. New elections 
were held in early 2003, whereby the established parties recovered 
somewhat and the LPF fell back to 5.6 per cent of the vote. The VVD gai-
ned considerably and took part in the new government that consisted of 
CDA, VVD and D66. 
With the LPF diminished in size, theoretically the established parties 
were able to regain political control. However, this proved very diffi-
cult. Fortuyn had successfully framed the political establishment as an 
incompetent class of morally corrupt elitists. His message (as well as his 
populist style of communication) had appealed to a large group of voters 
and the established parties, including the VVD, had difficulties safeguar-
ding their political credibility. This inability fed Wilders’ growing dis-
satisfaction with the course of the VVD. In February 2004 Wilders was 
interviewed by Dutch opinion weekly HP/De Tijd.11 In this interview he 
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proposed a ban on headscarves for civil servants. Speculating upon the 
resistance to this proposal, he stated: »Let the headscarves protest, I’ll 
eat them raw«.12 This yielded him a reproach from his fellow party fac-
tion members.13 
The final breaking point between the VVD and Wilders was a dispute 
over the possible admittance of Turkey to the EU. Wilders had formu-
lated an uncompromising 10 point plan with the intention to heat up 
the internal discussion about the desired course of the party, but nonet-
heless he leaked it to the national newspaper De Telegraaf before it had 
been discussed. In reaction, his superiors demanded that Wilders offici-
ally withdrew the 10 points plan, or at least publicly acknowledged that 
it went too far. Wilders disobeyed and let the conflict increasingly come 
to a head. His position became untenable, and in September 2004 he left 
the VVD.14  
The founding of the PVV
After having left the VVD, Wilders kept his parliamentary seat and regis-
tered under the name Groep Wilders. On September 23rd, Wilders held 
his first speech as an independent parliamentarian. He concluded that 
the integration of non-Western immigrants had failed completely. Two 
weeks after Wilders left the VVD, he polled at around 8 per cent of the 
vote (also see figure 1).  However, Wilders’ fierce criticism of Islam and 
multicultural society also invoked death threats and hate mail against 
him. The brutal murder of Dutch filmmaker and Islam critic, Theo van 
Gogh, by an Islamic extremist on November 2nd 2004, illustrated the 
gravity of these threats, and sent a shockwave through Dutch society. 
Wilders quickly became one of the most heavily guarded Dutch citizens. 
However, Wilders did not moderate his tone. On the contrary, 
hyperbolic statements increasingly characterized his political style. His 
general narrative described the Dutch political elite was incompetent, 
reprehensible and morally corrupt. In his view, the PvdA, in particular, 
Sjoerdje van Heerden and Bram Creusen
167
had dramatically failed on immigration and integration issues. He also 
argued that the Dutch establishment had taken society hostage with 
political correctness. By this stage, Wilders had fully adopted the popu-
list discourse of Fortuyn. He also admitted that he learned a great deal 
from Bolkestein, who taught him that you should always stand by your 
argument, no matter how much opposition you receive.15 
On February 22nd 2006, a few months before the general elections, 
Wilders officially registered the PVV. But despite calling the PVV a 
party, it was still not organized democratically (in contrast to all other 
Dutch parliamentary parties). The PVV has two official members: Geert 
Wilders and the foundation Groep Wilders (which allowed the PVV 
to receive donations from supporters). It still remains impossible to 
become a member of the PVV, and therefore adherents have no influ-
ence over party decisions. 
At the general elections in November 2006, the PVV gained about 6 
per cent of the vote. This result surprised friend and foe alike. Clearly, 
the messages of the PVV had resonated well with many voters. Leading 
up to the elections, the PVV had urged for a halt on migrants from non-
Western countries and a five-year ban on the construction of mosques 
and Islamic schools.
The established parties, especially the PvdA and VVD, lost a signifi-
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cant proportion of the vote. The electoral gain of the PVV indicated that 
the VVD had lost many votes to the right. This was an indirect cause for 
former VVD Minister of Immigration and Integration, Rita Verdonk, to 
establish Trots Op Nederland (TON) - an outspoken conservative right-
wing populist movement, which became a direct competitor of the PVV. 
Throughout 2007 Wilders bolstered his attacks on Islam. In February 
2007, he stated that Dutch borders must be closed in order to keep away 
Islamists. He also urged to deport many Muslims and denaturalise 
Islamic criminals.16 Later that year Wilders sent a letter to a national 
newspaper, de Volkskrant, in which he advocated for a ban on the Quran. 
Wilders compared the Quran to Hitler’s Mein Kampf and stated that the 
book entailed a fascist ideology.17 Later on, he called the then Minister 
of Integration and Housing Ella Vogelaar (PvdA) ‘completely bonkers’ 
(‘knettergek’) based on her remark that the Netherlands would be cha-
racterized by a Jewish-Christian-Islamic tradition in the future.18 In 
November 2007, Wilders announced a film project called Fitna to illus-
trate the danger of Islam for Western civilisation. Since no Dutch televi-
sion network was willing to broadcast Fitna, the film premiered on the 
Internet. The film portrayed Islam as a highly violent and imperialistic 
ideology.19 
For a while, TON proved a serious competitor for the PVV, however, 
in January 2009 the curtain fell for TON (largely due to organisational 
problems and internal rift). Subsequently, the PVV climbed back up in 
the polls.20 Wilders had free rein again and his radial attacks on Islam 
proceeded undiminished. In late 2009, he made headlines by proposing 
a tax on ‘head rags’ (headscarves).21 
In 2009, Wilders was prosecuted for hate speech based on several 
of his controversial statements. The trial started in October 2010 and 
became a media spectacle. Eventually, Wilders was acquitted of all char-
ges in June 2011. Wilders stated that his acquittal was first and foremost 
a victory for freedom of speech. Later on, it appeared that the decision 
to prosecute Wilders did not only gain a lot of media attention (natio-
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nal and international) for the PVV, but that this decision also caused an 
increase in the parties popularity which could transfer into votes.22 
Leading up to the general elections of 2010, the PvdA appointed the 
prominent party member, and former mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen 
as its party leader. Cohen had a lot of experience with immigration 
and integration politics. The plan was to juxtapose Cohen’s ‘political 
decency’ with the impertinence of Wilders. Unfortunately for the PVV 
and PvdA, the general elections largely revolved around the financial 
crisis which began in 2008. As the VVD had a strong lead on economic 
and financial issues, they won the general elections in 2010. It became 
the largest party with a little more than 20 per cent of the vote. The 
PVV became the third largest party; receiving 15.5 per cent of the vote. 
For some time the mainstream parties tried to establish a government 
that excluded the PVV, but in the end this appeared impossible. VVD 
and PVV saw no other option than to cooperate. In September 2010, a 
minority government was formed between VVD and CDA, with the PVV 
as its official support partner. It was the first time the PVV took govern-
ment responsibilities, although the party did not control any executive 
offices. For a substantial time the coalition seemed workable, despite 
the fact that Wilders didn’t moderate his tone and there were several 
problems with party candidates appeared. Nonetheless, in April 2012, 
the PVV pulled the plug on their support of the government because 
the party would not go along with the budget proposals of the VVD and 
CDA. New elections were held in September 2012. The VVD was again 
the largest party (26.6 per cent). It appeared that the voters had punis-
hed the PVV for the failure of the last cabinet: the party fell back to 10.1 
per cent of the vote (from 15.4 per cent). The VVD and the PvdA formed 
a new government and the PVV was back in opposition. 
After the election, the PVV gradually regained its support. While 
the attention on the economic crisis decreased a little, the PVV tried to 
bring immigration and integration back on the agenda. At the municipal 
elections in March 2014, the PVV participated in only two municipali-
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ties, but still managed to attract a lot of media attention. For example, in 
early 2013, the PVV initiated a parliamentary debate about the »Moroc-
can problem«. At a party rally in The Hague, Wilders asked his suppor-
ters whether they wanted »more or fewer« Moroccans.23 The PVV adhe-
rents ended up cheering »fewer, fewer« to all the questions. In response 
Wilders said: »Good, then we’re going to arrange that«. The event raised 
outrage and a heated discussion. Several people compared Wilders’ 
comments to Adolf Hitler’s views on Jews in Nazi Germany. It also 
caused friction in the PVV itself. Several parliamentary members, con-
tributors and municipal politicians decided to leave the party, or offici-
ally distanced themselves from these remarks. The party also lost some 
electoral support in the polls the following week. However, despite all 
the outrage and disapproval, the PVV was estimated at obtaining around 
14 per cent of the vote during the most recent polling outcome currently 
available (August 17th, 2014), making it the largest Dutch party together 
with D66.24 
Interviews
In this section we present the results of our interviews. All the inter-
views were conducted in the spring of 2014. The respondents were asked 
about their views on how Dutch parties and the media have responded 
to the populist radical right rhetoric of the PVV, and what consequences 
this has had. For example, have established parties been able to (re)take 
command of the debate about immigration and integration? What are 
the effects of political collaboration and/or political exclusion? What is 
the role of the media in this process?
Respondents
• Hero Brinkman is a former PVV parliamentarian. In 2006 
he entered the Second Chamber, coming in fourth on the 
candidate list. In March 2012, Brinkman left the party due to 
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on-going disputes over the preferred agenda and organiza-
tion of the party. 
• Erik van Bruggen is a former assistant to the then PvdA 
chairman Felix Rottenberg. Currently he is director of cam-
paign bureau BKB25 that develops campaigns for governme-
nts, private companies and public organizations. He was a 
strategist for the PvdA campaign in 2006. 
• Jan Driessen has been a reporter for over twenty years and 
worked for several media outlets. Driessen has also been a 
political strategist of the VVD and advisor to Prime Minster 
Mark Rutte. After working as head of communication for 
AEGON, he now runs his own strategic communication 
bureau Q&A. 
• Johan Driessen is a former staff member of Wilders 
(2007-2010) and parliamentarian (2010-2012) of the PVV. 
He is currently policy advisor to Louis Bontes (also a former 
PVV parliamentarian) of the political fraction Groep Bontes/
Van Klaveren.
• Kay van de Linde is a professional spin-doctor and party 
strategist, who worked for both LN and TON. He has also 
worked in the United States and was part of the campaign 
teams of Ed Koch and Rudi Giuliani when they ran for mayor 
of New York City.  
• Anonymous is a political reporter. 
• Ella Vogelaar is a former Minister of Integration and Hou-
sing for the PvdA who took office in 2007. However, in 2008 
Vogelaar resigned after the party leadership removed its 
confidence because of her alleged poor media performances. 
• Max van Weezel is a political journalist who predomi-
nantly writes for the Dutch quality opinion weekly Vrij 
Nederland. Between 2007 and 2011 he was the chairman of 
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the political press centre Nieuwspoort, which is closely situ-
ated to many important Dutch political institutes, such as 
the Second Chamber. Nieuwspoort, a member’s only club, is 
the place where the Dutch parliamentary press, politicians, 
spokespeople and lobbyists informally meet each other. 
The previous sections of the chapter illustrate how established par-
ties were taken by surprise with the success of the LPF and the PVV – 
parties which have successfully managed to obtain »issue ownership« of 
immigration and integration. Basically, »issue ownership« entails that 
voters associate certain issues with certain parties. Clearly, established 
parties have continuously underestimated the degree of discontent 
about these issues among voters. »Issue ownership« is considered an 
important political strength, because parties win votes most easily on 
the issues they »own«.26 Jan Driessen confirms the idea that the esta-
blishment did not effectively lock down these issues: 
Bolkestein was the first to publicly notice that certain aspects of 
immigration and integration needed to be addressed, but he was 
maligned for this. At that point the establishment missed an opp-
ortunity. We have been very naive about multicultural society, not 
only in the Netherlands, but also in many other parts of Western 
Europe. Collectively we have made the wrong assessment. Bol-
kestein said it, but nobody listened.
 
According to Ella Vogelaar the issues of immigration and integra-
tion have traumatised the PvdA since early 2000. She argues that after 
Fortuyn (LPF) the perception within the party was that it had idealized 
multicultural society too much, and that the PvdA had not sufficiently 
realised that multicultural society also had its downsides. She conclu-
des that, until today, it seems like established parties never really regai-
ned control over these issues. 
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Engage or disengage? 
In general, the establishment has been able to choose between two 
main strategic responses to populist radical right parties: engage or 
disengage.27 Examples of engagement strategies are the formation of 
governing coalitions or the adaptation of successful (and collaborative) 
policy positions. The hope of such strategies is by including populist 
radical right parties in government, their electoral threat is neutrali-
zed. Either, the populist radical right party becomes more mainstream 
through co-operating with more moderate partners, or the party suffers 
from its government responsibilities. This relies on the assumption that 
populist radical right parties are often not as well organized and capable 
as established parties. Alternatively, by adopting the policy positions of 
populist radical right parties, established parties seek to win back votes. 
That is, by becoming stricter on the issues of immigration and integra-
tion, established parties make the populist radical right party largely 
redundant. Examples of disengagement strategies are: raising institu-
tional barriers, outlawing the party, and/or the formation of blocking 
coalitions. These kinds of strategies aim to deprive the populist radical 
right party of its legitimacy, or it seeks to deny them any platform at all. 
According to Vogelaar, the strategy of adopting Wilders’ frame merely 
backfired for the PvdA. In reaction to the realisation that the party had 
underestimated the unease with multicultural society, the party star-
ted to excessively emphasise the negative aspects of immigration and 
integration. She argues that »the [PvdA] was unable to remain balanced 
about this, and once you approach these issues in such a one-sided man-
ner, you quickly step into the frame of Wilders […] I mostly blame my 
own party for this, but other parties such as the CDA and VVD act in 
similar ways. […] Now the tragedy of the PvdA is that next to losing the 
traditional voters, they have also lost voters with a non-Western back-
ground.« Indeed, the latest municipal elections indicated that at least 
in Amsterdam, non-Western immigrants increasingly voted for other 
parties, at the cost of the PvdA.
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Jan Driessen also refutes the idea of adopting Wilders’ populist style 
and/or his party’s policy positions. He argues that the VVD should not 
seek to become a PVV-light: »We should not copy the PVV and scream 
that Moroccans have to leave the country. That is not the way, and it will 
never be the way. It is impossible to scream louder than Wilders does. 
[…] You will always be a bad imitation. You should operate in a civil and 
intellectual way, and not copy the language of the street. Clearly, you 
should point out unacceptable behaviour, but you can never top Wil-
ders. Therefore, you should offer a different perspective that invokes 
pride [instead of distrust and pessimism].«
Kay van de Linde argues that it is undesirable to pursue a reactive 
campaign:
Once you react, the competitive party has the lead. Most voters, also 
the voters who don’t support the PVV, perceive Wilders most credi-
ble when it concerns immigration or anti-Islam policies. […] What 
parties should do is create an environment in which they influence 
the public opinion in such a way that the issue they own becomes 
important. If you wish to battle the PVV, you have to make sure that 
immigration and integration are not the main topics of the election. 
[…] In the case of the PVV you should create a sense of urgency about 
a theme that PVV does not control as much, for example education. 
Academic studies have shown how election results can be explained 
by the salience of particular issues preceding the election.28 By increa-
sing the salience of each of their issues, parties can gain electoral sup-
port. This is the reason for continuously emphasizing ‘their’ topics 
during campaigns.29 For example, before the financial crisis, the issues of 
immigration and integration were very high on the public and political 
agenda. The PVV managed to attract a lot of attention for these issues 
by making controversial statements that resonated widely in the media. 
Because the electorate perceives an issue as more important when 
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this gains media attention,30 this further may amplify the PVV’s »issue 
ownership« and strengthen the party’s electoral appeal. However, the 
financial crisis complicated the PVV’s position, since it shifted the emp-
hasis to economic issues, providing better opportunities for the politi-
cal establishment to profile itself.31  
Johan Driessen argues that during the elections of 2010, the PVV 
deliberately found ways to bring immigration and integration back on 
the agenda. As a member of the campaign team, he noticed that the 
PVV was trailing in the polls because the election focussed on the major 
contest between Rutte (VVD) and Cohen (PvdA). In addition, the elec-
toral debates emphasised the economic crisis. Johan Driessen states 
that it was pre-planned that during a televised debate, Wilders would 
ask Cohen why he (Wilders) needed to wear a bulletproof vest. Wilders 
would then answer the question himself stating that this was because he 
had criticized Islam. The plan was the statement would revive the old 
narrative that Cohen underestimated the violent nature of Islam and 
had failed to deal with the problems of multicultural society. According 
to Johan Driessen the plan worked. The next day immigration was a 
topic of debate again and the PVV gained seats in the polls. Johan Dries-
sen further discloses that Wilders also tried to relate economic issues to 
immigration, by putting forward the question of how much immigration 
had cost the Dutch tax-payer. Subsequently, Wilders maintained that it 
is impossible for the Netherlands to be a welfare state and an immigra-
tion country at the same time. 
Vogelaar argues that issue framing in electoral politics is a problem of 
spin-doctors and party strategists. She is not a strong believer of »slick 
talk« during elections. Media appearances are very important but there 
should also be carefully considered policy behind it. Vogelaar states: 
Something tangible should happen in the neighbourhoods where 
problems arise. If that doesn’t happen, the people who have lost 
trust in politics will never regain their trust. I truly believe that had 
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we been able to execute the neighbourhood plans like we drafted in 
2006, this presented golden opportunities. If we had been able to 
make changes, that certainly would have made a difference. 
Thus, according to Vogelaar parties like the PvdA but also others such 
as the VVD and CDA, have wrongfully adopted the harsh rhetoric of 
Wilders in an attempt to win back voters. Instead, she argues that they 
should make policies that tackle the electorates concerns with immigra-
tion and integration. Hero Brinkman shares this idea: 
Certain groups like homosexuals are harassed by Moroccans when 
they bike through Amsterdam. […] Therefore you have to do what 
Samsom (party leader PvdA) did two years ago: stating that some 
groups in society have an ethnic monopoly on criminal behaviour. 
To be fair, he made this remark in a broader context, but at least he 
pointed out a huge societal problem. […]. The issues of immigration 
and integration will lose their urgency, once you remove the soil of 
the societal unrest. 
Jan Driessen is sceptical. He argues that you should clearly deal with 
existing problems, but that you should not forget that many PVV voters 
live in cities or areas where problems with multicultural society are 
minimal or even non-existent. He states that Dutch politicians and jour-
nalists have drawn these voters into a spiral of pessimism and distrust. 
What is lacking is a positive perspective. By dealing with problem areas, 
the problem is not solved. Therefore, Jan Driessen feels it is essential 
that politicians offer the electorate a new perspective. 
In 2010, the PVV became the official support partner of the Dutch 
minority government. At the time commentators argued that the 
PVV would lose support because it was now unable to portray itself as 
thoroughly anti-establishment. Furthermore, it was argued that the 
PVV would self-destruct since its organization was weak and its poli-
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ticians incompetent. Brinkman confirms that Wilders did not want to 
govern after the elections of 2010: 
Those 24 electoral seats in parliament imposed a huge problem for 
Geert, because some of these people were critical about the course 
of the party, like me, and others were new and enthusiastic about 
making a change and therefore willing to make compromises. […] 
Geert thought we were not ready for taking governmental responsi-
bilities. Finally, I succeeded in establishing a 13–11 majority [within 
the parliamentary faction, ed.] to start negotiations with CDA and 
VVD. 
When asked about possible strategic motives behind appointing the 
PVV as an official support partner, Jan Driessen denies that such consi-
derations ever played a role. He points out that prominent members of 
the VVD did have great difficulty with the political compromise. But, as 
he states: 
At that time, the PvdA refused to take its responsibilities. Thus 
taking away the opportunity of a stable majority government, at 
least not without extensive and complicated deliberation about 
alternative formations. At that point, the VVD and the CDA took 
their responsibilities and acted pragmatically: the country needed 
to be governed and then it just had to be like this [with the support of 
the PVV, ed.]. Perhaps that the government collapse had an impact 
on voters, but the electorate has an unimpressive memory: next elec-
tion many of them will have forgotten and vote for the PVV again.
According to Fennema and Van der Brug,32 the failure of the CD and 
its leader Hans Janmaat was largely due to the continuous de-legitima-
tion of the party by Dutch establishment and media. This was enhanced 
by several criminal prosecutions that also led to three convictions. 
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Contrary to this, a recent study suggests, that the decision to prosecute 
Wilders actually increased party support for the PVV.33 Van Bruggen also 
argues that the prosecution worked in favour of the PVV, even when 
Wilders would have been convicted instead of acquitted. Jan Driessen 
concurs: »[..] the more noise, the more press, the better a protest party 
performs. A trial or prosecution would damage a ‘normal’ politician, but 
these rules don’t apply to Wilders«. Brinkman agrees: »we laughed about 
it. People underestimate Wilders. People think he just yells something. 
But, believe me, he doesn’t. He is a control freak and those people never 
say a word by accident. That his statements led to accusations and pro-
secution was only to his advantage.« 
However, Johan Driessen disagrees with the extent of Brinkman’s ana-
lysis. With his legal background, he assisted Wilders during the trial. He 
argues: »[Wilders] thought the trial was dreadful. He absolutely did not 
want to be prosecuted. […] Many people claimed Wilders loved it because 
he gained a lot of media attention with his trial, but he didn’t love it at all. 
The trial was very time and money consuming and Wilders was sincerely 
afraid of conviction.« Johan Driessen thinks that conviction would have 
harmed the PVV: »Voters dislike convictions, at that point you no longer 
belong to the category Bolkestein or Fortuyn, but to Janmaat and Glim-
merveen [a Dutch politician with neo-Nazi sympathies, ed.].« 
Media
Leaving aside overwhelming events, such as 9/11 or the financial crisis, 
political parties generally have substantial influence on which issues the 
media cover during election campaigns. By seeking and creating discu-
rsive opportunities, party strategists try to influence media coverage. 
Multiple studies indicate that parties are indeed able to affect the media 
agenda, which in turn, may also influence voting behaviour.34
Brants and Van Praag point out that the role of the media has trans-
formed over time. Until the 1960s Dutch media was characterized by its 
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partisanship.35 In this time of »partisan logic«, most written and spoken 
media sources exclusively represented the view of the party or ideology/
religion they were tied to. From the 1960s onwards, the media became 
much more independent. In this time of »public logic«, journalists were 
no longer the »pet dogs« of political parties; instead they increasingly 
became a »watchdog«. The media served the interest of the public 
rather than the interest of politicians. However, right-wing parties still 
complained about a media bias. Public logic gradually disappeared with 
the arrival of commercial television broadcasts in 1989; this was follo-
wed by a time of »media logic«. In contrast to public logic, media logic 
is primarily driven by demand. The increasingly competitive market led 
to coverage that is meant to attract the most viewers/readers. Instead of 
primarily informing the public, most media outlets increasingly want to 
entertain the public. The role of watchdog is largely confined to the act 
of publicising hypes, scoops and scandals.36 
Vogelaar confirms the principle of media logic: »[…] The big problem 
with the media nowadays is that they are extremely confined to the 
coverage of incidents. Due to the strong competition between diffe-
rent media outlets, the urge to score, the hunt for a scoop, has become 
immense.« Jan Driessen argues that the current media culture advan-
tages the PVV: »Wilders’ principal way to handle the media is sending 
one-liners via Twitter. Subsequently the media report these one-liners 
one on one, without much criticism. This way, Wilders determines the 
news and he does so brilliantly. But, isn’t it bizarre that journalists are 
acting like this?« Kay van de Linde also confirms that when one provi-
des journalists with irresistible quotes or one-liners, they almost never 
refuse. He used similar tactics when campaigning for LN and TON and 
»it surely helps«. 
Johan Driessen extends this argument by suggesting that the image 
of the established media as the chief enemy of the PVV is artificial. Ins-
tead, the media are Wilders’ best friend, because without their massive 
attention, the PVV would never have been this big. Often Geert said to 
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me: »Did you see? Pauw & Witteman [Dutch late night talk show, ed.] dis-
cussed the PVV all night and we weren’t even there. They are such dumb 
journalists«. According to Van Weezel, Kay van de Linde introduced this 
strategy in the Netherlands: 
When he [Van de Linde, ed.] was campaign manager of LN, he 
had just come back from the US. He had seen how politicians make 
a huge career out of thin air, using attacks on the establishment 
and leftists/mainstream media to win votes. He advised Fortuyn to 
do the same, and Fortuyn did [to much success, ed.]. After that, it 
became a well-known trick of populist parties. […] Another stra-
tegy of Wilders is not to participate in parliamentary debates on a 
substantial level, but to make sure that he delivers a one-liner. This 
one-liner must be so catching and/or shocking that it dominates the 
news the following days. 
Dutch journalists, Anonymous and Max van Weezel, acknowledge 
that Geert Wilders and the PVV boost media sales. Van Weezel states 
that: »Sex and Wilders sell best, and even more so in combination«. 
Asked about the responsibility of the parliamentary press to assess poli-
tical statements critically, Van Weezel appears somewhat sceptical. He 
tells us that he thinks the parliamentary press is too de-compartmenta-
lized. During the compartmentalisation of Dutch media, there was dis-
cussion about; ‘What are our principles? What do we stand for? And how 
should we perceive and report reality? This discussion has almost disap-
peared. Nowadays it is more about the issues of the day, and the idea that 
you should always be the first to report these issues, before the compe-
tition beats you to it. Van Weezel states: »As chairman of Nieuwspoort, 
I continuously tried to invoke discussion about the functioning of the 
parliamentary press, especially given the rise of populist parties, but 
hardly any journalists showed for these events.« Anonymous also ack-
nowledges that the media culture has changed. There is less time for 
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fact checking, and journalist are increasingly focused on being the first 
to bring in the news. The on-going popularity of online news coverage 
has also changed the rules-of-the-game. Media outlets now strive for 
the most ‘clicks’ on the Internet. The first media outlet to report a news 
story is likely to have more ‘clicks’ than others. Eager for clicks, some 
media outlets instantly copy an article that appears on another website 
without checking the reliability of the report. 
Van Weezel further states that the parliamentary press have the ten-
dency to »lick up and kick down«. He stresses that this is true for popu-
list radical right parties, but also for other parties. When a politician 
is winning, the press facilitates and supports this winning streak. For 
example, such politicians are elected »politician of the year«.37 Howe-
ver, when a politician is in trouble, the press instantly »smells blood« 
and will attack relentlessly. Van Weezel emphasizes that the press has 
praised Wilders for a very long time; a time in which the PVV grew from 
9 to 24 electoral seats (out of 150). During this period, everybody wan-
ted him in front of the camera. However, Van Weezel points out that if 
a politician overplays his hand, or when a party has internal struggles, 
the press will come for them. Indeed, recently the majority of the Dutch 
press turned on Wilders, following his ‘fewer, fewer, fewer’ comments. 
This even included the usually supportive right-wing leaning tabloid 
newspaper De Telegraaf. Van Weezel cannot explain why the media sud-
denly turned on the PVV, because Wilders had made similarly shocking 
and indecent remarks before. Other respondents find this question dif-
ficult to answer. In that respect, having the favour of the press appears 
more or less arbitrary.
External and internal threats
Brinkman states that Wilders fears very few of his political competitors. 
Johan Driessen affirms this; he argues that the continuous criticism 
voiced by Pechtold (D66) did not damage the PVV. On the contrary, 
it seemed profitable, not only for the PVV, but also for D66. Assuming 
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that most left-wing leaning voters are fierce opponents of the PVV, left-
wing parties can present themselves as the best ‘remedy’ against the 
PVV. This way, they can both attract left wing voters who fear or dislike 
the success of the PVV and they also gain media attention and disperse 
their party views even further. In that respect, it seems lucrative to be 
one of the two main opposing political parties; it allows you to draw the 
most votes from your side of the spectrum. Campaign strategist Kay 
van de Linde also maintains that you need a »proper enemy« to grow 
big. Van de Linde nonetheless thinks that established parties want to 
get rid of the PVV. In this respect, he feels that established parties have 
not made full use of the options available to them. For example, Van de 
Linde points out that in the United States political parties make use of 
so-called Super Political Action Committees (Super PACS). These are 
independent expenditure committees that are not allowed to make 
donations to parties directly, but may engage in endless political spen-
ding. In contrast to traditional PACs they may accept contributions 
from individuals, corporations, unions and other groups without any 
legal limit. According to Van de Linde, the formation of Super PACs is 
also possible in the Netherlands, and it could definitely damage Wilders. 
In this respect, Van de Linde feels that Wilders has been lucky that until 
now only amateurs have challenged him.
Johan Driessen perceives »a decent alternative« for the PVV as poten-
tial competition. In this respect, he tells us that Wilders is currently 
afraid of Joost Eerdmans, a successful regional LN politician. Eerdmans 
holds a middle position between the conservative liberal VVD and the 
populist radical right PVV. Thus, Eerdmans is firm on immigration and 
integration issues, while he is not considered too extreme or out of 
control. At the same time, he is a credible anti-establishment politician 
and therefore also able to attract protest voters. Erik van Bruggen also 
imagines that Eerdmans may become serious competition for the PVV. 
He thinks a new party that moves more to the middle than to the right, 
would provide the biggest threat. In that respect, Eerdmans would be a 
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suitable candidate, especially when he remains successful in Rotterdam 
where he recently became an alderman. But, Van Bruggen further ads 
that it is currently extremely hard to win votes from Wilders. 
Brinkman recalls that Wilders had also been very worried about 
Verdonk (TON). Johan Driessen confirms: »At one point TON held 30 
electoral seats in the polls, while the PVV was polled at 6. This led to 
panic within the PVV.« Brinkman, currently busy with establishing his 
own party, states that Wilders was so worried about TON that ‘unsound’ 
things have happened in order to stop her: »Geert assigned several PVV 
adherents and bloggers to investigate the past of TON notables to see if 
something dirty would come up.« Martin Bosma, who worked for the US 
Republican Party in the past and incorporated their negative campaign 
tactics in the PVV, heavily influenced the PVV in this respect. Brinkman 
states that since two years he is also victim of these tactics: »I know that 
two people have been paid to conduct a smear campaign against me.« 
Kay van de Linde, who experienced the start-up of a new populist 
party twice at first hand, warns how hard it is to establish a new party. 
He states that it is very impressive that Wilders managed to keep his 
party together, despite several internal rifts. For example, internal 
friction previously led to the collapse of the LPF and also TON. Asked 
about how Wilders manages his party, Van de Linde decidedly answers 
»with fear«. The PVV is »one big paranoid club, led by a strategy of 
divide and conquer«. Anonymous explained to us that Wilders often 
rewarded rebellious or unsatisfied politicians to keep them within the 
party. For example, when Joram van Klaveren was plotting to leave the 
PVV, Wilders publicly suggested that Van Klaveren should become the 
mayor of the city of Almere, a PVV stronghold. Although this strategy 
may have worked to keep potential dissidents in place, at the same time 
it bred discontent among loyal PVV adherents who felt betrayed. Brink-
man points out that the strict hierarchical regime is also a way to keep 
control over the party. According to Brinkman, Wilders does not want 
other PVV politicians to become too powerful or too popular, because 
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he would then lose control. For this reason, Wilders tries to avoid other 
PVV politicians taking up executive offices. For example, when the PVV 
gained many electoral seats at the municipal elections in 2010, Wilders 
immediately made some shocking remarks, forcing other parties to 
refuse to form a coalition with the local PVV. According to Johan Dries-
sen, Wilders is indeed extremely afraid that other PVV politicians will 
become his rivals. He therefore surrounds himself with young or incom-
petent people, who he easily rules over. Brinkman always heavily oppo-
sed the undemocratic organization of the PVV and pleaded for a move 
towards party membership. He states that Wilders should not be allo-
wed to obtain democratic power, with an undemocratic party. Brinkman 
suggests that it should be obligatory for a party to become democratic 
within a few years and once it is elected to parliament. He also adds that 
a process of democratization would mean the political end of Geert Wil-
ders.
 
What next? 
Recently, the divide and conquer tactics of Wilders, as well as his strict 
hierarchical organization, appear somewhat exhausted. The PVV have 
suffered some moderate electoral loss at both the municipal and Euro-
pean elections. Nonetheless, the party still polls at around 13 per cent of 
the vote. This amazes Jan Driessen, who hopes that people will finally 
start to see that the PVV’s populist rhetoric has led to nothing substan-
tial: »Wilders has not been able to build a sustainable environment 
within his own party. It is a protest party that refuses to take political 
responsibility«. 
Complaints about the PVV’s modest political track record in terms 
of accomplishments have indeed increased. After the fall of the mino-
rity government in 2012, D66 party leader, Pechtold, repeatedly asked 
Wilders about his achievements as a support partner of the minority 
government. He argued that Wilders had polarized a lot but had achie-
ved little.38 Anonymous argues that room for populist rhetoric diminis-
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hes when competence is emphasized in debates. A stronger emphasis 
on political accomplishments implies that the capability/quality of a 
politician is largely derived from his/her past achievements. Brinkman 
states that established parties only minimally combat Wilders on com-
petence and content: »Ever since Wilders emerged, established parties 
have tried to portray him as dangerous or nuts. However, he is certainly 
not nuts. […] Wilders discusses problems that are actually part of 
society and because of this people are willing to accept that sometimes 
he goes overboard. […] Established parties should start taking Wilders 
seriously, and challenge him on content, because his content is poor.« 
However, it remains the question how much PVV voters care about the 
implementation of policy. As Van de Linde puts it: »they just want to be 
heard.« 
Summary
This chapter was set up to describe how Dutch established parties and 
Dutch media have responded to the emergence of the PVV and to what 
effect. Established parties were taken by surprise by the success of the 
PVV in 2006. Whilst the political establishment experienced a similar 
electoral threat a few years before (from the LPF), it was unable to pre-
vent the emergence of a new populist radical right party. Furthermore, 
the continuous electoral success of Wilders and the PVV suggest that 
many voters are still unsatisfied with how mainstream parties have 
dealt with, and continue to tackle, issues such as integration and immi-
gration. 
All respondents confirm that established parties have trouble stri-
king the right tone when competing with the populist radical right. Most 
respondents agree that established parties do not win back voters by 
copying populist radical right rhetoric. It is also perceived as dragging 
down the tone of the political debate in general. It is not considered 
credible or effective. Populist radical right rhetoric fits the nature of a 
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protest party such as the PVV, but it does not suit established parties. 
According to most respondents parroting ‘street language’ from popu-
list radical right parties, makes established parties look weak. This 
seems illustrated by the strenuous efforts of the PvdA to ‘toughen up’ 
their position on immigration and integration. 
Respondents are divided over the question of whether or not esta-
blished parties should try to win the back the issues of immigration and 
integration. Van de Linde states that this is a hopeless effort: the PVV 
reigns on these issues and it is impossible to compete with the party 
in this respect. Attention to the issues of integration and immigration 
only seems to benefit the PVV. According to Van de Linde, established 
parties should emphasize their own strengths instead of the strengths 
of others. Vogelaar, on the other hand, believes that the right policies 
can take away the reasons why people vote for populist radical right 
parties. Finally, Jan Driessen advocates that politicians should offer the 
electorate a new perspective on Dutch (multicultural) society. None of 
the respondents believe that incorporating a populist radical right party 
in government would damage this party electorally. Most respondents 
believe that prosecution of populist radical right politicians favours the 
party, because of the media attention this draws. Nonetheless, respon-
dents are divided about whether prosecution remains advantageous in 
case of a conviction. 
All respondents agree about the fact that media attention is crucial to 
the success of any political party. Most agree that the PVV is extremely 
skilful in attracting media attention. The PVV distinguishes itself from 
other parties through it’s interaction with the press. The party boycotts 
some mainstream media, especially those that are considered left-wing. 
Some interviewees argued, that because of this behaviour the party is 
often discussed in the aforementioned media. Also, more than other 
politicians, Wilders communicates in a one-way fashion. For example, 
he often uses Twitter to bring about his message. Jan Driessen points 
out that the press simply report Wilders’ tweets without much critique. 
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Several respondents suggest that the increasing commercialisation of 
the media facilitates this kind of communication. Media are increasingly 
eager to report one-liners, scoops and scandals, and in this respect Wil-
ders’ way of communicating fits perfectly. However, Van Weezel empha-
sises that the media do not intentionally favour Wilders, rather the PVV 
simply gains by how the media function nowadays.    
Concluding reflections
Clearly, it is a difficult task for established parties to re-strengthen 
their position on the issues of immigration or integration and respond 
to populist rhetoric. Populist radical right parties will emphasize every 
negative aspect of multicultural society to illustrate their point, and this 
puts established parties automatically on the defence. Once established 
parties begin to stress the negative aspects of immigration or integra-
tion, their statements are most likely considered artificial (by voters 
who are drawn to the right) or unwelcome (by voters who are not drawn 
to the right). It seems that if established parties wish to respond, they 
should do so by questioning the competence and achievements of the 
populist radical right. That is, what have these parties actually done to 
improve the situation? It is also possible to indirectly respond, by crea-
ting a new and more positive discourse on immigration and integration. 
This suggests that established parties consequently frame immigration 
and integration on their own terms, instead of stepping into the frame 
offered by the populist radical right party. A long-term possibility is to 
take away the aspects that cause social unrest by means of policy imple-
mentation, either with or without inclusion of the populist radical right 
party. Besides, established parties have to make sure that the message 
they wish to spread, gets picked up by the media, while provocative 
statements seem to resonate better than duly considered ones. This 
suggests that established politicians have to walk a fine line between fra-
ming their messages attractive to the media, and losing their credibility. 
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Paradoxically, the biggest threat to a populist radical right party 
seems to be the party itself. In general, populist radical right parties have 
tremendous trouble finding suitable and reliable political candidates. 
Often, populist radical right parties strive on their loudmouth rhetoric 
and provocative (mostly unfeasibly) policy proposals. That is to say, 
populist radical right parties are far from nuanced. While this kind of 
behaviour attracts voters, it hinders the employment of ‘regular’ politi-
cians. The lack of willingness to work for a populist radical right party is 
further strengthened by the fact that it is hard to find another job after 
you have been publicly affiliated to such a party. Populist radical right 
parties often attract opportunists with little political experience, or 
shady people with criminal track records and/or extreme right sympa-
thies. Subsequently, the survival of radical right parties is often threa-
tened by management problems and internal struggles. In that respect, 
their political strength, being the provocative political »outsider«, is 
also their weakness. The PVV certainly seems exemplary of this populist 
radical right party paradox. 
Party name Party Family Seat average*
CDA Christian-democratic 25.0
CU Christian -democratic 5.3
D66 Social-liberal 8.3
Groenlinks Ecologic (green) 7.0
PvdA Social-democratic 33.6
PvdD Ecologic (green) 2.0
PVV Radical right 16.0
SGP Christian-orthodox 2.3
SP Socialist 18.3
50Plus Elderly Welfare 2.0
VVD Liberal-conservative 31.3
Appendix. Name of the party, party family and parliamentary seat average
Note: Christian-orthodox and Christian-democratic parties are considered one party family. 
* Average of parliamentary seats (out of 150) during the elections between 2006-2012. 50Plus entered 
parliament for the first time in 2012. 
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Notes
1 Contact the authors through S.C.vanheerden@uva.nl and B.Creusen@uva.nl. 
2 In this chapter we speak of radical right parties, based on a principal divide 
between radical right and extreme right anti-immigration parties. In contrast 
to extreme right parties, radical right parties accept the main rules of parlia-
mentary democracy. Radical right parties are in many ways ‘normal parties’ 
with ‘normal voters’, located at the far right side of the political spectrum. 
Moreover, we consider both types of parties anti-immigration parties. For a 
further elaboration upon different types of anti-immigration parties, see the 
chapter by Van der Brug et al.
3  The Netherlands is a bicameral parliamentary democracy characterized 
by proportional representation. This means that political parties enter 
parliament by getting enough votes for at least one seat, regardless of where 
in the country the votes were cast. As opposed to, for instance Germany, the 
Dutch political system has a low political threshold (0.66 per cent), which 
allows new parties a fair chance of entering parliament. The Second Chamber 
(or House of Representatives) consists of 150 seats; the First Chamber (or 
Senate) consists of 75 seats. 
4 Since the emergence of the PVV, 10 other parties have been seated in Dutch 
parliament. General elections were held in 2006, 2010, and 2012. Together 
these parties can be classified as members of 8 different party families (see 
Appendix I). The Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), Christen-Democratisch Appèl 
(CDA) and Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) are considered ‘the 
big three’ Dutch mainstream parties. At least two of these parties participated 
in every government coalition after the Second World War.
5 For example see: Van Spanje, J. and De Vreese, C.H. (forthcoming) ‘The good, 
the bad and the voter; The impact of hate speech prosecution of a politician on 
electoral support for his party, Party Politics DOI: 10.1177/1354068812472553 
Also see: http://www.joop.nl/opinies/detail/artikel/26485_waarom_wilders_
wint/ (visited May 23th , 2014).
6 For example see: http://www.joop.nl/leven/detail/artikel/14610_step_vaes-
sen_in_arondeuslezing/ (visited May 23th , 2014).
7 De Rooy, P. (2013) in: Aerts, Remieg e.a., »Land van Kleine gebaren. Een poli-
tieke geschiedenis van Nederland, 1780-2012« Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom.
8 Fennema, M. (2010) »Geert Wilders Tovenaarsleerling« Amsterdam: Promet-
heus.
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9 De Rooy (2013).
10 Fennema (2010).
11 February 6th, 2004.
12 The quote in Dutch was: »En laat daarna de hoofddoekjes maar wapperen op 
het Malieveld. Ik lust ze rauw«.
13 Fennema (2010).
14 Fennema (2010).
15 See ‘Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring’ (Wilders’ declaration of independence): 
http://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article.html?id=684:onafha
nkelijkheidsverklaring (visited May 8th, 2004); also see Fennema (2010).
16 De Pers, February 13th, 2007. Also see Fennema (2010).
17 De Volkskrant, August 8th, 2007. See: http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/
Binnenland/article/detail/870782/2007/08/08/Wilders-verbied-de-Koran-
ook-in-moskee.dhtml (visited May 8th, 2014).
18 See http://www.elsevier.nl/Politiek/nieuws/2007/9/Wilders-Vogelaar-is-
knettergek-geworden-ELSEVIER137850W/ (visited May 7th 2014).
19 Fennema (2010).
20 Fennema (2010); also see www.peil.nl.
21 See; http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1166140/ 
2009/09/16/Wilders-wil-kopvoddentaks.dhtml (visited May 8th).
22 Van Spanje, J. and De Vreese, C.H.  (forthcoming),
23 He also asked his supporters whether they wanted ‘more or fewer’ European 
Union and ‘more or fewer’ PvdA. 
24 Please see: https://www.noties.nl/peil.nl/ (visited August 18th, 2014)
25 The acronym stands for the name of the three founders. 
26 Petrocik, J.R. (1996) ‘Issue ownership in presidential elections, with a 1980 
case study’ American Journal of Political Science Vol. 40(3).
27 Downs, W.M. (2001) ‘Pariahs in their midst: Belgian and Norwegian parties react 
to extremist threats’ West European Politics Vol. 24(3. Also see: Downs, W.M. 
(2002) ‘How effective is the Cordon Sanitaire? Lessons from Efforts to Contain 
the Far Right in Belgium, France, Denmark and Norway’ Journal fur Konflikt- und 
Gewaltforschung (Journal of conflict and Violence Research) Vol. 4(1).
28 Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie. (1983) »Explaining and Predicting Elections: 
Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies« London: 
Allen & Unwin.
29 Van der Brug, W. (2004) ‘Issue ownership and party choice’ Electoral Studies 
Vol. 23(2).
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30 McCombs, M.E. and Shaw, D.L. (1972) ‘The agenda-setting function of mass 
media’ Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 36(2).
31 Thus, in contrast to some observations from Denmark and Greece, the 
financial crisis did not instigate radical right party support. 
32 Fennema, M. and Van der Brug, W. (2007) ‘What causes people to vote for a 
radical right party? A review of recent work’ International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research Vol. 19(4). 
33 Van Spanje and De Vreese (forthcoming).
34 Hopmann, D.N., Elmelund-Præstekær, Albæk, E., Vliegenthart, R. and C.H. 
de Vreese, (2012) ‘Party media agenda-setting: How parties influence election 
news coverage’ Party Politics Vol.18(2); also see: Koopmans, R. and J. Muis 
(2009) ‘The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands: a 
discursive opportunity approach’ European Journal of Political Research Vol. 
48(5).
35 Van Praag, P. and Brants, K. (2008) ‘Professioneler, harder en populistischer. 
Veranderingen in de campagnecultuur na 2002’ Bestuurskunde Vol. 17 (3).
36 Van Praag, P. (2005) ‘De veranderende Nederlandse campagnecultuur’ in K. 
Brants and P. van Praag (eds.) Politiek en Media in verwarring De verkiezings-
campagnes in het lange jaar 2002, Het Spinhuis: Amsterdam, pp. 21-43 
Van Praag, P. and Brants, K. (2008) ‘Professioneler, harder en populistischer. 
Veranderingen in de campagnecultuur na 2002’ Bestuurskunde Vol. 17 (3).
37 Geert Wilders was awarded with this title in 2010 and 2013. See http://politi-
cusvanhetjaar.eenvandaag.nl. 
38 See: http://nos.nl/video/376464-pechtold-wilders-heeft-met-gedoogconstruc-
tie-niets-bereikt.html. 
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Italy occupies a peculiar position in the international debate on 
immigration policy. At the socio-legal level, it has been one of the most 
open countries in Europe: It has granted seven amnesties in 25 years 
which have given legal residence to more than four million foreigners1 
and integrated more than two million immigrants into the labour mar-
ket.2 However, this has not been matched with wide reaching political 
strategies. Italy has demonstrated strong reluctance to accept its new 
status as a ‘migrant receiving country’ and to address the concerns of 
a multi-ethnic population.3 For instance, in 1992 the laws governing 
citizenship were made more restrictive, responding to growing fears 
that the countries ‘ethnic composition’ was changing.4 Moreover, Italy 
has hosted one of the strongest and longest-lasting anti-immigration 
parties in Europe, Lega Nord (Northern League). The party formed part 
of the governing coalition under the Berlusconi governments (1994-
1996; 2001-2006; 2008-2011), and in they held responsibility over Home 
Affairs in the last one (2008-2011). Under the influence of Lega Nord, 
Italian centre-right governments have both spread attitudes of anxiety 
and hostility towards immigrants and asylum seekers, and sought to 
enforce anti-immigration and exclusory policies at the national and 
local level.  
Subsequent governments since 2011 (headed by Mario Monti, Enrico 
Letta, and Matteo Renzi) have lacked a clear pro-immigrant majority. 
Whilst the rhetoric has changed and, in particular, the rescue of asylum 
seekers in the Mediterranean has been granted, to date they have not 
modified access to citizenship or altered immigration law. However, the 
Renzi government did de-criminalize irregular immigration. In other 
words, despite minor changes, the architecture of Italy’s contemporary 
immigration and citizenship regime has been largely shaped by center-
right governments.
By contrast, civil society actors have played an important role in con-
testing anti-immigration sentiment and restrictive policies. They often 
provide social services to immigrants (e.g. information and support 
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with bureaucratic procedures, health care for irregular sojourners, Ita-
lian language classes), but also protest against anti-immigrant policies, 
pursue legal claims in court and campaign to influence public opinion 
on matters like citizenship and voting rights.5 
This chapter begins by describing Italy’s rapid change from an emi-
gration to an immigration country. It then analyzes Italian immigration 
policies at the national level, highlighting the restrictive attitudes that 
prevailed in the decade 2002–2011. I underline the apparent contra-
diction between tough policy rhetoric, often influenced by Lega Nord6, 
and the more lenient application of policies. I argue that the needs of the 
Italian labour market (firms and families) have pushed a practical accep-
tance of migrant workers. In this section, I also show how civil society 
actors have opposed anti-immigration policies and tried to influence 
the public discourse, which has largely supported the government’s 
position. In the third section, I consider the development of policies 
of exclusion at the local level, specifically in regions and towns ruled 
by Lega Nord and its centre-right allies. In section four and five I ana-
lyze the reaction of civil society actors to anti-immigration policies 
with reference to two main events: the struggle against local policies 
of exclusion and the L’Italia sono anch’io (I am Italy too) campaign for a 
new citizenship law. This reflects findings from a series of interviews 
that took place in Lombardy from 2012 to 2014. Finally, I propose that 
anti-immigration sentiment has begun to soften in Italy. Whilst it is not 
possible to suggest that such changes are a direct consequence of civil 
society’s campaigns, the latter have provided a significant challenge to 
anti-immigration discourse.
Italy as a ‘host’ country
When analyzing the phenomenon of migration in Italy, what is most stri-
king is how rapidly the country has changed from a place of emigration 
to one of immigration. Italy and the Southern European countries more 
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generally have become major destinations for international migration 
in the past twenty years. This has been due not only to porous borders 
and proximity to the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, as was 
initially thought, but also to the specific demands of their economic 
systems. At present, Italy has between 5.3 and 4.4 million immigrants 
(between 8.8 per cent and 7.3 per cent of the population). More than 2.2 
million regularly work for the Italian economy and represent more than 
10 per cent of total employment.7  
Foreign immigration to Italy is caught between an economic demand 
that has been highly dynamic, at least until the economic recession that 
began in 2008, and policies that in principle have sought to block the 
entry of new immigrants and halt the multi-ethnic transformation of 
society. Over the last 25 years policy makers have been forced to come 
to terms with economic demands for manual workers. This led to the 
introduction of a number of amnesties for both irregular immigrants 
and their employers, which circumvented standard labour market regu-
lations (see below).8 
The transition from an emigration to an immigration region was lar-
gely unexpected and laxly regulated by those in power. While there was 
a huge change in the labour market and to local societies, this was only 
later acknowledged by elites and public opinion and often not reflected 
in public institutions and legal regulation.
In the 1980s, when it became clear in the public sphere that Italy was 
becoming a country of immigration, the phenomenon was represen-
ted mainly as a social problem by the public and most political actors. 
The assumption was that a new social problem had impacted upon an 
already troubled country, plagued by high unemployment and deep 
regional inequalities.9 
Meanwhile, in a quiet and fragmented manner, immigrants where 
already integrating into the Italian Labour market, working for small 
and medium firms but also in the domestic sector. This ‘economic inte-
gration’ was supported by several social actors (NGOs, trade unions, 
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churches). The trend was initially informal, but it grew increasingly 
formalized over time. This use of migrant labour was mainly focused in 
richer and more developed regions where the gap between labor supply 
and demand was wider and more evident. The political regulation of 
this movement came only later. It began with the Martelli Law of 1990, 
which allowed regular immigrants to participate in the private labor 
market freely and on equal terms with Italian workers.
However, over the years the gap between market demands and 
immigration policies has reopened time and again. Not by accident, 
regularization laws have been the mainstay of Italian immigration 
policies. Several have been passed – 7 in 25 years, the most recent one 
being in September 2012. This has been supplemented with a number 
of hidden regularizations made through the quota system for foreign 
worker admissions. Four ‘amnesties’ were implemented between 1986 
and 1998, affecting 790,000 irregular migrants, 630,000 regularisations 
were granted in 2002 alone, about 300,000 in 2009 under the last Ber-
lusconi government, and about 120,000 in 2012 (Monti government). In 
this regard there has been a surprising continuity in Italian immigration 
policies towards irregular workers, irrespective of which party has been 
in power.10 
Overall, the political governance of immigration in Italy has exhi-
bited contrasting tendencies, which have intensified in recent years. 
There exists a dichotomy between restrictive policies in principle and 
de facto tolerance. There is extensive use of irregular immigrants in the 
underground economy, furthermore regularization measures, such as 
amnesties and legalising irregular workers, mean that immigrants hold 
a significant presence in the Italian labour market. The gap between 
rhetoric and economic demands has been constant features of Italian 
immigration policies since the 80s.11 
With time, there has been growing acknowledgement of the econo-
mic role of migrants. This has enhanced the political legitimacy of their 
presence in the country.  Even when centre-right governments have 
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been in power they have been unable to deny the demand for immigrant 
labour. So they chose to use it as a discriminating criterion for the admis-
sion and legal residence of immigrants: in principle, only immigrants 
holding a job are legally admitted.12 
Despite these restrictions, this approach still acknowledges the con-
tribution by immigrants to the Italian economy.  Furthermore, when 
migrants have a job this affords access to a range of social rights and it 
fosters family reunification. What remains problematic is that such a 
functional integration of immigrants (i.e. in response to the needs of the 
Italian economy) does not translate into citizenship and full political 
rights. 
Political resistance against   
‘multiethnic’ transformation
Where Italian immigration policies have been less open is in regards to 
naturalization. Restricting citizenship to immigrants, and granting it 
generously to Italian emigrants’ descendants, remains a legacy of Italy’s 
identity as an ‘emigrant nation’. The new citizenship code was almost 
unanimously approved by Parliament in 1992, at a time when immigra-
tion to Italy began to increase on a large scale. This strengthened the lin-
kage of citizenship to birthright, enabling the grandchildren of former 
Italian emigrants to maintain and to acquire citizenship, while remain-
ing very strict towards non-EU foreigners wanting to acquire full rights. 
The law requires ten years of residence, the application takes three to 
four years to process, and the administration’s discretionary response 
is often negative. Children of immigrants can apply for Italian citizen-
ship when they reach adult age if they have been born in Italy and have 
lived in the country without interruption. Otherwise, they are subject 
to the requisite ten years of residence. The difficulty of acquiring Ita-
lian citizenship also shapes the interaction of immigrants in the labour 
market as they can only access private sector employment. This is a 
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consequence of a law enacted during fascist rule (1922–1945), which still 
restricts public sector work to those with full Italian citizenship. 
By contrast, gaining Italian citizenship through marriage is signifi-
cantly easier than in most other European countries. This is why for 
many years the most frequent naturalization route was through mar-
riage.13   
The right to vote has followed more or less the same pattern as natu-
ralization policy. Since the national elections of 2006, a new law has 
allowed Italian emigrants, often resident abroad for decades, to vote 
without returning to Italy, and to elect their own representatives in the 
Italian Parliament: a right very rare across the world. On the contrary, 
third-country nationals, even if long-term residents, have not yet gained 
the right to vote in local elections in Italy. 
The centre-right parties have resisted any opening on these two 
issues, and the centre-left parties, when in power, have failed to reach 
agreement on the matter. In recent years, technical governments and 
broad coalitions have not demonstrated any strong commitment on 
the issue, probably anticipating that such a political initiative could risk 
bringing down the government.
This reluctance has a clear symbolic dimension, in that Italy has 
struggled to redefine itself as a multi-ethnic nation. It also has social 
and political consequences. Given that foreign immigrants are unable 
to access citizenship and voting rights, they face many obstacles in 
accessing social rights, and sometimes civil rights, such as freedom of 
worship.14 
The decade between 2001 and 2011 was particularly marked by a 
hostile political discourse towards immigrants. This was accentuated 
in the years between 2008 and 2011 under the third Berlusconi govern-
ment, when Roberto Maroni of Lega Nord was appointed as Minister of 
Home Affairs. Comparative to the majority of other European citizens, 
according to several European surveys, immigration is of particular 
concern to Italians.15  
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In Italy, as an analysis by the Pavia Observatory (a research institute 
specialized in the analysis of the mass-media) has shown, news items 
concerning criminality and violent crimes dominate public and private 
television broadcasts to an extent unparalleled in the rest of Europe.16 
This type of coverage particularly intensified between 2006 and 2008, 
and Italians became convinced that they were living in a very dangerous 
country. This sense of personal insecurity was built on a fear regarding 
the remission of prison sentences approved by the centre-left govern-
ment and by growing immigration figures. In particular this fear was 
focused on so-called »illegal« immigration. These factors dominated 
news coverage whilst largely ignoring other security issues, such as the 
Mafia control of certain regions in the south of the country. This vision 
gradually became hegemonic with major newspapers and many left-
wing politicians also adhering to this logic.  In such a climate, the story 
of a woman in Rome who was killed by a Romanian immigrant during an 
attempted rape provoked political uproar. It brought street demonstra-
tions against immigrants, demands for special laws to protect citizens’ 
security and the expulsion of »illegals« (even migrants from within the 
European Union). 
Issues of security and the struggle against »illegal« immigration 
dominated the 2008 election campaign. This has contributed to the 
centre-right’s overwhelming victory, as they ran with the promise: »No 
more clandestine immigrants on our doorstep«. After coming to power, 
the Berlusconi government, as already mentioned, made Roberto 
Maroni, a leading member of Lega Nord, minister for Home Affairs 
(2008–2011). This effectively gave an anti-immigrant party responsibi-
lity over domestic security and immigration. 
During this period the government enacted a number of provisions, 
which aimed to fight ‘illegal’ immigration and did so by treating immi-
gration as a security issue. Between 2008 and 2009 the government 
introduced a »security package« in which several provisions targeted 
immigrants. The different security measures included a census of Roma 
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minorities living in unauthorized camps in the areas surrounding Rome, 
Milan, and Naples; the deployment of troops on the streets of major 
cities and in neighbourhoods critical for law-enforcement purposes; the 
introduction of a clause which meant that »illegal« immigrant status was 
considered as an aggravating circumstance in trials of immigrants being 
prosecuted for other crimes; the definition of »unauthorized presence 
in the country« as a crime; the possible detention of irregular immi-
grants failing to comply with expulsion orders; the introduction of sur-
veillance by citizens’ associations (or »citizen patrols«); and the prohi-
bition of all administrative acts, including marriage, for undocumented 
immigrants.17 Furthermore, an agreement was signed with Libya, which 
helped return immigrants arriving by sea who were defined without 
exceptions as ‘clandestine’. This resulted in the rejection of 900 people 
in the summer 2009, none of whom were allowed to apply for asylum. 
Finally, this »security package« included the extension of the period of 
detention for undocumented immigrants in 2011, first to six months and 
then to eighteen months. 18 These policies were accompanied by a strong 
anti-immigrant rhetoric, which was adopted by the Italian government, 
again treating immigrants as threats. For example, Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi argued in January 2010 that »a reduction in [the number of] 
foreigners in Italy means fewer people to swell the ranks of criminals.«19 
The mainstream media argued that these measures were supported by 
public opinion. When the first »security package« was approved (2008), 
the main Italian newspaper, Il Corriere della Sera, published the results 
of an opinion poll under the headline: »Tough Line by the Government. 
Three Italians out of four agree.«20  
Whilst taking a tough line on certain aspects of immigration control, 
it is notable that the government held back on workplace inspections to 
combat the underground economy. It thus showed a practical tolerance 
of employers exploiting irregular immigrants. In 2009, the government 
even announced an amnesty for families employing irregular immi-
grants as domestic and care workers, with about 300,000 applications 
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being made. Moreover, expulsions remained at about 14–18,000 each 
year, a small fraction of the irregular population, which was estimated at 
between 400,000 and 700,000 people. The severity of declared immi-
gration policies was often contradicted by the practical tolerance of an 
irregular migrant workforce. 
For some time, this approach to immigration has been supported 
by the Italian electorate. The regional elections in March 2010 mainly 
rewarded the Lega Nord. Several polls in 2009 also suggested that the 
majority of Italians approved of tougher immigration laws: they were 
convinced that they were safer; supported local governments opposing 
the construction of places of worship for Muslim immigrants; wanted to 
reserve certain social rights to Italians alone; and they agreed with limi-
ting migrant rights.21   
More recent elections since 2011 reveal a more complicated picture. 
Immigration has a strong symbolic meaning in political discourse in 
Italy as in many other countries. In general terms, center-right parties 
demand much stricter rules on admission of new immigrants: More 
restrictive policies against irregular immigrants, a halt on asylum claims 
and the ending of operations to save migrants crossing the Mediter-
ranean, as well as restrictions on social rights (such as social housing). 
At the same time, they do not want to change citizenship laws and give 
third country nationals the right to vote in local elections. In contrast, 
centre-left parties demand more active policies on new admissions, 
stress the need to regularize irregular immigrants, and show more 
commitment to the reception of asylum seekers, even if they demand 
European solidarity on the issue. The radical left demands the closure 
of detention centres for irregular immigrants. The centre-left and radi-
cal left agree on the reform of the citizenship law intended to facilitate 
naturalizations, and, more or less, automatic citizenship for children 
born in Italy. The populist Cinque Stelle (Five Stars) Movement, which 
rose to surprising success in the 2012 general elections, comprises diffe-
rent opinions and has not expressed an official position on immigration. 
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However, the movement’s leader, Beppe Grillo has adopted an anti-
immigration stance. He has also concluded an alliance with Nigel Farage 
and the right-wing UK Independence Party.
Whilst centre-right parties tended to dominate electoral politics 
until 2011, the 2011 local elections in major cities such as Milan marked a 
change in this trend, with the victory of centre-left parties. Equally, the 
general elections of 2012 showed a decrease in votes for the centre-right 
and a partial victory of the centre-left. This was balanced with the sur-
prising success of the Five Stars Movement. The local elections of May 
2014 also confirmed the decline of the centre-right and the success of 
the centre-left headed by the new leader Matteo Renzi. There was also a 
halt in the advance of the Five Stars Movement, although they still took 
around 20 per cent of the vote. Despite this, Lega Nord still governs the 
three most important regions of Northern Italy (namely, Lombardy, 
Veneto and Piedmont until May 2014), as well as several provinces 
(counties) and towns in those regions. It continues to introduce dif-
ferential treatment of, and restrictions on, immigrants at regional and 
urban level. 
Despite the relative dominance of anti-immigration sentiment it 
is important to recognize the work of civil society and professional 
bodies who challenge the implementation of anti-immigrant policies. 
The medical treatment of irregular immigrants is an interesting case. In 
2008 the Berlusconi government announced a plan to compel medical 
personnel in public hospitals to report the treatment of irregular immi-
grants.22 Several protest campaigns immediately began. They involved 
not only NGOs, but also the medical associations and boards that regu-
late the health professions.23 A prominent role was played by SIMM (the 
Italian Society of Migration Medicine) and by the Regional Migration 
and Health Groups (GRIS). The Italian branch of the international NGO 
Doctors Without Borders (MSF), the main trade unions (CGIL, Confe-
derazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro: Italian General Confederation 
of Work, and CISL, Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori: 
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Italian Confederation of Workers Unions), the Association of Family 
Doctors, representatives of paramedic professions (IPASVI, the Natio-
nal Federation of Professional Nurses, Health Assistants and Child 
Minders), and the Association of Catholic Doctors all undertook vari-
ous initiatives, such as filing appeals, collecting signatures, and staging 
demonstrations. 
The protest culminated with a day of national mobilization on 17 
March 2009, when health professionals, social actors and migrant asso-
ciations demonstrated against the new regulation in a number of Italian 
cities. Their shared slogan was: »We are doctors and nurses, not spies.«24 
The campaign was successful, and in April 2009 the government was 
finally forced to drop its controversial plan. Whilst the general public 
was not heavily involved, two factors made the campaign a success: 
Firstly, the alliance was formed between pro-immigrant actors and pro-
fessional bodies in the health sector; secondly, the campaign involved 
Catholic medical associations who are influential because of their con-
nection with the Catholic electorate – a still influential force in Italian 
politics.25 The next section focuses further on the role of civil society in 
challenging anti-immigration policies, in particular on the local level. 
Local policies of exclusion
After 2008, many city governments, especially in northern Italy, intro-
duced several provisions that limited immigrants’ rights and access to 
welfare.26 The reasons for targeting immigrants responded to three main 
concerns I have already highlighted: Fears regarding safety, competition 
for welfare benefits, and the perception of a »threat« to local cultural iden-
tity.  Although the targeting of migrants was not always explicit, in that 
they did not mention foreigners directly, the purpose of these policies was 
very clear: to enact more controls against immigrants, to limit their right 
to reside, or to restrict their access to local benefits and state resources.27  
The aim of these provisions was to send out the message that local 
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governments were protecting the »insiders« against intrusion by »out-
siders«. The local governments sought to build consensus at a relatively 
low cost by presenting themselves as guarantors of security and social 
order. To do this they labelled immigrants (especially »illegal« migrants) 
as a menace and undesirable. Local policies thus promoted and institu-
tionalized the boundaries between an »us« and »them« and encouraged 
separation and tension between majority and minority groups. 
A pilot study on 70 cases involving 47 local authorities in the region 
of Lombardy has shown that migrants were targeted in various ways in 
measures to protect the »security« of citizens.28 Controls of this type 
involved the local authorities and the police. For instance, checks by 
both ticket inspectors and police on urban transport in Milan specifi-
cally targeted irregular migrants without valid tickets. In Adro, a €550 
reward was introduced for the successful detainment of an irregular 
immigrant by the local police. An operation called »White Christmas« 
was introduced in the small town of Coccaglio. Here official inspections 
of private homes were allowed in order to identify irregular migrants. 
Local citizens were also encouraged to get involved in the policing of 
migrants. There have been examples of citizens mobilizing to form 
neighbourhood patrols with the aim of identifying and warning off 
irregular migrants. Local residents were encouraged to report »illegal« 
migrants: In Cantu a special toll-free report line was introduced; in San 
Martino all’Argine official notices were published by the local authori-
ties, inviting citizens to report irregular migrants. Significantly, many 
Roma settlements were the object of numerous evictions and restric-
tions throughout the region.
Further measures have excluded immigrants from local welfare 
benefits. For instance, in several towns only Italian citizens could apply 
for grants for new-born babies. Other examples include opposition to 
the creation of places of worship for Muslims, or bans on head scarves 
and face veils. As we shall see in the next section, the discriminatory 
or exclusionary character of these measures has been challenged. That 
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is, they have been denounced by civil society actors, and in many cases 
condemned by legal rulings.
The opposition against  
policies of exclusion
If local government measures restricting migrants have not been fully 
implemented, the main reason is the opposition that they have encoun-
tered in Italian civil society. Although migrant organizations are still 
weak in Italy, several Italian actors have mobilized in favour of migrant 
rights. This has encompassed Catholic institutions to radical social 
movements. Pro-immigration actors form a minority but they have 
created a combative advocacy coalition in defence of migrants’ rights.  
Opposition against local policies therefore has been raised mainly by 
non-governmental actors. In this section, I shall describe their strate-
gies by using interviews conducted at the local level in Lombardy. This 
research involved 15 semi-structured qualitative interviews with people 
from different backgrounds: lawyers, members of trade unions, mem-
bers of NGOs, members of local political bodies.29 
The main social actors that opposed the local exclusion policies in 
Lombardy were the Catholic organization Caritas, the two main Italian 
trade unions (i.e. CGIL and CISL), some organizations linked to trade 
unions such as the Associazione nazionale oltre le Frontiere (National 
Beyond the Borders Association) (ANOLF30), the Catholic association 
ACLI (Associazioni Cristiane Lavoratori Italiani: Italian Christian Wor-
kers Associations), the leftist ARCI (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale 
Italiana: Italian Recreational and Cultural Association),  the Associa-
zione Avvocati per Niente (Association of Pro-Bono Lawyers) and the 
Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (Associazione per gli 
Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione, ASGI). 
Immigrant associations hardly intervened due to their institutional 
weakness.31 They tend to lack power, funds and representation and are 
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mostly cultural, social or religious associations. As one of our intervie-
wees, a member of the nonprofit Italian association Arci, said: »In Milan 
there are many groups, many small associations which are not well orga-
nized or officially recognized.« As a consequence, these organizations 
have little power to act and rely on »Italian« non-profit associations like 
Arci. These associations act as the link between immigrants and govern-
ment institutions. 
Social actors such as Arci have stressed the discriminatory nature of 
local regulations in Lombardy (and other regions). The new local pro-
visions were invariably described as »xenophobic initiatives«, »racist 
acts«, »pure racism«, »apartheid climax« and the mayors were descri-
bed as »mayor sheriffs«.32  
An important issue cited in the interviews was the creation of boun-
daries between »us« and »them«. The radicalisation of this division can 
lead to conflict, as one interviewee suggested: 
Faced with something no one knows, after all...faced with an atti-
tude of suspicion which is constantly spreading, and which creates 
social alarm and mistrust in others, even neighbours, and not 
necessarily foreigners…not only foreigners...and the fact that secu-
rity issues are constantly raised, but from a virtual point of view 
to make people think it is an actual imminent problem, creates a 
sort of alarmism against everything that might cause problems...
this means that, instead of educating people to live together and to 
negotiate possible conflict, it stirs up opposition, radicalizes fears, 
leads to actual social conflict (BM, member of CGIL Brescia and of 
a  NGO, advocacy coalition). 
The media have often reported the conflicting views between the 
local authorities and civil society groups. Local authorities tend to 
affirm the priority of (Italian) citizens’ rights, and the need to provide 
security against »dangerous«, »illegal« immigrants (often focusing 
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on Roma minorities). Trade unions, Catholic organizations, and other 
civil-society actors have stressed a concern for human rights against 
xenophobic or racist discrimination. 
This conflicting viewpoint was represented by our interviewees. To 
those opposing restrictive measures the aim of local authorities was to 
obtain political support from the public by discriminating against immi-
grants. As a member of the trade union CISL said:
During the electoral campaigns they play on this fear. Mistrust, fear 
of others, painting a black picture of them [immigrants] , just to 
bring out those instincts that are probably natural, which are inside 
all of us, which are about mistrust of those who arrive from another 
country. And they go against them with electoral posters, like »No 
gypsy cities«. They rely on that for electoral gain (MC, member of 
CISL Milan, Department of Immigration Policies).
The opinion that the aim is only to obtain political support is confir-
med by the fact that many of these local regulations are inapplicable:
My evaluation was quite disheartening. I saw a repressive attitude 
in those by-laws. From the technical point of view they were very 
badly written, cut and pasted one from another, with only political 
propaganda purposes, to obtain electoral support, because...in that 
period the most debated issue was urban security [.....]. But some 
of them were also inapplicable...for example that by-law about 
begging: if someone begs, he/she has to pay a 500 euro fine...where 
does he/she find 500 euro? It was demagogy. They did not realize 
that these measures were inapplicable, even in a concrete sense (PI, 
member of Caritas, Immigration Office, Milan).
Even if this advocacy coalition promoted different forms of protest, 
the main tool used to fight exclusion policies has been legal recourse on 
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grounds of discrimination. Lawyers working pro bono have been a key 
resource in the battles against local governments. As a first step, social 
actors usually try to involve public authorities, mainly UNAR, Ufficio 
Nazionale Anti Discriminazione Razziale (National Office Against 
Racial Discrimination) and the prefects, local representatives of the 
national government.33 
After verifying that a local policy was indeed discriminatory, trade 
unions, in collaboration with the Associazione Avvocati per Niente, sent 
a warning to the municipality, and also to UNAR and to the local Prefect 
in order to ask for their opinions. However, these initial routes have had 
limited success. The autonomy of regional and urban governments is 
greater in Italy than in many other countries. The Home Affairs Minis-
ter, and the prefects, rarely interfere in the decisions of local authorities. 
The Security Packages of 2008/2009 gave local authorities more powers 
on issues of urban security, and many mayors interpreted them broadly, 
for instance by prohibiting face veils. In compliance with European 
Union rules against discrimination, the Italian government has founded 
UNAR; but this body can only put forward opinions and does not pursue 
legal cases of discrimination. Its power is hampered because it is not an 
independent body from government. 
Further to this, civil society opposition has not been deeply suppor-
ted by political actors. In many interviewees’ opinion, the local political 
opposition (in general, centre-left parties) has not strongly opposed the 
proposals because urban security and immigration are extremely sensi-
tive issues for the electorate. The opposition does not challenge these 
policies for fear of losing votes. 
What has been more successful has been the persecution of cases 
against municipalities by lawyers.34 The attempt to exclude immigrants 
from certain rights was opposed by experts in law and also by the courts, 
which passed judgments against local exclusory policies. The civil 
society actors and lawyers involved in the trials justified their accusa-
tions by citing the violation of fundamental rights. Many local policies 
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have been found to violate human rights, such as the freedom of religion 
or personal freedom, the right to education, the right to move, or health 
rights.35 This was the argument used in the courts, where the Associa-
zione Avvocati per Niente, usually in collaboration with the trade uni-
ons, has fought against the local exclusion of immigrants. Importantly, 
this same argument has been used by judges who have ruled against 
local municipalities. In almost all the judgments the reason for banning 
local policies was the infringement of immigrants’ human rights. 
The Association Avvocati per Niente was founded in 2004, and holds 
the aim of guaranteeing justice for the vulnerable people with the pro 
bono legal support. It is promoted by Caritas and supported by a number 
of civil society organizations (Trade Unions, ACLI – the Christian Asso-
ciations of Italian Workers). The association has won several important 
legal battles: against the municipality of Milan for its exclusion of the 
children of irregular immigrants from nursery schools; against the 
municipality of Brescia for its exclusion of new-born babies of foreign 
citizens from financial benefits; against various town councils for their 
bans on wearing a veil; and against ATM of Milan (the Municipal Public 
Transport Company) for excluding a foreign citizen on the basis that 
only Italian citizens can work for the state.
The Association, moreover, offers legal advice to organizations 
working with the most vulnerable individuals and provides training for 
other lawyers on topics relating to discrimination. As well as providing 
free legal support, the Association’s regulations require that »each 
member give the Association the proceeds from pro bono work for at 
least two cases per year, and from any costs that the other party is orde-
red to reimburse.«36  
In conclusion, civil society actors have tried to oppose local exclu-
sion policies by claiming the defence of human rights, such as personal 
freedom or the freedom of worship.  Moreover, the role of civil society 
actors has proved particularly effective in a historical context in which 
traditional political parties have weakened. The popularity of parties 
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and politicians is now very low in Italy, and their role is often occupied 
by non-traditional actors. The success of Lega Nord and then the Five 
Stars Movement is a clear sign of this trend: Beppe Grillo always denies 
that his formation is a party. In this landscape, civil society acts in seve-
ral cases as a bridge between public opinion and political institutions, 
pursuing rights claims, raising awareness of social issues and fostering 
political debates. 
The L’Italia sono anch’io campaign
The preceding section described the role of civil-society actors in oppo-
sing local policies of exclusion.37 This section explores the role played by 
civil society at the national level by examining the example of the launch 
of the L’Italia sono anch’io (I am Italy too) political campaign in 2011, on 
the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Italy’s unification. The campaign 
pressed for reform of the citizenship code and introduction of the right of 
immigrants to vote in local elections. In accordance with Italian law, the 
campaign sought to collect the 50,000 signatures necessary for the tab-
ling in parliament of two ‘popular initiative’ bills: one regarding the right 
to citizenship and one regarding the right to vote in local elections.
I mentioned earlier that since 1992 the rules governing citizenship 
acquisition in Italy have tightened. In this context, the first bill called for 
a reduction of the required duration of legal residency before naturalisa-
tion: from ten to five years. For minors born in Italy, or who entered the 
country before the age of ten, the bill calls for the granting of citizenship 
upon application within two years of reaching majority age. This propo-
sed opportunity is also extended to the children of irregular residents. 
Furthermore, it suggests that citizenship could be granted to minors 
who have achieved a qualification in the Italian school system (on appli-
cation of their parents). The second proposed bill aimed to grant voting 
rights in municipal and regional elections to all third-country nationals 
who have been resident in Italy for at least five years.
Acting for Immigrants’ Rights: Civil Society and Immigration Policies in Italy
214
The campaign was promoted by 22 civil society organizations, with 
the support of the well-known publisher Carlo Feltrinelli. It selected 
the mayor and president of the ANCI (Associazione Nazionale Comuni 
Italiani: National Association of Italian Municipalities), Graziano del 
Rio, as chairman of the national promotion committee. The list of the 
participating organizations is also interesting because it mirrors the 
advocacy coalition for immigrants in its various forms. In fact, it again 
comprises two trade union federations (CGIL and UIL: Unione Italiana 
del Lavoro, Italian Union of Work) but also an autonomous union politi-
cally close to the centre-right (UGL: Unione Generale del Lavoro, Gene-
ral Union of Work). A list of Catholic organizations are also involved, 
notably Caritas and the Fondazione Migrantes of the Italian Episcopal 
Conference, together with the federation of evangelical churches in 
Italy. Also on the list are federations or consortia of bodies and asso-
ciations active in promoting solidarity, peace, and anti-mafia action, 
and two anti-racism organizations. However, there are only two migrant 
organisations involved.  
Although immigrants have been involved in the campaign, also in 
important roles – for example within the trade unions – once again the 
battles for immigrants’ rights have been mainly fought by »Italian« 
organizations. This is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength 
because these are organizations with deep roots in Italian society, some-
times with several millions of members and sympathisers. It is a weak-
ness because it confirms the fragility of immigrant associations, and the 
need to compensate for it with the commitment of Italian civil society. 
Nevertheless, whilst underrepresented migrant organizations still form 
a presence in the campaign. 
The campaign has seen the involvement of numerous local institu-
tions and leading figures in the arts and entertainment world. Campaign 
groups have mobilized in more than a hundred towns and promotion 
committees have been created at local and regional level. The national 
promotion committee has organized six national »D-Days« to collect 
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signatures, during which the stands of local committees have been set 
up in numerous streets and town squares.38 Each local committee and 
its members also organized events and conferences, disseminating the 
campaign through its local centres and initiatives.
A representative of the CGIL trade union, a promoter of the cam-
paign, stressed the large involvement of activists and volunteers. He 
described:
An effort at organization and social participation, which has invol-
ved thousands of volunteers and young people of all nationalities 
in the campaign’s stands and initiatives. The campaign has cul-
minated in delivery of the signatures to parliament and with full 
support expressed by president Giorgio Napolitano for rapid solu-
tion for this severe shortcoming in the law. The activity of collecting 
signatures showed that public opinion is much more mature than 
the reactionary stance adopted by numerous xenophobic political 
movements. In fact, several signatories believed that those legal 
provisions – especially the one on the Italian citizenship of children 
born here – were already in force (FP, head of the immigration 
office, CGIL Milano).
At the local level, other associations have often joined the campaign 
or assisted with its promotion in various ways. The politically indepen-
dent trade union CISL has not joined the campaign at national level, but 
in Milan it has supported its proposals. The head of the immigration 
office stated:
 
The Milan CISL has promoted and won a series of test cases, obtain-
ing a favorable ruling, for example, on the possibility for second-
generation youth to do community service. Moreover, because 
we are convinced that legal actions must always be accompanied 
by patient and constant work of cultural promotion (...) we have 
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decided to participate actively in the collection of signatures for 
the L’Italia sono anch’io campaign, in the certainty that, even if it 
has somewhat radical overtones that will hopefully be tempered by 
parliament, the time has come to introduce into our legislation the 
»ius soli« principle, on the basis of which anyone born and grown 
up in our country is Italian  (MB, head of the immigration office, 
CISL Milano).
Caritas Ambrosiana, has provided further support of with numerous 
initiatives to promote the campaign at its local branches. As the head of 
the Caritas Ambrosiana office for foreigners explained:
 
This is done by talking about the campaign, distributing the relative 
material, and on occasions when a significant number of people 
are present – for instance presentation of the statistical dossier on 
immigration – by directly promoting the signature collection, which 
in any case can be done at our centre (LB, Caritas Ambrosiana).
To foster awareness of citizenship rights, the movie director Fred 
Kuwornu has produced the documentary 18 ius soli, which has been 
projected in numerous Italian schools and by local committees. These 
events are organized to inform the public about the campaign and to col-
lect signatures. Even after the signatures were delivered to parliament, a 
new campaign began to maintain public interest in the issues raised and 
to pressurize members of parliament to start a discussion of the tabled 
bills.
Another awareness-raising device has been the Inside Out/L’Italia 
sono anch’io public art project run by JR, a well-known Parisian street 
artist. In 2012, JR agreed to launch Inside Out in Italy on a national scale 
to support the Italia sono anch’io campaign in collaboration with the 
municipalities and its promoters. 1 500 Italians and foreigners agreed to 
allow photographs of their faces to be used by the campaign for the two 
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popular initiative laws. Their photographs were taken by volunteers and 
assembled by JR in large black-and-white posters affixed in public spa-
ces of eight Italian towns to testify their support for the campaign. On 
20 October 2012 the spaces made available by the local administrations 
were ‘invaded’ by hundreds of posters, which turned them into large 
public works of art proclaiming L’Italia sono anch’io.
Picture 1. Inside Out/L’Italia sono anch’io
Finally, the campaign has made much use of the internet to collect 
and distribute news, and to post video clips produced by national pro-
moters and local committees. The Italia sono anch’io Facebook pages 
have 10,000 friends and there a further 50 Facebook pages designed 
by local committees, 3,860,000 web tags39, as well as 15,000 followers 
reached by the campaign every week through the social media, such as 
Twitter.
The Italia sono anch’io campaign achieved its first objective at the 
beginning of 2012, when signatures for both the parliamentary bills 
exceeded the figure of 100,000 (double the number required): 109, 268 
for the bill on citizenship, 106,329 for the one on the right to vote in local 
elections. However, at the legislative level there has been no progress. 
Parties hostile to change have prevailed in the Italian parliament, and 
the early elections of February 2013 prevented the formation of a clear 
majority in favour of reforming the law. Some parties are against any 
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change, or they want to restrict the conditions to access naturalization 
even further (Lega Nord, Forza Italia, Fratelli d’Italia). Other parties 
maintain that citizenship for immigrants is not a priority (Five Stars 
Movement).40 Yet others (Nuovo Centro Destra, Unione Democratici di 
Centro, Scelta Civica) are open to discussion but want to impose con-
ditions and restrictions on the original bills, for instance choosing an 
intermediate point between ten years and five years of residence before 
naturalization is allowed; or, for children, the adoption of what is called 
a »moderate right of the soil« allowing naturalization only to children 
with one parent sojourning in Italy for five years, and holding regular 
status for one year (Scelta Civica). Equally, on the centre-left there are 
different positions. For instance, there is little consensus on the auto-
matic right of residence for babies born in Italy - some wish to subordi-
nate this right to certain conditions (e.g. length of residence, legal status 
of parents, school attendance). 
Importantly, the new prime minister, Renzi, has announced his 
intention to modify the rules, at least for the second generation, but 
his government depends on the decisive vote of centre-right parties, 
such as Nuovo Centro Destra (NCD, New Centre Right) and Unione dei 
Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (UDC, Union of Christian Democrats 
and Centre) who are cautious on the matter. In fact, the announcement 
has not yet been followed by a formal political proposal.
The Italia sono anch’io campaign has nevertheless achieved one 
result. It has increased awareness among Italians concerning the issues 
raised and helped build support on the need for reform. Other factors 
have also certainly influenced public opinion: the President of the Ita-
lian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, has repeatedly requested reform of 
the Italian citizenship code, in particular for children of immigrants 
born in Italy. As I suggested, with the decline of centre-right support in 
the 2012 election the position and the language of centre-right parties 
have lost ground. This shift from the dominance of centre-right parties 
over the last twenty years must be seen in the context of the economic 
Maurizio Ambrosini
219
crisis and the rise of unemployment. With these pressing economic 
concerns the majority of Italians no longer think that their main pro-
blems are ensuring security, struggling against illegal immigration, or 
defending the country’s cultural identity.41 
This is reflected in changing public attitudes. According to a survey 
conducted in November 2013, more than four in every five Italians think 
that regularly resident migrants should be able to vote in local elec-
tions.42 Among young people under the age of 34, the consensus exceeds 
90 per cent. On the issue of citizenship, four out of ten interviewees 
(42.6 per cent) declared themselves in favour of the unconditional gran-
ting of Italian citizenship to persons born in Italy, a further four (45.6 per 
cent) were in favour but made naturalization subject to certain condi-
tions: legal residence for a number of years, knowledge of Italian and the 
history of the country. Overall, therefore, Italians are more open to the 
granting of rights to immigrants than large part of their political repre-
sentatives. The Italian Parliament has yet to find a majority to change 
the law on citizenship, while the majority of public opinion now appears 
more open to the inclusion of foreign immigrants in the Italian polity.
This hints at how it is political actors seeking support, like Lega 
Nord and in some cases the Five Stars Movement, that provoke fear and 
xenophobia. The mobilization of civil society actors therefore performs 
an important role in combating these tendencies at a cultural level, 
and it prepares the ground for the reforms necessary to adapt the Ita-
lian institutions to the new multi-ethnic composition of society. Many 
NGOs, trade unions, and religious institutions are well known in Italy 
for their activities in favour of immigrants. By compensating for defi-
ciencies of the public sector, or assisting irregular immigrants excluded 
from many public services, they provide a wide range of benefits: infor-
mation, support with bureaucratic procedures, language courses, health 
services, free meals. But they also play a cultural and political role by dis-
seminating a notion of immigration as a resource for Italian society and 
by countering xenophobic positions. In short, they perform four main 
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activities: they promote networks of solidarity on behalf of migrants; 
they organize protests against xenophobic policies and campaigns 
for immigrants’ rights; they provide alternative services, above all for 
irregular immigrants; they provide legal advocacy to immigrants, in 
particular against public authorities.43 It is impossible to establish a clear 
causal connection between their campaigns and the new political lands-
cape in Italy. Nevertheless, they have performed a strong advocacy role 
during the long cultural dominance of anti-immigration sentiment and 
have combated xenophobic discourse and exclusory policies through 
legal channels and through popular mobilisation.
Conclusions. Civil society and  
the promotion of a new vision 
Civil society actors in Italy play a salient role in the social fabric of immi-
grant integration. Not only by providing a wide range of services but also 
by defending their rights and promoting political reforms. An advocacy 
coalition ranging from the Catholic Church to trade unions and social 
movements has formed. This coalition has challenged xenophobic poli-
cies in many ways; it has won crucial battles; and it has fostered a cultural 
and political change of views, attitudes and rules towards immigrants. It 
has sometimes anticipated and substituted political parties reluctant to 
engage in the defence of immigrants. 
Immigrants in Italy are not allowed to vote and find it difficult to 
become Italian citizens, their political capital is weak. Hence there is 
little political interest in supporting immigrants’ interests and claims, 
and there is a greater political return from adopting anti-immigration 
stances. Whilst some parties may support immigrant rights in principle, 
the fear of losing the support of Italian voters has made them very cau-
tious. 
For organizations like trade unions, faced with problems of declining 
membership and a weakening of their public image, alliance with other 
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social actors is a way to connect with civil society and to attract new 
members. More than one million immigrants have joined trade unions 
in Italy, and they form the fastest growing group among active workers.44 
The Catholic Church, in turn, reaffirms its role of supporting vulnerable 
people and defending human rights.
In this chapter I have examined some of the actions undertaken by 
civil society actors to challenge anti-immigration policies: public pro-
tests, appeals, and demonstrations against xenophobic policies; legal 
battles in courts; campaigns to raise public awareness of immigrants’ 
rights and to propose new laws which reflect the democratic governance 
of a multi-ethnic society.
In contrast to other European states, migrant organizations play 
a less significant role in Italian civil society. A lack of means and com-
petences leaves them in a marginal position. A lack of political rights 
weakens the voice of immigrants and their ability to gain public support. 
In a vicious circle, this lack of public support weakens collective action 
by immigrants. Some immigrant leaders have been co-opted by trade 
unions or by other organizations, others have mounted radical forms of 
protest; but overall these actions have not yet produced true activism 
by immigrants in affirmation of their rights. Some progress has been 
achieved with the L’Italia sono anch’io campaign, in which immigrant 
associations have been involved, and some individual immigrants have 
been speakers at public events. 
Since 2011 centre-right parties have lost a great deal of political sup-
port and many cities have changed their political leadership in recent 
years by electing centre-left mayors. The economic crisis of Italy has 
provoked a change of attitudes among Italian citizens: unemployment 
and economic issues have become the first priority, while fears concer-
ning immigrants have lost ground.45 According to recent figures, Italians 
seem to be questioning the idea that contemporary problems originate 
in the growth of an immigrant population and that security and public 
order are the main issues facing the country. This is not directly the 
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effect of civil society’s campaigns, but they have nevertheless antici-
pated and fostered the change of attitudes and the need for reforms. 
The time seems ripe for major changes in citizenship and immigration 
policies. However, the current government is based on a heteroge-
neous coalition and lacks a clear majority on these issues. Citizenship 
and immigration matters are overloaded with symbolic and ideological 
meanings; they are frequently used by political parties to define their 
identity and to mobilize their supporters. The Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi has promised a new law on citizenship, but the pressure of the 
economic crisis, the need for major institutional reforms, and divergen-
ces within the political majority make the priority of this commitment 
uncertain. Civil society will probably have to mobilize again to achieve 
the desired changes in Italian immigration policies.
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Figure 1. Allow none or a few immigrants from poorer countries
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Figure 4. Share of foreign born of population
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